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La economía de lo posible

Pensiones e informalidad en América Latina

拉丁美洲的非正规经济和养老金

Ángel Melguizo

con J.R. de Laiglesia, R. Da Costa,

y E. Martínez

Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE

Conferencia CASS - ILAS

Desafíos para el Desarrollo Sostenible de

América Latina y China

(2)

2

Marco conceptual

Perspectivas Económicas de América Latina 2011, LEO2011:

Políticas para favorecer la movilidad ascendente y reducir la

vulnerabilidad de los sectores de ingreso medio:

Educación

Protección social: pensiones, salud y prestaciones por

desempleo

(3)

3

Motivación

El aumento de la cobertura de los sistemas de pensiones en América

Latina sigue representando un reto

• Sólo un 30% de los trabajadores activos cotizan

• Menos de un 60% de los mayores de 65 años tienen pensión

Creciente „clase media‟ en América Latina

Como región, América Latina ha liderado la adopción de reformas

estructurales del sistema de pensiones

Reformas de segunda/tercera generación: son las pensiones sociales la

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4

Principales resultados

Los estratos de ingreso medio trabajan en su mayoría en el sector

informal de la economía (en torno al 60% en los países analizados)

Los trabajadores formales de ingreso medio están razonablemente bien

cubiertos por los sistemas de pensiones

La cobertura de los trabajadores no formales es irregular y está

correlacionada positivamente con el nivel de ingreso

Implicaciones:

Necesidad de instrumentos específicos

Lo posible: adaptados a tipo de informalidad, edad, historial de cotización,

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5

Indice

Marco conceptual, estadísticas y medición

Cobertura e informalidad

Trabajadores independientes

Conclusiones

(6)

6

Marco conceptual: pensiones

Con qué frecuencia los trabajadores formales e informales cotizan al

sistema de pensiones? Un análisis de los estratos de ingreso

medio

Informalidad: Informal vs. No formal

Contrato de trabajo vs. Cobertura de pensión

Cobertura:

Cotizantes vs. Afiliados

Público vs. privado / Obligatorio vs. voluntario

Ciclo vital vs. Cross section

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7

Fuentes estadísticas y definiciones

Muestra: Bolivia, Brasil, Chile y México

Datos de Encuestas Nacionales de Hogares:

Encuesta Continua de

Hogares de condiciones de vida (BOL, 01-02), Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra

de Domicilios (BRA, 96-06), Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica

Nacional (CHL, 94-06), y Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los

Hogares (MEX, 98-06)

Informalidad: Contrato de trabajo o carteira de trabalho (BRA)

Cobertura:

Totales, cotizantes BRA y CHL, afiliados BOL y MEX

Estratos medios: 50% - 150% del ingreso per capita mediano,

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8

Baja cobertura, también en estratos medios

Nota: Porcentaje de afiliados (Bolivia y Mexico) o cotizantes (Brasil y Chile), sobre trabajadores (14-64 años)

Cobertura previsional por nivel de ingreso

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Desfavorecidos

Estratos Medios

Acomodados

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9

Los trabajadores de estratos medios no son formales

Nota: Porcentaje del total de trabajadores de ingresos medios (0.5 – 1.5 ingreso per capita mediano ajustado)

Estratos medios por categoría laboral (%)

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

2002 BOL

2006 BRA

2006 CHL

2006 MEX

Trabajadores formales Independientes con educación terciaria Independientes no agrícolas - Informales no agrícolas

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10

La informalidad reduce la cobertura previsional

Nota: Porcentaje de afiliados (Bolivia y Mexico) o cotizantes (Brasil y Chile), sobre trabajadores de ringreso medio (14-64 años)

Cobertura previsional de los trabajadores de ingreso medio

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Formal

Informal

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11

Los trabajadores informales son heterogéneos

heterogeneous

Nota: Porcentaje de afiliados (Bolivia y Mexico) o cotizantes (Brasil y Chile), sobre trabajadores de ringreso medio (14-64 años)

Cobertura previsional de los trabajadores informales de ingreso medio

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Trabajadores por

cuenta propia (con

educación terciaria

terminada)

Empleados informales

no agrícolas

Trabajadores por

cuenta propia no

agrícolas

Trabajadores por

cuenta propia agrícolas

Empleados informales

agrícolas

BOL 2002

BRA 2006

CHL 2006

MEX 2006

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12

La cobertura es ‘regresiva’ entre los informales

Cobertura previsional de trabajadores informales por nivel de ingreso

Nota: Porcentaje de afiliados (Bolivia y Mexico) o cotizantes (Brasil y Chile), sobre trabajadores (14-64 años)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Desfavorecidos

Estratos medios

Acomodados

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13

Análisis de independientes en Brasil y Chile, al detalle

• Status laboral, ingreso y cobertura previsional

Principales resultados

• Ingreso del hogar (+), en línea con Packard et al. (2002) y Auerbach et al.

(2007)

• Ingreso del hogar(++) entre los no formales

• Afiliación obligatoria de independientes (BRA vs. CHL) incrementa la

cobertura total…

… pero no rompe el vínculo ingreso-cotizaciones

Otros resultados

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14

Recomendaciones de política: principios

Equilibrio general: Pensiones y Salud y Desempleo (+ Educación)

Ribe et al. (2010), Escrivá et al. (2010)

Financiables: Recursos públicos limitados

Transparentes:

Seguro vs. Redistribución

Economía política (comunicación, incertidumbre)

(15)

15

Recomendaciones de política: medidas (ex post, ex ante)

Pensiones mínimas: afiliados de más edad, informales agrícolas

Universalidad vs. Elegibilidad más laxa

ECLAC (2006), Levy (2008), Pages (2010), Dethier et al. (2010)

Afiliación: Independientes con educación terciaria

Obligatoriedad vs. Opt-out

Flexibilidad (cotizaciones, retiro de fondos)

Hu y Steward (2009)

Co-financiación pública: Trabajadores informales de ingreso medio con

ahorros

(Voluntary) Matching defined contributions

(16)

谢谢

www.oecd.org/dev/

(17)

La economía de lo posible

Pensiones e informalidad en América Latina

养老金和拉丁美洲的非正规性

Ángel Melguizo

con J.R. de Laiglesia, R. Da Costa,

y E. Martínez

Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE

Conferencia CASS - ILAS

Desafíos para el Desarrollo Sostenible de

América Latina y China

(18)

18

Principales referencias

AUERBACH, P., M.E. GENONI and C. PAGES (2007), “Social Security coverage and the labor market in developing countries”, IZA Discussion

Paper 2979, Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn.

BANERJEE, A. and E. DUFLO (2007), “What is middle class about the middle classes around the world?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(2), 3-28.

DETHIER, J.J., P. PERTIEAU and R. ALI (2010), “Universal Minimum Old Age Pensions: Impact on Poverty and Fiscal Costs in 18 Latin American Countries”, Policy Research Working Paper 5292, World Bank, Washington, DC.

ECLAC (2006), Shaping the future of social protection: Access, financing and solidarity, UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), Santiago de Chile.

ESCRIVA, J.L., E. FUENTES and A. GARCIA HERRERO (2010), Pensions reforms in Latin America: Balance and challenges ahead, BBVA, Madrid.

GILL, I., T. PACKARD and J. YERMO (2005), Keeping the promise of old age income security in Latin America. The World Bank and Stanford University Press, Washington DC.

HOLZMANN, R., D.A. ROBALINO and N. TAKAYAMA (2009), Closing the coverage gap. The role of social pensions and other retirement income

transfers, World Bank, Washington, DC.

HU, Y. and F. STEWART (2009),"Pension coverage and informal sector workers: International experiences", OECD Working Papers on Insurance

and Private Pensions 31, OECD.

LEVY, S. (2008), Good intentions, bad outcomes. Social policy, informality and economic growth in Mexico, after changes. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.

OECD (2010), Latin American Economic Perspectives 2011.Forthcoming. Paris.

PACKARD, T., N. SHINKAI and R. FUENTES (2002) “The reach of Social Security in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Background Paper for

Regional Study on Social Security Reform 30491, Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, World Bank,

Washington, DC.

PAGES, C. and M. STAMPINI (2007), “No Education, No Good Jobs? Evidence on the Relationship Between Education and Labor Market Segmentation”, IZA Discussion Paper 3187, Institute for the Study of Labour, Bonn.

PAGES, C. (2010), The age of productivity. Transforming economies from the bottom up, Inter-American Development Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY.

RIBE, H., D.A. ROBALINO and I. WALKER (2010), From Right to Reality: Achieving Effective Social Protection for all in Latin America and the

Caribbean, World Bank, Washington, DC.

ROFMAN, R., L. LUCCHETTI and G. OURENS (2008), “Pension systems in Latin America: Concepts and measurements of coverage”, Social Protection and Labour Discussion Paper 0616, The World Bank.

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19

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4

Disadvantaged Middle Sectors Affluent

N u m b e r o f in d iv id u al s (i n m ill io n )

Formal employees Self Employed (with tertiary education completed) Non Agricultural Self-employed Non Agricultural Informal Employees Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural informal employees

Workers by employment category and income group

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0

Disadvantaged Middle Sectors Affluent

N u m b e r o f i n d iv id u al s ( in m ill io n )

Formal employees Self Employed (with tertiary education completed)

Non Agricultural Self-employed Non Agricultural Informal Employees

Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural informal employees

Bolivia Brazil 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0

Disadvantaged Middle Sectors Affluent

N u m b e r o f in d iv id u al s (i n m ill io n )

Formal employees Self Employed (with tertiary education completed) Non Agricultural Self-employed Non Agricultural Informal Employees

Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural informal employees

Chile 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0

Disadvantaged Middle Sectors Affluent

N u m b e r o f in d iv id u al s (i n m ill io n )

Formal employees Self Employed (with tertiary education completed) Non Agricultural Self-employed Non Agricultural Informal Employees Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural informal employees

Mexico

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20

Pension coverage rate of formal workers by income level

Note: Percentage of affiliates (Bolivia and Mexico) or contributors (Brazil and Chile), over workers (14-64 years)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Disadvantaged Middle Sectors Affluent

BOL 2002 BRA 2006 CHL 2006 MEX 2006

(21)

21

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Disadvantaged

Middle Sectors

Affluent

P

e

rc

e

n

t

Bolivia 2002

Self Employed (with tertiary education completed) Non Agricultural Informal Employees

Non Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural informal employees

Pension coverage rate by informal occupational group and income level (I)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Disadvantaged Middle Sectors Affluent

P e rc e n t

Brazil 2006

Self Employed (with tertiary education completed) Non Agricultural Informal Employees

Non Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural informal employees

Note: Percentage of affiliates (Bolivia and Mexico) or contributors (Brazil and Chile), over middle-sectors workers (14-64 years)

(22)

22

Pension coverage rate by informal occupational group and income level (and II)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Disadvantaged

Middle Sectors

Affluent

P

e

rc

e

n

t

Mexico 2006

Self Employed (with tertiary education completed) Non Agricultural Informal Employees

Non Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural informal employees

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Disadvantaged

Middle Sectors

Affluent

P

e

rc

e

n

t

Chile 2006

Self Employed (with tertiary education completed) Non Agricultural Informal Employees

Non Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural Self-employed Agricultural informal employees

Note: Percentage of affiliates (Bolivia and Mexico) or contributors (Brazil and Chile), over middle-sectors workers (14-64 years)

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23

Anexo

1 2 3 4 5 logy [.083***] [0.098***] [0.083***] [0.081***] 0.216*** 0.284*** 0.242*** 0.235*** (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) Income (log)*formal [-0.010*] -0.030* (0.015) Income(log)* [0.138***] independents 0.396*** (0.012) Income(log)* [0.108***] Educated independents 0.311*** (0.029) Income(log)* [0.062***] Informal workers 0.179*** (0.016) Age [-0.004***] [0.001***] [0.002***] [0.003***] [0.003***] -0.012*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** (0.000) (0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Female [-0.050***] [-0.057***] [-0.065***] [-0.049***] [-0.047***] -0.130*** -0.162*** -0.185*** -0.141*** -0.135*** (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) Independents [-0.834***] [-0.832***] [-0.835***] [-0.996***] -2.786*** -2.770*** -2.792*** -7.945*** (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.23) Independents with [-0.680***] [-0.680***] [-0.685***] [-0.749***] Tertiary education -2.309*** -2.315*** -2.358*** -6.724*** (0.032) (0.038) (0.039) (0.437) [-0.773***] [-0.770***] [-0.770***] [-0.917***] Informal workers -2.514*** -2.493*** -2.491*** -4.999*** (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.245) Controls for

Educational attainment No No Yes Yes Yes

Sector No No No Yes Yes

Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Pseudo R² 0.029 0.543 0.546 0.548 0.552 Log likelihood -62904.2 -29600.6 -29352.5 -29216.7 -28955.8

N 96748 96748 96520 96520 96520

Notes: Probit coefficients, marginal effects (at the mean of the dependent variables) between brackets, standard errors in

parenthesis.

Asterisks indicate significant coefficients (resp.) at the 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***) level.

Chile

Brazil

1 2 3 4 5 logy [0.231***] [0.195***] [0.152***] [0.141***] 0.579*** 0.510*** 0.397*** 0.368*** (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) Income (log)*formal [-0.149***] -0.385*** (0.02) Income(log)* [0.199***] independents 0.514*** (0.01) Income(log)* [0.075***] Educated independents 0.193*** (0.024) Income(log)* [0.123***] Informal workers 0.316*** (0.013) Age [-0.005***] [0.002***] [0.004***] [0.004***] [0.004***] -0.012*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** (0.000) (0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Female [-0.043***] [-0.026***] [-0.041***] [-0.057***] [-0.052***] -0.107*** -0.067*** -0.106*** -0.149*** -0.135*** (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) Independents [-0.889***] [-0.886***] [-0.881***] [-0.999***] -3.424*** -3.376*** -3.325*** -9.093*** (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.145) Independents with [-0.634***] [-0.641***] [-0.638***] [-0.656***] Tertiary education -2.964*** -3.252*** -3.102*** -6.820*** (0.028) (0.037) (0.039) (0.24) Informal workers [-0.881***] [-0.880***] [-0.877***] [-0.991***] -3.558*** -3.537*** -3.504*** -8.026*** (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.145) Controls for

Educational attainment No No Yes Yes Yes

Sector No No No Yes Yes

Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Pseudo R² 0.117 0.673 0.679 0.687 0.694 Log likelihood -100098.78 -37039.73 -36401.08 -35475.02 -34652.8 N 163660 163660 163652 163652 163652

Notes: Probit coefficients, marginal effects (at the mean of the dependent variables) between brackets, standard errors in

parenthesis.

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24

Anexo: determinantes de las cotizaciones

Brasil (2006)

Chile (2006)

I

IV

V

I

IV

V

Ingreso (log)

[0.23***] [0.14***]

[0.08***] [0.08***]

Ingreso * formal

[-0.15***]

[-0.01* ]

Ingreso * independiente

[0.19***]

[0.14***]

Ingreso * independiente (educ.)

[0.07***]

[0.11***]

Ingreso * informal asalariado

[0.12***]

[0.06***]

Independiente

[-0.88***] [-0.99***]

[-0.84***] [-0.99***]

Independiente (educ.)

[-0.64***] [-0.69***]

[-0.69***] [-0.75***]

Informal asalariado

[-0.88***] [-0.99***]

[-0.77***] [-0.92***]

Controles:

Educación

No

No

Sector

No

No

Composición del hogar

Pseudo R²

0.12

0.69

0.69

0.03

0.55

0.55

N

163660

163652

163652

96748

96520

96520

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25

Anexo: qué tal lo hacen las pensiones sociales?

0

20

40

60

80

100

Disadvantaged

Middle Sectors

Affluent

Disadvantaged

Middle Sectors

Affluent

Disadvantaged

Middle Sectors

Affluent

Disadvantaged

Middle Sectors

Affluent

Mex

ic

o

C

h

ile

B

razil

B

ol

iv

ia

Contributory

Non Contributory

Contributory & Non Contributory

Note: Data for 2006 except Bolivia 2004. No data are available for non-contributory pensions in Brazil and Mexico.

Referencias

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