The next section briefly discusses the main goals of the new auction in Spain and its main results. This resolution includes the date of the auction, the auctioned volume and the minimum reserves (quotas), the reserve price, the date when the installation must produce electricity, the date when the installation would no longer be supported (REER exemption) and the maximum delivery period . There were 8 awarded bidders and the three largest awarded bidders accounted for 76% of the awarded capacity, with the largest bidder having a participation of 62.3.
For each element, a synthesis is given of the assessment of the choice of design elements in the Spanish auction. A timetable for REER has been established in the period 2020-2025, which includes indicative deadlines, the frequency of the rounds, the expected capacity and the technologies envisaged. Lead times refer to the period between publication of the auction and submission of bids.
However, the deadline for submitting bids should not be extended too much, as this delays the outcome of the auction (Fundación Renovables, 2020).
Geographical diversity
Actor and size diversity
We also consider it appropriate that demonstration projects are exempted from the auction scheme (Article 3 of the RD, because the suitability of auctions for them has not been proven. Compared to auctions that promote the diversity of actors (for example, by providing additional payment for smaller actors or organizing contingents for them), actor-neutral auctions would lead to lower production costs and support costs, but perhaps also to a higher probability that projects will be built (if the big players are more professional companies with many years of experience in building renewable energy sources Large number of actors ensures that a certain actor will not have a dominant position and the resulting prices will be more attractive (Fundación Renovables, 2020)8.
8.13, "the details of RE communities can be taken into account in the definition of the criteria and the functioning of the auction so that they can compete on equal terms with other participants in the market". In its article 3.2, the RD 960/2020 states that the ministerial order will be able to exempt small-sized installations (<5 MW) and demonstration projects from the auction. In this case, the result of the auction can be used as a reference for their compensation.
However, as in previous auctions, different sizes and actors have not been promoted in this auction. In the new auction, there was neither maximum size limitation nor promotion of RE communities. However, this is understandable, as this was the first auction with the new scheme and the government probably wanted to know how it worked without being "contaminated" with additional aspects that would not allow identifying the effects of the basic design on its results.
8 For example, CEER (2020, p. 22) argues that one of the reasons for the lower level of competition in recent German rooftop PV tenders was that, due to high competition at the outset, smaller installations could had seen themselves as not competitive enough and did not participate further. We believe that in the future specific auctions should be implemented for RE communities and small projects to have a more diverse sector. In the case of small projects, a FIT with the remuneration determined indirectly in the auction may be a better alternative, given the usual difficulties of small actors to participate in the auction (see Jacobs et al., 2020).
Prequalifications
The combination of economic guarantees and material pre-qualifications (identification of the installation and building permit) is in accordance with the practice in many countries, although it is less strict than in those countries that require a network connection point.
Seller concentration rules (SCRs)
Remuneration type
They maintain a line of continuity with the previous auctions, which proved to be sufficient to promote diffusion11. It is not necessary to wait decades to know the total amount of aid provided (as with generational aid). The remuneration in the new Spanish auction is provided for production (€/MWh), in contrast to the previous auction, which was capacity-based (€/MW).
However, some authors argue that capacity (investment) rather than production (operational support) should be supported. For example, von Blücher et al. 2020, p. 18) argue that 'operating support generally encourages plant production, as the support is paid per kWh. In cases where support payments represent a larger part of the project's revenues, this increases efficiency in terms of achieving goals (generation) compared to investment support and thus also the cost effectiveness of the support.
However, as support shares in total income steadily decrease in the European Union, this argument becomes less important. This is especially true for variable RES which tend to maximize production at all times, as they have close to zero operating costs. A general disadvantage of operating support is that it has a distorting effect on the dispatch of RES installations and therefore creates harmful effects on market integration.
Remuneration form
Under current EU regulations, support must be provided in the form of a FIP (see Article 4.3 of Directive 2001/2018). Where PR is the price received by the installation, AP the price awarded at the auction, MP the day-ahead market price and AF the correction factor. If PR is above MP, the market has a payment obligation for the installation.
If the product in the auction is a capacity, then this energy is defined within the range given by the maximum and minimum energy of the auction, and such energy is paid for 12 years, after which it can be sold in the market. 12 Devices must sell the minimum auction energy during the longest supply period (Article 16 RD 960). The end of "auction energy" (and thus the end of REER) for an individual device occurs when the maximum auction energy is reached or when the longest lead time is reached.
When the minimum auction energy is reached, the installation can leave the REER and sell the electricity on the market (even before 12 years) and would only receive the market reward (Article 17 RZ 960/2020). If the minimum energy is not reached, it can leave the REER and sell the electricity on the market, but there is a penalty for doing so (see Article 20 in RD 960/2020). After exiting the retributive mechanism, the rest of the energy that is generated by each installation during its useful life can be sold on the market and at market prices.
The objective of AF is to stimulate the production of electricity during the most expensive hours of the day in order to reduce the price of electricity during these hours. On the contrary, the higher the market price, the greater the incentive to sell electricity on the market, as the payment obligation for the market is greater. In contrast to previous auctions, this one allows the customer a lower price of electricity due to the penetration of renewable energy into the market.
Selection criteria
Auction format
Auction type
Pricing rules
Ceiling prices
Although some countries have decided not to disclose these maximum prices before the auction (to avoid the aforementioned "anchoring effect"), most countries do, as they may believe that this increases transparency, investor confidence and their participation (del Río, 2017a ).
Minimum prices
Realisation periods
Although some countries have decided not to disclose those maximum prices before the auction (to avoid the above. 2020a, p. 20), 18 months are needed to build a PV project and 24 months are needed to build a to build a wind farm, although it may take longer due to administrative procedures. According to del Río and Kiefer (2021), the average realization periods in the wind auctions worldwide were 3.7 years, and 2 years for PV.
Penalties
CONCLUSION
Peteîha, diseño remate pyahu oimplica peteî ruptura radical esquema de remate oîva'ekue ndive, péva base rehe oñembosako'i remate 2016 ha 2017. Mokõiha, umi elemento diseño umi remate pyahúpe oime generalmente en línea práctica internacional ha oî porã ojehupyty haguã umi objetivo oñemoîva NECP-pe. Sector eólico omomba'e resultado remate péva asignación esquema económico energía renovable ha'éva peteî avance ombohapéva área de mejora.
Disponible en: https://www.aeeolica.org/comunicacion/la-actualidad-eolica/4460-el-sector-eolico-valora-los-resultados-de-la-subasta-para-el-concession-del-regimen -la-economía-de-las-energías-renovables-como-un-progreso-que-permite-áreas-de-mejora. Subastas para apoyar las fuentes de energía renovables en Grecia, en el informe del proyecto AURES II, financiado por la UE. Informe sobre la propuesta de real decreto sobre el concurso para la adjudicación de un régimen especial de pago para nuevas instalaciones de producción de electricidad a partir de biomasa en el sistema eléctrico peninsular y para instalaciones de tecnología eólica, y sobre la propuesta de orden reguladora el procedimiento para determinar un determinado régimen de recompensa en esta licitación y confirmar sus parámetros de adjudicación.
Acuerdo por el que se emite un informe sobre el proyecto de real decreto por el que se regula el régimen financiero de energías renovables para las instalaciones de generación de energía eléctrica. Acuerdo por el que se emite informe sobre la propuesta de orden ejecutiva que regula el primer mecanismo de subasta para la asignación del régimen económico de energías renovables y establece el calendario indicativo para el periodo 2020-2025. Los argumentos a favor de una combinación más amplia de políticas energéticas en consonancia con los objetivos del Acuerdo de París.
Presentación de Hugo Lucas, Secretario Jefe de Estado de Energía del Gabinete para el V Taller Regional del proyecto AURES II, financiado por la UE. Informe sobre el análisis de impacto regulatorio del Real Decreto por el que se regula el régimen económico de las energías renovables para las instalaciones de producción eléctrica. Informe sobre el análisis del impacto regulatorio de la propuesta de orden que regula el primer mecanismo de subasta para la adjudicación del régimen económico de energías renovables y fija el calendario orientativo del período.
Se puede obtener en: https://www.aeqenergia.com/index.php/blog/las-nuevas-trabajos-de-generacion-renovable-en-espana.