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Ownership structure and risk at Colombian banks

Ownership structure and risk at Colombian banks

The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk.

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Essays on Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance

Essays on Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance

CEO dominated boards are likely to exist when the CEO and the chairman of the board are the same person, i.e., single leadership. The single leadership structure breaks the balance of powers between the top management and the board of directors, potentially restricting the board's effectiveness in controlling managerial initiatives and actions (Boyd et al., 2005). Furthermore, single leadership increases information asymmetry between the CEO and the board, which may become a primary source of agency problems (Eisenhardt 1989). Adams and Ferreira (2007) state that the CEO faces a trade-off in disclosing information to the board because with better information comes better advice, but a better informed board may also monitor the CEO more intensively. If the role of the board is control, the CEO may be reluctant to share information. CEOs who also operate as chairmen can more easily tailor content and information to the boardroom. As a result, single leadership can influence on the board decision-making processes. Therefore, combining the positions of CEO and board chairperson weakens boards' effectiveness in controlling and monitoring functions (Aguilera 2005). However, the CEO may enhance the information flow towards the board members when the board’s role is to assist management strategically rather than control its actions. Better communication and increased levels of disclosure could increase the understanding between management and board members (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; van Ees et al., 2009) and improve board effectiveness. Given that the control role will be more pronounced in firms with dispersed ownership, and the direction role more important in firms with concentrated ownership, the effectiveness of dual leadership is likely to depend on the ownership structure:

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Evidence on the role of ownership structure on firms’ innovative performance

Evidence on the role of ownership structure on firms’ innovative performance

In the last columns of Table 3 the NegBin model estimations are shown; this mo- del generalizes the Poisson by allowing for an additional source of variance above that due to pure sampling error. Therefore, we have observed some differences in the sign and significance of the variables explaining the outcome of the innovation pro- cess on the type of model under estimation, either a Poisson or a NegBin. Econome- trically, since our data show a clear overdispersion of zeros in the case of patents (the coefficient of overdispersion of the NegBin model is statistically significant), the se- cond estimation model is pointed out as the most accurate, and therefore their results are the ones we prefer. The basic result of the NegBin models is that the patenting ac- tivity is explained by the effect of the R&D effort and the size like other papers ex- plained. But the most interesting fact is that there are some variables that remain sig- nificant in the patentability activity of Spanish manufacturing firms. All in all, we obtain that the knowledge accumulation through R&D investments is the most im- portant effect for the patenting activity in Spanish manufactures (with a higher elasti- city than in the Poisson model), as well as the size of the firms, since the bigger the firm the more it patents. Additionally, once the overdispersion of the data is taken into account, the firms’ ownership still matters with diffusely-held firms patenting more than closely-held firms. This negative effect of ownership concentration is even increased in the case of foreign owned firms, which patent even less. Concerning the introduction of owners in the board of directors the same negative effect that the one obtained with the Poisson estimation is obtained, although now this effect is indepen- dent of the ownership structure.

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Who should set Managerial Compensation?

Who should set Managerial Compensation?

There has been a long and popular tradition of assailing top mana- gement pay as “excessive” as well as claiming that it provides improper incentives. In the aftermath of the financial crisis it has been argued that flawed compensation arrangements have been an important cause of excessive risk taking and that these flaws stem from defects in the underlying governance structures that allow executives to wield consi- derable influence over boards. Undoubtedly, executive compensation and incentives will continue to be a hotly debated issue for years to come. The aim of this paper is to explain the key corporate governance mechanisms that influence executive compensation, such as the board of directors and the ownership structure and to provide a framework to understand the current debate on excessive managerial compensation and the value of giving shareholders decision power.

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Estrategia de gestión y divulgación del capital intelectual: influencia del gobierno corporativo

Estrategia de gestión y divulgación del capital intelectual: influencia del gobierno corporativo

To this end, and using the “content analysis” methodology, disclosure indices have been created, building four statistical models using the linear regression technique. These models allow determining the influence that the variables representative of the ownership structure and of the characteristics of the board of directors of the company exercise on the disclosure of information regarding IC, generally and particularly, of the HC, RC and SC. Furthermore, certain control variables such as size, indebtedness, and sector have been considered. For this purpose, and considering the entry into force of law 26/2003 of July 17th on information transparency, the annual reports of a sample of 23 listed companies included in the IBEX 35 stock index, for the years of 2004 to 2008, were selected; a total of 115 annual reports were analyzed. The 2009 to 2015 period was not included, left to future works, following the approval of law 16/2007 of July 4th on the reform and adaptation of commercial accounting legislation for its international harmonization based on EU standards, as well as coinciding, following its entry into force, with a series of mergers of companies listed in the IBEX 35 throughout the years 2009 and 2010, which would have distorted the historical series of the selected companies.

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Does board diversity affect institutional investor preferences? Evidence from Latin America

Does board diversity affect institutional investor preferences? Evidence from Latin America

During the last 20 years, the number of institutional investors has grown substantially in developed economies such as Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom and they now control more than half of the corporate property in these countries (Aggarwal et al., 2010). According to Ferreira and Matos (2008), the increasing importance of institutional investors is a key factor in the global capital market, suggesting that the presence of these investors is vital financial markets development. In Latin America, institutional investors have a real opportunity to influence the development of the region’s capital markets, since they currently manage considerable financial assets (Blume and Alonso, 2007). Many studies on institutional investors have analyzed the relationship between performance, firm valuation and ownership structure (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Woidtke, 2002; Navissi and Naiker, 2006, Ferreira and Matos, 2008; De-La-Hoz and Pombo, 2016) concluding that firms with institutional blockholders are associated with higher firm performance and value yield stocks. These studies derive their results based on market performance while firm internal corporate governance mechanisms, those related with the board of directors, are not considered to understand the presence and extent of institutional investors.

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School starters’ early structure sense

School starters’ early structure sense

spective on and way of structuring patterns. They have difficulties to relate sub- structures. Number presentations are more often seen with a daily framework than from a mathematical perspective. While perceiving structure external char- acteristics, spatial dimension und figural aspects are most important. On the con- trary, high achieving children have an insight into the convenience of structure for determining, comparing and operating with small quantities. They are able to flexibly structure a pattern and shift their focus on different aspects of pattern and structure. They relate established sub-structures in more than one way. Num- ber representations are also seen with a mathematical framework. They under- stand that some configurations support numerical procedures. External aspects are less important, the focus lies on the decomposing and the established sub- structures. Figural aspects and arithmetical knowledge, mathematical abilities and structuring competences are integrated with high achieving children and are used naturally while solving problems.

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Is Workers' Effort Sensitive to Contract Type and Firm Ownership? The Spanish Case

Is Workers' Effort Sensitive to Contract Type and Firm Ownership? The Spanish Case

As far as the iso-profit curves are concerned, their shape may be conditioned by technical features such as firm size. It is also important to note how easy it is for firms to fire workers, that is, the legal framework for adjustment costs. In particular, firms’ capacity to stimulate workers’ effort by means of higher wages will become more powerful if workers know they can be fired easily when avoiding their duties and obligations (see again Fairris and Alston 1994, p. 151). The likelihood of being dismissed can be proxied by contract type (permanent or fixed-term) and firm ownership (public or private). Whatever the ownership might be, it is assumed that it is always easier to fire a temporary worker than a permanent one, as the adjustment costs are lower for the former. On the other hand, regardless which contract type is, public sector tends to provide workers with more labour stability (and in the case of Spanish civil servants, we may estate that the chances of being fired are almost none).

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Business Ownership and Self-Employment in Developing Economies: The Colombian Case

Business Ownership and Self-Employment in Developing Economies: The Colombian Case

Entry flows to business ownership (on an annual basis) from other states/occupations are in general low and not sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. While 0.3% of wage earners and those self-employed who become BOs each year, only 1% of the unemployed start a business within a year. However, taking into account the size of each of these groups within the labor force, 4% to 5% of observed business owners were wage earners who started their business in less than one year (1% to 2% being either SE or UN). On the hand, while 83% of those exiting business ownership become unemployed during the high growth and recession periods (58% in the recovery period), around 13% return to paid work (28% in the recovery period). In all three periods, the flow from business ownership to self-employment tends to be very small. In regards to self-employment, entry flows are both higher and more sensitive to macroeconomic performance than those observed for business ownership. In this case, while only 0.5% to 1.1% of business owners transit to self-employment, that fraction ranges from 1.6% to 2.4% for wage earners and from 7% to 9% for the unemployed. Furthermore, 5.5%- 6.0% of the observed self-employed each year were wage earners one year before, while 2%-4% transited from unemployment. In addition, the fractions of those exiting self-employment to paid work and unemployment are is 51% and 44% for the high growth period. During the recession period these fractions become 33% and 64%; moving back to 44% and 53% in the last period.

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Range structure analysis: Unveiling the internal structure of species' ranges

Range structure analysis: Unveiling the internal structure of species' ranges

RSA allows to identify specific locations, within the geo- graphic range of a species, where a given parameter is most important in driving spatial variation in occupancy dynamics (Fig. 2). In this particular example, extinc- tion and colonization are the most important parameters driving PIJA persistence throughout its range and dom- inate in a similar proportion of sites (49.4 and 49.8 % respectively), while habitat suitability dominates in only 0.8 % of the sites and is restricted to well-defined areas within the range where abundance is high. Our results point out that the way colonization and extinction vary in importance across the geographic range of a species is much more complex and richer in spatial structure than previously thought (Fig. 2). Even though our analy- ses shows that extinctions dominate over colonization on range margins for PIJA (Fig. 2b), as expected (e.g., Holt and Keitt 2000), it does so in many other areas of the

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STRUCTURE-BORNE SOUND POWER TRANSMISSION THROUGH A POINT CONNECTION TO A FRAME STRUCTURE

STRUCTURE-BORNE SOUND POWER TRANSMISSION THROUGH A POINT CONNECTION TO A FRAME STRUCTURE

Characterization of machines as sources of structure-borne sound is the major problem when estimating the structure-borne sound emission [1]. Characterization is needed when designers, product developers, vendors or purchasers need quantitative data about the vibration or sound levels of machines. This data is used when one source is compared to another, sources with set limits are compared, sound levels of installed machines are predicted or improvement of new low noise designs are quantified [2]. The source characterization must be a property of the source, independent of the receiving structure of the installed machine. It must describe the source's ability to generate structure-borne sound, be an independent property of the source, be able to be expressed as a single quantity, and give the data for the calculation of power generated when the machine is installed [2].

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Phase structure of soliton molecules

Phase structure of soliton molecules

that I 共⍀ , ␶ 兲 does not suffer from nontrivial ambiguities. Ide- ally, this would be achieved by a well-separated double pulse structure with an asymmetry in duration, peak power, and chirp of the individual pulses 关12兴. A sufficient asymmetry is required, but detailed knowledge of the structure is definitely not. For example, a suitable gate pulse could easily be gen- erated by splitting a laser pulse into a pair by means of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with a dispersive element in one of its arms. This way the VAMPIRE spectrogram would contain two spectrally dispersed signals from the cross- correlations of the probe pulse with the two different com- ponents of the gate pulse so that the required noncentrosym- metric spectrogram is obtained 关12兴. In comparison to other pulse retrieval techniques, the asymmetry thus provided in the cross-correlation contains just that extra amount of infor- mation which guarantees a unique relation between the cross-correlated pulses and the spectrogram.

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Pemex and the Challenge of Energy Modernization: An Analysis of Strategies for Reforming the Oil Industry in Mexico-Edición Única

Pemex and the Challenge of Energy Modernization: An Analysis of Strategies for Reforming the Oil Industry in Mexico-Edición Única

This section addressed the economic rationale for Pemex’s oil-exploitation system by explaining two central ideas. First, international oil-pricing mechanisms are not only driven by geological and/or technical factors, but also by political and economic aspects that private and public oil-asset owners internalize and translate into powerful market decisions, with variable impact on Mexico’s oil-producing criteria. If the international oil market conditions are predominantly unstable and unpredictable, it is because at least in the short term, price fluctuations are independent from supplying controls and vice versa. One of the main reasons of this phenomenon is that oil markets are not competitive, since private and public oil suppliers are normally capable of influencing price standars through output controls endorsed by economic and legal barriers to entry. Second, oil allows for a large economic rent so that private and public suppliers find powerful incentives to shield the oil market. Spare revenues derived from the oil economic rent can be rendered as capital potentialities that permit major companies to maintain the status quo through vertical-integration schemes. For oil-managing governments such as the Mexican example, the oil economic rent is also crucial for the consolidation of public finances through the state owneship of hydrocarbons. However, the tenet of state-ownership can be compromised by the negative effects of petrolization.

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– HumanCapital, Bankruptcy and Capital Structure

– HumanCapital, Bankruptcy and Capital Structure

Our focus on the human cost of bankruptcy is closely related to the literature that examines capital structure decisions in the presence of management en- trenchment. Novaes and Zingales (1995), Zwiebel (1996), Subramanian (2002), and Morellec (2004) provide formal models of a manager’s capital structure choice when ownership is separated from control and managers are entrenched for exogenous reasons. In these papers, entrenched managers determine the firm’s capital structure, recognizing that they can be fired (and thus suffer a utility loss) if the firm goes bankrupt (or is taken over). Because employees are entrenched, capital structure decisions reflect this desire to avoid being replaced. These papers do not explicitly consider the effects of a competitive labor market and so do not provide an endogenous reason for entrenchment. In contrast, we derive managerial entrenchment endogenously as an optimal response to labor market competition. The capital structure implications of this optimal response are the opposite of those in the existing entrenchment literature. In particular, debt is costly in our model, whereas it is beneficial in the models cited earlier because there it mitigates the inefficiencies that result from entrenchment. There is no inefficiency associated with entrenchment in our model; our only friction is the inability of employees to insure their human capital, which is not a focus of the prior literature on entrenchment and capital structure. In our model, entrenchment is the efficient response to this friction rather than an exogenously imposed inefficiency.

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Energy intensity and investment ownership across Chinese provinces

Energy intensity and investment ownership across Chinese provinces

The main objective of this paper is to investigate whether openness and investment ownership are key factors in explaining the diffusion of energy-saving technologies in China. Compared with previous studies, the novel aspect of this work is the use of a rich dataset at provincial level, which allows the high level of regional heterogeneity to be taken into consideration. The unbalanced regional growth has been translated into differences in the need for energy resources across the vast territory of China. A detailed analysis of these issues may provide new insights into the energy situation in this country. The analysis is also disaggregated by type of energy: coal, electricity and petroleum. We estimate the models by panel-corrected standard errors, developed by Beck and Katz (1995), over the period 1985-2008. Results obtained confirm the hypothesis that both foreign and non-state investments play a leading role in the decline of energy intensity across Chinese regions, whereas there is no evidence of a positive contribution of state investment. The findings also reveal differences in energy intensity across regions, thus confirming the importance of accounting for the regional dimension when analyzing energy consumption in China.

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The effect of family ownership and generation on financial literacy

The effect of family ownership and generation on financial literacy

This paper presents the following contributions. The previous investigation of financial knowledge in the family business has been limited at comparing the variations between family and non-family businesses. Our research tries to understand the heterogeneity in the family business (Chua et al., 2012) regarding financial knowledge, analysing as potential causes of heterogeneity, both the level of family control through the percentage of ownership and the generational stage in which the family business is located. In addition, most articles study financial knowledge in samples of listed companies, due to the lower complexity of extracting information. However, our study focuses on small and medium companies (SMEs), because very little is known about the current state of financial knowledge in SMEs (Sulaiman, 2016). The rest of the article is organized following these steps. First, we present the literature that links financial literacy and family business, as well as hypotheses. After this, the research methodology is included with the results, to finally conclude the discussion and conclusions.

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Ownership and Control in Colombian Corporations

Ownership and Control in Colombian Corporations

The Sindicato Antioqueño refers to a business group formed by firms in several industries as well as financial companies. Its core businesses are cement, processed food, roasted coffee, iron, tobacco, construction, textiles, investment funds, trust funds, investment banks (corporaciones financieras) and insurance firms. The number of companies affiliated to the group is around 100 between listed and non-listed firms. Its structure is the result of several alliances and web of firms that make it a pure cross share holding. Its name comes from the province in which its key companies are based, around the city of Medellin, which has the second largest industrial dis- trict in Colombia and the largest textile and apparel industries within the Andean countries. Some of the companies have more that 80 years of being founded. For instance, Industrias Alimenticias Noel was founded in 1916, Nacional de Chocolates and Fabricato S.A, the largest tex- tile mill in the country, were both founded in 1920, and Compañía de Cementos Argos began commercial operations in 1935. Today the heart of the conglomerate is within the cement industry and is centered around Cementos Argos, which became a holding company in 2000 when it stopped operations as a cement mill. Argos has direct investments across the largest cement companies in the country and integrates all the productive chain: stone quarrying, clay, and sand mining, manufacture of cement, cement mixing, reinforced concrete, and distribution. Argos’s group has one-half of market share and exports around 2.5 million tons per year.

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Does active management add value? New evidence from a quantile regression approach

Does active management add value? New evidence from a quantile regression approach

We also provide results for the variables related to ownership. Managerial ownership (M C ), which can be either positive (M C = 1) or zero (M C = 0), has a generally negative impact (positive coefficient), whose magnitude is large and significant throughout—regardless of the quantile τ or trimming parameter (m) considered (see Tables 6 and 7). Results are robust when extending the analysis to order-α (Table 8). We only find some differences when focusing on the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, which are generally larger for order-m. However, the trend of higher magnitude coefficients for the lowest quantiles is shared both for order-m (Tables 6 and 7) and order-α (Table 8). This result is not entirely in line with the empirical evidence to date. Taking into account the literature revised on page 12, only a few authors such as Kumlin and Puttonen (2009) find this negative association between managerial ownership and performance. However, none of the reviewed contributions considers regression quantiles and, therefore, cannot find that the effect is particularly strong for the best performing funds (higher coefficients). These relatively conflicting views imply that more research is needed, using different methods—if possible.

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Ownership as a determining factor in the evolution of efficiency

Ownership as a determining factor in the evolution of efficiency

In order to determine the extent to which the productive efficiency is responsible for this differential behaviour, we can turn to the decomposition of the Malmquist index (table 1), and to the successive analyses of difference of means carried out for each of the components, taking as a factor the consideration that the company has been privatised during the nineties (1990-1998) or has maintained its private ownership throughout the decade. However, in this context, we must take into consideration that, regarding what we have called “technological change”, it has no sense to compare the evolution in the private and in the public context, as it actually refers to the technological boost occurred in the reference efficient companies or leading companies, which can be public or private, regardless of the ownership of the company in question. Nevertheless, if we stop to determine which are the efficient companies and their ownership (obtained in the comparative efficiency analysis in public, private and privatised companies from a static perspective by means of the non-parametric analysis DEA), we can observe that all are private entities. In other words, the guidelines related to technical change are characterised by private companies, which indicate that public companies are clearly a step behind when compared with them. We shall have the opportunity to stress this point later on.

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El modelo Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) y la adquisición de un paquete informático propietario

El modelo Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) y la adquisición de un paquete informático propietario

Resumen: Este trabajo se focaliza en el estudio y análisis del modelo Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) para obtener como resultado su configuración para la ad- quisición de un paquete informático propietario. Se describe el modelo TCO y se presenta el estado del arte con los diferentes tipos de estudios existentes y aplicaciones prácticas de referencia. Una vez conocida la situación actual de las investigaciones, se crea una base de características relevantes del modelo, para a partir de ellas obtener los factores a tener en cuenta en la adquisición de un pa- quete informático propietario considerando las características específicas de este tipo de producto. A continuación se aplica el modelo a un caso concreto de ad- quisición de un paquete de gestión de medios de pago.

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