a binary logit model. Finally, Vicard (2006) relates economicandpoliticalintegration, and proves that the determinants of regional integration differ according to the type of regional integration agreement. The heterogeneity in the nature of RIAs is introduced by taking into account two integration levels: shallow RIAs (PTAs and FTAs) and deep RIAs (CUs and CMs). The author runs three different regressions, one for all RIAs, one for shallow RIAs and one for deep RIAs. Then, a binary probit model is estimated. Unlike these authors, we take on a more difficult question: Why deeper integration? The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 stylised facts in relation to the reasons why countries decide to engage in deeper economicintegration are discussed. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and the econometric model. Section 4 describes the data, the variables and the hypothesis to be tested. Section 5 discusses the estimation results. The model in Section 6 is estimated for an additional sample, including data for the EU-27 from 1999 to 2007, thus enabling dynamic issues to be also analysed. Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions.
The central ideas argued in this paper are that integration in the Eurozone has been rather injuring, indeed almost catastrophic to Portuguese economy and society; and that there is a high probability that it will continue to be so. The reasons for such state of affairs are manifold, having been argued by a number of authors, among whom a mention is due at least to Lapavitsas et al. (2010a, 2010b, 2011), Krugman (2012a, 2012b), Weisbrot and Montecino (2012), Jacques Sapir (2013, 2014), Streeck (2014, 2016) and Stiglitz (2016), besides various Portuguese commentators, namely João Ferreira do Amaral (2013, 2014), Octávio Teixeira, Jorge Bateira, João Rodrigues and Nuno Teles. The perception of facts constitutes, however, a totally different subject-matter. In Portugal, as besides in most southern European countries, a vast, overwhelming politicaland cultural consensus favorable to the Euro persists, including the so-called 'arch of governance', i.e. the two alternating dominant parties (PS and PSD), plus center-right CDS-PP, adding also the Europeanist Left: mostly Left Block but also a number of smaller groups.
From the point of view of institutional decision-making the protagonists have been the European Council, the Council, particularly the Eurogroup for- mation, and of course the European Central Bank. Leadership, if understood as general guidance for EU’s political choices, emerges from the European Council, while the European Commission and the European Parliament have kept a lower political profile. Hence, a problem in the horizontal linkage of EU institutions may be emerging. Although consentaneous with the statutory pro- file of the institutions, the outcome of the process appears to be a reinforce- ment of the intergovernmental dimension of EU negotiation. However, there is a paradox, given the asymmetrical nature of that negotiation, apparently the result of imbalances in the pragmatic economic interests of member states. Be- sides, in the case of states receiving EU’s emergency financial aid, a major vertical problem also sprouts from the reinforcement of top-down processes of decision under conditionality agreements that undermine their national auton- omy 60 . The intergovernmental framework does not fully explain the process.
The dynamics of regional integration (and of open or disguised protectionism) have been so impressive that Mussa (1993) suggested a three-fold strategy as a practical device in pursuing free trade. First, free traders should recognize that rents matter, that is that in political processes what is at stake are the " . . . additional amounts that factors employed in a protected activity are likely to earn in comparison with their next-best alternative" (p. 375); in Mussa's opinion, what free traders can productively do is to cali decisión makers' attention to losses faced by consumers as the "cost of granting protection". Second, it is necessary to "avoid hysterical multilateralism" and to recognize that multilateralism per se does not assure free trade; bilateral and regional trade agreements have helped effectively to open world's trading system in spite of some negative effects on third countries through trade diversion effects (either accidental or intended). Third, it is convenient to accept the importance that a mercantilistic approach to trade negotiations has in reaching lower barriers to trade and that pure free trade is not always (and perhaps never) the best policy for all nations in all circumstances; in other words, economists "... should be more humble in recognizing the def iciencies of economics in teaching the strategy and tactics through which a relatively open system of world trade may be established and sustained." (p. 376)
And this will be so, until the political union is complete and the European Union is no longer a fragile and vulnerable building under construction, exposed to any external aggression. The Union was created to obtain the resistance of the strong. The road to final political union will be difficult whatever the nature may be of the crisis that we suffer, because the weakness comes from that assaults falling on an unfinished integration process, halfway between the nation states that comprise it and the discipline and shielding that they aspire to through unity. Going forward with small steps has the advantage of prudence and the disadvantage of vulnerability, until the processes of unity are completed. Europe is not failing. It is being constructed in a stormy environment. But the process needs more than ever, in order to survive and consolidate, political will and leadership. Without them, the technical solutions appear to be inadequate. From the University Institute for European Studies (Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos) we continue to believe that we need more Europe. For us, Europe is the solution and not the problem, the best alternative in order for Europeans to play a significant role on the global stage, projecting our principles and values and defending our interests. However, for this approach to be effective and not merely a declaration of principles, we must turn good intentions into action. Therefore, we want to make our contribution to a debate that is fundamental to the future of both Europe and our country.
Students learn the most sophisticated skills and techniques of modern campaign management. The subject focuses on campaign advertising and promotion, communications and strategy, mass media and politics and campaign organization. Nowadays political parties have assumed important responsibilities within the political power and the society. The political parties hold the leadership of political life and are the channel for expression the popular will, through the elections. These commitments demand that the political leaders must know all techniques related with social groups and citizens as well as advanced tools of communication. The skills acquired will help the student to know the intricacies of a campaign to be part of a team of campaign advisers at the political level, but also as a private consultant.
In contrast, Pessoa (2008), for a sample of 119 countries in the period 1980-2004, finds a negative relation between institutional quality and resource abundance for all countries. The author uses a panel data approach but does not control for endogeneity between his proxy for institutions andeconomic growth. Several authors have pointed out that institutions are endogenous (North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1990; and Acemouglu et al., 2001), but the author of this study argues that assuming that they are endogenous limits the range of any policy recommendation (Pessoa, 2008, p. 11). His (ibid., p. 11) proxy for institutions is an economic freedom index constructed by Gwartney and Lawson (2003). Finally, his findings contradict the hypothesis that nations with poor institutions suffer from this ―curse‖ while those with consolidated institutions do not. This seems to imply that all countries are at risk when it comes to natural resource abundance. Thus, any country is susceptible to corruption from rent-seeking behavior in that sector.
that is, a silent, low-profile stance to avoid disturbing their neighboring U. S., a conciliation policy. This policy has caused strong criticism, since after Donald Trump was elected president of the United States, who made the campaign promise to build a border wall under the slogan “build the wall”. He had the promise to increase removals of irregular immigrants with a special emphasis on Mexican immigrants. About this point, has only spoken of a political crisis between the two nations, but not of a political action or a social program that addresses the phenomenon. Although du- ring Peña Nieto’s six-year term, were created are the programs “Somos Mexicanos”,”Construye en Tu Tierra” and “Puertas Abiertas”. The Mexi- can government not has a clear position on the immigration issues, but Trump, yes, applying immigration laws rigorously and increasing depor- tations.
One of the most important schools of thought about neoliberalism is structuralism. Works on the structural causes of policy reforms emphasize the constraints that international economic markets and international financial organizations impose on countries’ policy choices and how reforming politicians have little control over policy or, alternatively, avoid taking responsibility for difficult decisions (Stallings 1992; 1995; Robinson 2004; Whitehead 2002). Often, though not always, rooted in the dependency perspective, this literature generally expects the domestic costs of market reforms to be very high and therefore to generate opposition, although, as Weyland (2004) points out, it also tends to take the view that domestic protest against neoliberalism faces high obstacles, if it is not entirely futile (Walton and Ragin 1990). This literature is especially guilty of not mentioning consumers, whether as a group potentially hurt or helped by economic reforms. Recent consumer reactions against aspects of the privatization of utilities such as telecommunications, water, and gas in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil indicate that consumers do indeed sometimes form part of the struggle against
Lobbying is modeled following the political contributions approach. Domestic firms offer political contributions to the government, that are tied to the government’s policy choices. Then, the government sets the policy to maximise a weighted sum of total contributions and aggregate social welfare. Lobbying in our model has the structure of the common agency problem explored by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), which is later used by Grossman and Helpman (1994a) to characterize the political equilibrium under trade protection and finally generalized by Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) for wider economic applications. A clear example that fit with our model is given by the alleged political contribution offered by a domestic supermarket chain in favor of a political candidate running for the presidency in Mexico.
This article intends to present the researches that has contemplated the relationship between literature andpolitical violence, and literature, political violence and education. Methodologically, it begins with the work’s search in libraries, databases and university repositories, continues with its reading and signing and ends with its categorization. As a result of the process, in the first part are presented the general features of the works that address the relationship between literature andpolitical violence which are presented through a series of groupings according to the corpus construction, the literature participation in memory arrangement, literary violence representation or aesthetic and narrative resources through which representation is achieved. The second part shows how literary works that dialogue with political violence are related to education or work in the classroom. The article offers a mainly Latin American perspective, derived from a revision in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish languages.
expectancy and reduced infant mortality, have spread to nearly all parts of the world, though huge and tragic discrepancies remain in even these areas. In material well being, however, as measured by gross domestic product per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), the yawning gaps are stunning and show few signs of amelioration. According to the valuable data assembled by Angus Maddison for the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (1995), Western Europe outpaced Africa in average per capita GDP by a factor of around 2.9 in 1820, and by a factor of 13.2 by 1992. More stunningly, Madison puts the African per capita income in 1992 at $1,284 dollars (measured in 1990 PPP adjusted dollars), which is essentially identical to Maddison’s estimate of the average GDP per capita in Western Europe in 1820, $1,292. One area of the developing world, Asia, showed significant progress during the past thirty years, with average incomes rising from around $1,212 in 1965 to $3,239 in 1992 on the Maddison data. 1 In Africa, however, the levels of income in the 1990s were about the same as in 1970. (Maddison puts Africa’s average income at $1,289 in 1971 and $1,284 in 1992). In Latin America and the Caribbean, average income levels in 1992 ($4,820) were only 6.6 percent higher than in 1974 ($4,521).