We believe that it is worth mentioning in this preface the kind of model that will be used throughout the entire thesis to differentiate between the branded and the generic good. We will assume that there exists a degree of horizontal differentiation between both goods. We mentioned before that from the Health Authorities point of view, both kinds of goods are perfect substitutes, although from the consumers’ point of view, it has been shown that this is not the case. Hence, we need to differentiate the two goods. Generic goods have gone through safety tests to enter the market, so we believe that quality issues here are not important. The idea with these drugs is that since they have the same active ingredient as the branded good, the differences between the two goods are the excipients and side effects although statistically they behave similarly. With these kind of horizontal differentiated models, we could obtain that out of equilibrium, the price of the generic could be higher than the price of the branded good. Not only we observe circumstances where the price of the former is higher (although rare), but also we could argue that the side effects, or excipients, of the generic good may be preferred by some consumers, so that there would exist a demand for such good eventhough the price was higher. Hence, we can treat the measure of differentiation between both goods as the difference in side effects and/or excipients. If both goods are very differentiated (similar), it would imply that the side effects or the excipients are very different (alike). However, the actual process of curing the sickness is identical.
This paper develops a model of optimal ownership dynamics of multiple equally risk-averse insiders facing a moral hazard problem and tests the predictions of the model with data from the U.S. REIT industry. Onthe theoretical side, the paper extends the related one-agent models (DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) and Edelstein et al. (2005)) to the situation with multiple strategic insiders. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider ownership stake is derived in two cases: when insiders can credibly pre-commit not to deviate from their optimal ownership policies; and in the more realistic case when such a com- mitment is not credible (i.e., the time-consistent case). In the latter case there is an additional strategic reason for a dynamic aggregate stake adjustment. A decrease in the aggregate insider stake raises the market risk premium and thus lowers the company valuation. Therefore, by selling more today, each insider hopes to decrease the incentive for others to sell in the future (since they will receive a lower share price). This creates a “race to diversify” and in equilibrium, the speed of adjustment toward the perfect risk sharing allocation increases with the number of insiders in the company. As a result we would expect: (a) the aggregate insider stake declines over time, (b) the long-run aggregate insider stake increases with the number of insiders and (c) the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium level also increases with the number of insiders.
The Medical College Organisation report (OMC) onthepharmaceutical sector (OMC, 2014) that some actions are recommended to increase the competitiveness of the sector. The OMC says that it would be reasonable to expect a process of concentraron and restructuring that promotes partnerships, joint ventures or mergers to créate solvent and innovative pharmaceutical companies. It is noteworthy that the research model of thepharmaceuticalindustry continúes to evolve over the last decade, from the classic pattern of R&D to prototype called R&C (cooperation and/ or collaboration).
In the field of medicine, which is by far the most extensively studied area, recent evidence indicates that physicians’ medication prescription frequency would be affected by the fact of receiving money from thepharmaceuticalindustry(66), giving support to the above results. Moreover, publications dating from the 1990s indicate an increase in the prescription of pharmaceutical products from specific industries by physicians who had received support in the form of money for attendance to scientific events, whether as speakers or participants, as well as for research funding(67,68). One explanation for the minimization of the impact of accepting gifts is the influence of the seductive capacity of thepharmaceuticalindustry and rationalization by professionals —refuted by the evidence— in relation to their capacity to differentiate information sources based on their quality and the importance assigned to the medical sales representative as an efficient means for keeping pace with new developments(29). Another explanatory factor is a self-serving bias(6-8), which becomes evident when people evaluate themselves as being better than others. In this case, professionals believe that gifts from thepharmaceuticalindustry will not distort their professional judgment, although this could happen to others. It is an unconscious bias and, therefore, it escapes the rational control of the individual.
In order to isolate the effects of child labor legislation, it is necessary to restrict my attention to an even more confined geographical area, where the regional economic conditions are more or less constant. There are two major cities along the border for which manufacturing censuses reported individual information: Wheeling in West Virginia and, a few miles south from it onthe Ohio side of the river, Bellaire (See Figure C.3). In addition to being the largest cities onthe border between Ohio and West Virginia, the industrial composition of both was quite similar. Coal mining, rolling mills and, in particular, glassworks were abundant on both sides of the river. Fuel was widely available and equally cheap in both Wheeling and Bellaire. Of particular interest to the glass industry, natural gas had become available in the area around 1886 and it was the same firm that provided the service on both sides of the river. Finally, ever since the opening of the Wheeling suspension river in 1849, the area had become increasingly integrated. In a word, it could be reasonably argued that the cost of fuel and inputs in Wheeling and Bellaire was the same. The main difference between these two cities is that they are subject to different legislation as they belonged to different states. Table C.7 presents aggregate manufacturing data on Wheeling (WV) and Bellaire (OH) for the period 1899-1919. In both cities, employment and value added are growing at the beginning of the period. However, during the period 1904-1909, the evolution of employment starts to diverge between them. The number of wage earners in Bellaire stabilizes around 1914 and starts decreasing afterwards. By 1919, the number of wage earners in Bellaire was just about the same as in 1904. In the same period, employment had doubled in both Ohio and West Virginia, and even the neighboring city of Wheeling had managed to increase its manufacturing employment by over 20%.
Competitive intelligence (CI) is one of the most useful tools for strategic analysis because it provides, analyses and distributes information, the knowledge and intel- ligence throughout the organization. The importance given to CI has been based on offensive and defensive activities implemented in the company. However, some authors have opened another research line that creates tools to make deci- sions in other directions. Thus, sometimes the company launches its CI to research the environment and competition in particular with the aim to enhance internal improvements or collaborations with companies (e.g. for open innovation lines).
The research concludes that the teams with very high diversification show a better performance. The number of members of the team has a negative impact over the sporting performance but considering the database it is observed that the biggest differences in this variable are due to injuries substitutions or transfers result of unexpected bad outcomes during the season. Therefore we do not consider it determinant when the team is designed, contrary to the asymmetric distribution of the minutes among players and the heterogeneity of the features of themselves. The former has a positive impact, which leads us to the conclusion that it is more efficient the design of a team where the starters play the biggest part of the game instead of looking for a balance between line-ups and reserves. The latter has also a positive effect, which means that the coaches and general managers might design a team with players specialized in particular tasks, practicing a playbook where the movements of all players are studied in order to achieve that the most qualifier player for each action is the one who performs it.
To study the effects on credit availability, we first match each loan with the rel- evant bank balance-sheet variables and then aggregate all the different loans for each bank-firm pair in each month in order to construct a measure of total com- mitted lending from January 2008 to December 2008. By focusing on firms’ bor- rowing from multiple banks, we follow a difference-in-difference approach which compares lending to the same firm before (April, 2008) and after (July, 2008) the policy change among banks with different degrees of exposition to the sources of funds targeted by the policies (Jim´enez, Ongena, Peydr´o, Saurina, 2013). This allows us to identify the effects of the new reserve requirements onthe average supply of loans, both onthe intensive and the extensive margins, and the hetero- geneous effects of these changes among different firm and bank characteristics. In particular, on firms’ heterogeneity, we analyze whether the impact is different from firms with different ex-ante risk, and on banks’ heterogeneity, we analyze bank size, solvency and liquidity (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Moreover, as we lose a significant number of firms imposing multiple banks loans, we also control for unobserved borrower fundamentals with industry fixed effects. Finally, we also analyze the period before (January to April 2008) and after (July to October 2008) to run a placebo test.
The 1980s marked the major regulatory changes in the telecommunications industry. In the previous decade, the Governments’ expenditure had grown at a great rate, rising public debts at worrying levels. It was necessary to cut public expenditure, and the utilities sector was one of the best candidates for cost sav- ings. In particular, the public management of utilities was very inefficient, causing wastes that needed to be covered through transfers from central budget. In Europe, most countries decided to privatize utilities, mainly to avoid bad public manage- ment costs but also with the hope of boosting the economy (and hence tax incomes) through the growth of new private utility sectors. Telecommunications, along with other utilities (i.e. distribution of electricity and gas, water and sewerage, railways) were characterized by expensive networks, whose replication was unaffordable by entrants that could undermine competition. The solution has been to create a heavily regulated private monopoly for telecommunications long-distance services and to promote the growth of a competitive industry for local services.
Development of the statistical part of the project has been a though endeavour. LME and NLME models have demonstrated to be extremely powerful and versatile tools but they are not trivial to understand. Apart from the difficulty associated to their mathematical derivation, estimation methods are also complex and any of those two issues alone has enough entity to give place to several doctoral theses on their own right. Apart from the theory, software packages have a steep learning curve. Of the two packages used, lme4, has been found to be the easier to fit LME models. Onthe contrary, package nlme has been used to successfully fit NLME models with ease, including some special features like heteroscedasticity. In fact, flexibility is probably the best argument of the nlme package when compared against the more computationally efficient lme4. Despite the package used, both are easily implemented for most simple and common situations but, as the modelling needs become more demanding, syntax complexity exponentially increases.
In this paper, the evaluation of the investment project in research and development for the innovation and of great impact in thepharmaceuticalindustry is presented. The project evaluation is done through an American type real call option, based on binomial trees incorporating the expected volatility of the expected cash flows in order to determine the benefit of postponing the project three years, providing flexibility to investors in their decision making. Besides, in the valuation of a real option associated with the project, fuzzy sets theory is incorporated in the process of assigning possibilities to the branches of a tree. The value of the American type real call option to postpone the project are between 24.83 % and 51.22% of the investment, and the value of real option, using fuzzy logic is between 9.91% and 23.13% of the investment in a pessimistic scenario, and of the 10.04% and 39.08% of investment in an optimistic scenario, and for a experts scenario the option premium is between 10.00% and 26.91% of the investment, these are better results.
Cluster analysis represents only a portion of the overall tip programme. Figure 1 tries to sum up the major cluster-related studies and the intended logic of the programme design. In the beginning, the lack of current IO tables forced us to concentrate onthe detection of general patterns and “dense locations” within certain dimensions of technological and economic performance. The overall goal of this screening for relevant clusters was to draw a map, which helped to define priority areas for the following case studies. In the subsequent periods, important areas of economic or technological activity were selected for individual cluster case studies. Beginning with a study on industries related to wood and paper as common resource, the telecommunications sector, thepharmaceuticalindustry and currently the potential cluster at the interface of multimedia and cultural content have been analysed. With regard to the cluster case studies on “wood & paper” and telecommunications a policy review workshop was organised as well. Finally, tip participation within the OECD NIS project can be regarded as an activity which extends the cluster related research agenda.
There is also some evidence onthe effect of drugs onthe mortality rate and life expectancy. Lichtenberg (1998b) related the introduction of new drugs with an increase in life expectancy. Using cross-section data on diseases for two different periods (1970–1980 and 1980–1991), he found that the introduc- tion of new drugs increased life expectancy by about 0.75–1.0% per annum. Lichtenberg (2002) explained life expectancy by using a times-series analysis over the second half of the 20th century in the US. The long run elasticity of longevity, with respect to the number of new drugs approved, is significant and near 0.03. In Lichtenberg (2001), he analyzed the effects of drugs on mortality from rare diseases and HIV. New drugs, and especially drugs developed through the orphan drug act of 1983, show an important impact on reducing mortality. Further, Lichtenberg (2006) studies the impact of new laboratory procedures and other medical goods onthe health of Americans between 1990 and 2003, and found that an increase of almost 6 months of mean age at death is attributable to the use of new lab procedures, which represent almost 42% of the total increase in that period.
The third argument is that drug companies are today, in many countries, the only accessible source of financial support for drug trials, the organization of large scien- tific meetings and CME events, so that it is practically unavoidable for a professional who wants to implement one of those activities to look for the support of the in- dustry. This is most probably true. However, again, the fact that a partnership is unavoidable does not imply that such a partnership should not have rules. The fourth argument is that the relationship with drug companies is not the only source of financial conflicts of interests for physicians and researchers, although it is by large the most visible. This is certainly a good point. There are indeed financial conflicts of interests in psychiatric practice and research which do not involve thepharmaceuticalindustry. For instance, public health sponsors usually have an interest to avoid spending money onthe most expensive drugs(25). This may affect the conduct and the outcome of the studies they fund (e.g., comparisons between old- and new-generation drugs), especially if the report of re- sults in line with the public sponsor’s interest involves a better chance for researchers to be funded again by that sponsor.
Subsequently, I add to the regression an indicator for contract enforcement, as in the re- mainder I will argue that contract enforcement (or rather the lack thereof) is the crucial driving factor of the share of managerial workers across countries. For this I use data from the World Bank’s Doing Business database onthe cost of suing for a claim as a percentage of the value of the claim and subtract it from 1 (i.e. the percent of the claim that is expected to be recovered in a lawsuit). Again, I use averages over the years of interest. Interestingly GDP per capita now loses statistical significance while contract enforcement turns out very significant, along with education and, to a lesser extent, the size of the public sector. Since the model will also create cross-country differences in firm size and the share of self-employment, I finally also add the proportion of employers and self-employed in the population that is available from the ILO and similarly covers the period 1999-2008. One could argue that very small firms (captured by a high number of employers and self-employed) demand relatively fewer managerial workers, but the variable turns out not to matter at all in the regression.
We derive two forward-looking political equilibria. In the myopic equilibrium, the policy function is increasing with respect to capital; therefore tax enforcement increases in capital because higher transfers compensate the decisive voter for higher tax payments. In the strategic equilibrium, however, the policy function is decreasing with respect to capital, a result that reflects the believable threat of the current decisive voter regarding the choice of the future decisive voter. As the equilibrium is Markov-perfect, the only way to influence the myopic choice of the future voter is via a reduction in the level of capital stock, which is the result if the current decisive voter chooses a higher level of tax enforcement. Finally, in steady state, both Markov-perfect equilibria are determined by the negative impact that tax enforcement has on long run capital levels. This discouragement of capital accumulation is generated by the fact that workers have lower income and are the only agents who save. Steady-state enforcement is shown to be higher in the strategic equilibrium and in the social-planner equilibrium, compared to the myopic equilibrium. The model is extended to consider intra-generational inequality among workers that di?er by productivity. For this case, the Markov-perfect equilibrium is unique and strategic, reecting a coalition between capitalists and low-productivity workers. Higher inequality lowers capital and raises tax enforcement.
However, the better information that subnational governments might have regarding their schools’ needs and enhanced citizen control and political participation will only result in an improvement in teacher quality under certain circumstances. First, subnational governments need to be responsible for taking decisions in relation to the various factors that determine the supply of good quality teachers in the different fields, that is, individuals’ decisions to enter and stay in the teaching profession. Factors that have been identified as being important determinants of teacher quality include working conditions, such as the availability of administrative support and educational resources, class sizes, teaching load or safety; accountability methods, since schools that fail to meet performance standards can affect teacher morale and lead to teacher exodus, especially in more disadvantaged communities; teacher preparation, since the evidence suggests that better prepared teachers stay in the profession and in disadvantaged schools longer; location, since areas where the supply of teachers is lower than the demand are likely to recruit less qualified teachers, unless compensatory incentives are in place; and salaries, since higher salaries would attract better prepared teachers (Darling-Hammond and Sykes, 2003). Thus, the capacity of subnational governments to improve teacher quality will depend upon their decision-making power to influence these factors.
The effects of monetary policy have long been object of interest in the economic profes- sion. At present day a large amount of studies substantiated its transmission mecha- nism either using general equilibrium models as experimental laboratories or structural VARs as statistical tools. Christiano et al. (1999) survey the empirical literature, show- ing that, notwithstanding the variety of identification schemes proposed by different authors, there is a considerable agreement about the qualitative effects of exogenous monetary policy shocks. That is, regardless of the fact that identification relies onthe recursiveness assumption (e.g. Sims (1992); Christiano et al. (2005)), on sign restric- tions (e.g. Uhlig (2005)) or on narrative methods (e.g. Romer and Romer (2004)), the responses of various economic aggregates is broadly consistent. In a nut shell, after an exogenous monetary tightening, short term interest rates rise, aggregate output, profit and various monetary aggregates fall, and the price level responds sluggishly. Also, there is a widespread consensus that monetary policy shocks account for a modest percentage of the volatility of aggregate output and inflation.
studies because these two university degrees are very similar regarding subjects taught and professional opportunities after finishing these degrees. It is necessary to note the difficulties encountered in order to find students who have abandoned their degrees, considering that we are talking about a very closed target population, and that means we cannot find them randomly onthe street. That is why was necessary to ask university students if they knew of former students who had abandoned their studies, causing in this way that the sample of interviewees to be small. Also, not everybody agreed to provide information about his or her acquaintances who dropped out, or even in some cases, although the name or contact information were provided, these people did not respond or accept the call or message sent.
Newspaper sales and, by extension, media outlet benefits will increase based on their reputation and readers’ opinions onthe quality of news. Thus, editors will not want to put their reputation at risk (Anderson and McLaren, 2012). Consider a case in which a newspaper with an opposite ideology from the government gives less coverage to a corruption case involving the party in office. Citizens could interpret the scandal’s limited coverage as a sign that the newspaper has been captured, which may imply an important reputational cost and, as a consequence, a decrease in the number of readers (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). Governments may try to influence media to reduce the number of news published onthe scandals. However, that pressure may be more difficult to exert on unaligned newspapers. These media outlets will risk losing commercial revenues due to the reputational cost, which may not be compensated by the government’s alternative payoff. Hence, in situations in which the newspaper’s ideology differs significantly from the party involved in the scandal, politicians may have additional difficulties to influence the media. Conversely, it will be easier for newspapers that are ideologically aligned with the political party involved in the scandal to accept the government’s ‘bribe’. If they are predisposed to manipulate scandal coverage in favour of the incumbent in office, government capture could foster the existing media ideological slant. Considering the ideological slant of media outlets and media capture together, our last hypothesis to test is: