The AKP is concerned that intervention by the EU could seriously jeopardize its standing on the domestic scene (despite a decline in support for EU accession, the attractiveness of the EU remains significant among the Turkish people), and it could Turkey's international reputation seriously damaged. It is likely that the AKP will maintain its dominant position in Turkey's political arena over the next few years.
The AKP’s anti-European face
In the 1990s, the most prominent members of the AKP leadership belonged to the Islamist movement Millî Görüş ('National View') and the Welfare Party, which formed a government between 1996 and. In 1997, Erbakan's cabinet resigned under pressure from the military, which believed that the rule of the Islamic government posed a threat to Turkey's secularism.
The AKP: a European-Islamic-Kemalist mix
Regarding Islam, the AKP's policy has focused not on imposing an Islamic moral code on the entire society, but on removing the restrictions the Kemalist system imposed on the religious practices of the majority of Turkey's Sunni Muslims. 7 The influence of Islamic ideology on the internal politics of the AKP can be seen in the government's resistance to accepting the demands of the 10 million-strong Alevi minority, who call for the recognition of their beliefs as a separate religion and demand the same rights as those granted to Sunni Muslims. EU membership could also be aligned with the traditional values of Turkish society; and by strengthening democratic principles in the country, the AKP could increase the power of the conservative majority (ie its traditional electorate).
Although various members of the Turkish government have repeatedly called for the separation of state and religion, the AKP has so far refused to close the Directorate of Religious Affairs (inherited from Turkey's Kemalist era), which embodies control of state on religious practices. in place. These three components of the AKP's worldview differ in the way they perceive the importance of European norms, as well as in terms of practical solutions for building a new social and political order in Turkey. Although the latter does not oppose Turkey's integration into the EU, in practice, however, it distances Turkey from Europe due to the way in which this tradition has shaped the country's internal politics, e.g.
Europe as an instrument of political struggle
The EU's favorable response to Ankara's pro-European orientation has increased the AKP's credibility among the Turkish people. Domestically, the AKP's pro-EU policies have been most effective in reducing the role of the military in Turkish politics. One manifestation of Europe's declining importance in Turkish politics is the AKP's decision not to seek EU support during the peace talks with the Kurds, which the government resumed in late 2012.
Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the EU no longer matters for the AKP's position on the Turkish political scene. 14 In May and June 2013, Turkey experienced a series of large-scale protests against the authoritarianism of the AKP government. This is likely to encourage the AKP to continue the integration process with the EU.
Economic cooperation with the EU as a source of economic growth
From the point of view of the Turkish government, EU support is currently desirable but not necessary to achieve its domestic policy objectives. The Turkish government's fiscal policy is guided by the EU's Maastricht criteria, which show Ankara's intention to continue its association with the European economic system. Turkey has also been critical of the continued exclusion of Turkish nationals from the EU labor market.
According to the Turkish government, this puts Turkish companies operating in the EU under the Customs Union Agreement in a worse position than their European competitors. The fact that the government is well aware of the importance of the EU for Turkey is evident not only from its economic analyzes and political speeches, but also from the measures it has taken to promote Turkey's institutional integration with the European market and with the further expand the EU's economic system. . Moreover, to improve the effectiveness of Turkish companies operating in the European market, the government will have to, for example, campaign for the abolition of Schengen visas for Turkish citizens, which could prove difficult if Ankara were to cut ties with Turkey . the European Union.
Europe as a partner on the international stage
Therefore, economic cooperation with Europe will remain an important instrument of the AKP government's economic policy and will play an important role in motivating Ankara not to abandon its European Union integration policy. Ankara's cooperation with the EU and its member states has also been instrumental in increasing Turkey's international prestige. Opinion polls conducted in the region show that close ties with the EU have a positive impact on Turkey's image throughout the Arab world.36 Closer integration with the EU is also important for Ankara's relations with the United States. United States, which Turkey sees as one of its main. security partners.
Turkey's cooperation with individual EU members to address the Middle East crisis did not arise from, and had little to do with, the accession process itself, and could continue even if accession talks broke down. The connection between membership talks and diplomatic cooperation is more evident in Ankara's cooperation with the EU as an organization, but Brussels' influence on the balance of power in the region remains rather small, which the Turkish government likes. aware of. The policy of integration with the EU is of little use when it comes to strengthening Turkey's international standing.
The cause of Europe’s image problem
The public believes that the EU has failed to fulfill its previous promises, not only by not allowing Turkey to enter the European Union, but also by maintaining the embargo on trade with Northern Cyprus and by rejecting calls to abolish Schengen visas for Turkish citizens.42 Image Europe is also affected by the financial crisis, which has raised questions about the effectiveness of the European economic and political model. It also seems that the current low opinion of the European Union among Turks is partly due to the negative rhetoric of the Turkish government, which increasingly portrays the EU in a bad light in order to disclaim any responsibility for the lack of progress in the accession negotiations. Poor knowledge of Europe, combined with a high level of public trust in government, means that negative opinions that are publicly expressed for political reasons tend to penetrate the consciousness of a significant part of the population.
In the late 1990s, anti-European sentiment was also quite strong, after which Europe's image improved rapidly in the first half of the last decade, only to suffer another setback in recent years.44 This suggests that Turkish attitudes to Europe is easily influenced by the immediate political and economic context. After all, there is currently no prospect of real progress in Turkey's EU accession negotiations or of a resolution to the Cyprus conflict, rehabilitation of the image of Europeans as tolerant people or a quick end to the financial crisis. Rubbin (ed.), Turkey and the European Union: domestic politics, economic integration and international dynamics, Cass, London, 2004, p.
A rise in conservatism as a factor distancing Turkey from Europe?
Under the AKP, there has been a rapid socio-economic advancement of the poorer and more conservative segments of Turkish society. 48 Turkish critics of the AKP government have also pointed to the increasingly widespread efforts by the conservative segments of society to exert pressure on individuals who do not reveal their commitment to Islam, such as encouraging women to wear headscarves. 49 For example, an EDAM survey suggested that more than 86% of foreign policy experts are in favor of Turkey's EU membership (the survey was conducted on a sample of 202 experts).
However, it should be noted that the support for EU accession among Turkey's conservative circles - for example among the Kurds and within Fethullah Gülen's movement - is largely motivated by the hope that European integration will lead to the final dismantling of the Kemalist system which perceive these segments of society as a threat. The same will apply to the Kurdish minority: as the Kurds receive more rights and the eastern parts of Turkey are demilitarized, the meaning of the EU will weaken. The rate of deterioration of the EU's image is likely to increase as Turkish public opinion becomes convinced of Europe's bias against Islam.
However, most likely, the criticism will not be followed by any concrete action that could weaken Turkey's ties with the EU. However, such a scenario could not be ruled out if the EU would openly question the credibility of the AKP as a democratic and reformist political force. This would leave Erdogan's government little room for maneuver, and it is possible that in such a scenario Ankara would take measures to delegitimize the EU.
The EU integration process does not play a significant role in increasing Turkey's position in the international arena. Both are only slightly dependent on the status of Turkey's negotiations with the EU. This would reduce the EU's influence on the AKP's position on the political stage, as the EU would no longer have the ability to delegitimize the Turkish government.