The importance of promoting human rights in China through a bilateral
dialogue was included among the policy actions of the 1995 Commission
Communication. However, as was the case with several other Western
countries, the Chinese conditioned the inception and continuation of the
dialogue to the dropping of the UNCHR resolution. The EU’s official stance on
42
European Commission, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, Commission Communication COM (1998) 181, 1998.
the resumption of the ECDHR in 1997 never pointed to the fact that it was a
‘reward’ for the dropping of the UNCHR resolution. In fact the 1998
Commission Communication expressly noted that “the resumption of the EU-
China human rights dialogue [would be accepted] without any precondition”.43
Yet it is difficult to believe that this was the case in consideration of the
Chinese manoeuvrings to coerce the EU, its member states and other Western
countries to move from public shaming to private dialogues. Similarly, in an
answer to a written question from an MEP, the Council clearly stated that “the
results of the dialogue will be taken into account when the Union will decide the
step to follow at the UNCHR”.44
Since 1997, the ECDHR has been held twice a year between European high
officials (officials from the country holding the Presidency, representative for
human rights from COHOM45 and the political head of the Commission
Delegation in China) and representatives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs at directorate level.46 According to the EU’s human rights reports, which
have been issued annually since 1999, the ‘wish list’ of the EU’s areas of
concern presented at the bilateral dialogue remained broadly the same and
included (i) freedom of opinion, expression and assembly, (ii) extensive use of
43
Ibid. 44
Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights, p. 201. 45
The Agenda for the Dialogue is formulated within the COHOM Committee for Human Rights, which is linked to the European Council. The COHOM is presided by the incumbent Presidency of the Council but all member states are represented. In China at local level, little coordination apart from informal meetings of Political Counsellors takes place. There is an exchange of information on the procedures and results of the bilateral dialogues but this is as far as it goes. The Agenda is then discussed and agreed with the Chinese counterpart, which is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
46
Sometimes representatives of Chinese line ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Civil Affairs, took part to the meetings. Interestingly no other participants from European or Chinese civil society took part in the ECDHR.
the death penalty and torture, (iii) arbitrary detention and the use of labour
camps, and (iv) the treatment of religious and cultural minorities.47
Interestingly, in light of what Ian Manners refers to as the EU’s commitment
to second-generation human rights, it is important to notice that labour rights
were discussed for the first time only in 2007.48 Similarly, the list of the main
human rights concerns of the EU’s representatives at the ECDHR seems out of
tune with the societal requests emerging in China for more protection of social
and economic rights, as underlined in Chapter 1 and also pointed out by several
Chinese human rights experts.49
Through the dialogue process, the EU also raised concerns about the lack of
due process of law in China’s ‘reform through labour’ system, and the broad
definition of crimes endangering state security, despite the dropping of
counterrevolutionary crimes in the 1997 criminal law. At the same time, the
ECDHR was used as a venue for EU officials to convey the EU’s support for
China’s further involvement in the international human rights mechanisms.
Noting China’s signing and ratification of the International Covenant for
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1997) and its signing of the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1998), the EU
established the EU-China Human Rights Network (Network).
The Network’s over-arching aim was to provide China with human rights
expertise at the highest academic level in order to support the process of
ratification of the ICCPR and the implementation of both human rights
47
In the occasion of particularly blatant violations such as national campaigns against minorities or religious groups, the EU often expressed specific concerns. These included the situation in Tibet, including the ‘patriotic education campaign’, the crackdown on the Uighur minority in Xinjiang, which was fanned by the intensification of the ‘strike-hard’ campaign in connection with China’s fight against terrorism, and the issue of freedom of religion against the backdrop of a growing persecution of Falun Gong’s members, which intensified during the late 1990s, and the deteriorating situation of Chinese Christians.
48
Interview 6. 49
covenants.50 In addition to these independent activities, since 2001 the Network
has also taken over responsibility for the organisation of the biannual seminars
connected to the ECDHR on behalf of the European Commission, the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency of the European Union.
The seminars had been organised twice a year from 1997 and have received
the support of the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights. Their
aim was to complement the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue with ad-hoc
discussions on various issues of concern. The following were covered: women’s
rights, administration of justice, minor crimes and trade union rights, death
penalty, prohibition and prevention of torture and right to education, ratification
and implementation of the ICCPR, right to health and freedom of expression.
However the decision to move to more private forms of engagement led to
little information being made public on the real extent, scope and level of the
discussions that take place, apart from the official press statements, the
Council’s conclusions and the EU’s annual human rights reports. The
ambiguous results of the dialogue were underlined by a 2004 Council
evaluation. Although this document is notable for its absence among all the
electronic material available on the EU’s website, the Council’s conclusions that
followed the presentation of the evaluation document affirmed that “the overall
assessment of developments showed a mixed picture of progress in some areas
and continuing concerns in others”.51
A harsher position was expressed by academics as well as practitioners, who
also pointed out the ineffectiveness of giving up on the sponsoring of the
50
Activities included seminars, researches, development of training materials, delivery of training and other follow-up activities, as well as a series of exchanges and internships coordinated by the Human Rights Institute in Ireland and the Human Rights Centre established within the Chinese Academy of Social Science.
51
European Council, Council Conclusions on EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, No. 13216/04, Brussels, 8 October 2004.
UNCHR resolution.52 To a certain extent, the negative opinion on the results of
the ECDHR was indirectly confirmed by the Chinese. In China’s 2003 EU
Policy Paper it was argued that “[China] stands ready to continue dialogue,
exchange and cooperation on human rights with the EU on the basis of equality
and mutual respect so as to share information, enhance mutual understanding
and deepen cooperation”.53 However, they expressed the wish that such a
dialogue and exchange could be focused on “protecting citizens’ social and
cultural rights and the rights of the disadvantaged”, thus forgetting to mention
civil and political rights, which form the very core of the EU’s objectives for the
ECDHR. Similarly, while wishing to receive more European aid in such sectors
as environmental protection, public health, poverty alleviation and education,
the Chinese authorities once again omitted any reference to projects in support
of good governance, the rule of law and human rights.
Another interesting point that seems to confirm the limits of such a platform
emerged during interviews. Embassy officials referred to the continuous
requests of the Chinese authorities to eliminate bilateral human rights dialogues
with the member states because of the presence of the ECDHR.54 This also
confirms the instrumentality behind the Chinese participation to the ECDHR, as
expressed by some Chinese commentators.55
Finally, it should be pointed out that some member states did start bilateral
dialogues with China on human rights but they were not coordinated and each
member state seemed to pursue its own national goals.56 For example Germany
52
These concerns have been raised by European participants to the technical dialogues. Interviews 21 and 22.
53
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s EU White Paper, 2003. 54
This was in particular the case of Sweden, which has an informal dialogue with China. Interview 19.
55
Interviews 26 and 27. 56
According to interviews with EU and member states’ embassy officials little coordination, apart from sharing of information, exists among the various dialogues. Interviews 2, 6, 8 and 14.
started a Rule of Law Dialogue and a Human Rights Dialogue in 1999.
However from the research it appears that its contents were not shared with
other member states and the main issues discussed concerned the rule of law.57
Similarly, the UK started a bilateral dialogue in 1999. However the dialogues
seemed to be stressing issues of concern for the UK without any connection
with those pursued at EU level.58
In summation, from the analysis of the EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights
and those of the main EU member states with China, it emerges that the
economic motives and the division among member states made such exercises
very inefficient. Overall they lacked a real enforcing power, mostly served as
platforms to exchange information without ensuring any accountability of the
participants’ promises, and they were badly coordinated, thus granting the
Chinese an easy way to escape criticism and pressure. It is important to
underline that the adoption of dialogues created a side venue, where human
rights could comfortably be discussed without risking any spill-overs into other
growing fields of the EU and its member states’ relations with China. Despite
the clear limits of this platform, it emerged during several interviews that
member states did not request its abandonment or suspension.59 This suggests
an overall socialisation of all member states into supporting and conducting an
inefficient EU policy for the promotion of human rights in China.