El área Personal Social, sus componentes y rendimiento académico

Political power:

The ability, on the part of individuals or organisations, to use threats and rewards to motivate a state’s residents to act or not act in certain ways.

Political authority:

Political authority obtains when some agents and/or agencies as a matter of fact exercise political power reliably in a state, and the residents of that state as a matter of fact regard those who exercise political power as being entitled to do so.

De facto political authority:

De facto political authority obtains if and only if, as a matter of fact, individuals or organisations reliably exercise political power in a way that is generally endorsed or at least recognised by those subject to it.

Legitimate political authority:

Political authority is legitimate (as opposed to being just de facto) when some sort of

normatively satisfactory relationship (in a broad sense of the term) exists between those in authority and those subject to the authority. For example, political authority might be legitimate if a consent relationship obtains between the state and its subjects, or if the state satisfactorily protects certain rights and interests of its subjects, and so on.

Proper exercise of political authority:

Political authority is properly exercised if and only if, at a given point in time or

during a given period, a sufficient number of the acts ascribed to individuals and

institutions invested with political authority satisfy some normative requirement or other. Thus the relevant question is: ‘Are those with political authority doing their job properly?’.

Definitions Proper grounding of political authority:

Political authority is properly grounded if and only if a sufficient number of the agents and agencies invested with political authority at a given point in time or during a given period came to hold such authority in a normatively sound way. Thus the relevant question is: ‘Were those with political authority entitled to occupy that position in the first place?’.

Liberalism:

Political tradition characterised by policies and institutions affording maximal individual equal liberty. Liberals disagree widely as to what are the best normative foundations for such policies and institutions.

Justification (technical sense):

Normative considerations adduced in support of a polity’s authority, and concerning particular virtues instantiated by the polity (e.g. its promotion of well- being or excellence, etc.).

Legitimacy (technical sense):

Normative relationship (e.g. of consent) between a polity and those subjected to its authority. This relationships confers to the polity a right to the exercise of its authority.

Political framework:

A polity’s fundamental norms (i.e. the constitution or its functional equivalents) and institutions.

Liberal legitimacy view:

A theory of the proper exercise of legitimate political authority. According to the view, political authority is properly exercised if and only if (i) in some sense (even if only a hypothetical one) the citizenry of the polity at stake consent to its political framework (consent requirement), and (ii) the political framework at stake is liberal (justification requirement).

On a weak version of the view, the theory only applies to liberal polities (particularist variant), or only applies in full (universalist variant) to liberal polities

Definitions

(i.e. non-liberal polities are subject to altogether different legitimacy criteria. This position still allows—but does not require—liberal legitimacy theorists to claim that their view of legitimacy is preferable, even though polities that do not satisfy its requirements may nonetheless be considered legitimate). On an intermediate version of the view, the theory applies to both liberal and non-liberal polities, but not to any polity (i.e. only some non-liberal polities are subject to the view’s legitimacy criteria). On a strong version, it applies to any polity (i.e. only liberal polities can be legitimate).

Public justification/Public reason:

Account of hypothetical consent featured in the liberal legitimacy view. A political framework is consented to through public reason, i.e. it is publicly justified, if and only if it could have been arrived at had certain rules for the conduct of deliberation been followed.

Public deliberation:

Account of hypothetical consent that may feature in the liberal legitimacy view (typically just for assessing the legitimacy of changes to the political framework). According to this account the political framework may be understood as consented to in the sense that it is arrived at through a process of deliberation conducted according to rules that guarantee the preservation of the citizens’ free consent. That is to say, the rules are such that the foundational commitment generating the consent requirement (e.g. personal autonomy) will be safeguarded throughout the deliberation process.

Idealistic public justification/reason (or public deliberation):

Account of public justification characterised by norms for the (hypothetical or actual) conduct of deliberation on the structure of the political framework that require the citizens to only make use of reasons that satisfy certain moral and/or epistemological standards, regardless of whether those reasons are actually available to them or to a relevant subset of them.

Definitions Realistic public justification/reason (or public deliberation):

Account of public justification characterised by norms for the (hypothetical or actual) conduct of deliberation on the structure of the political framework that require the citizens to only make use of reasons that are actually available to them. Moralistic desideratum of public justification (or public deliberation):

Desideratum of public justification according to which deliberation (hypothetical or actual) need be conducted in a way that safeguards the participants’ personal autonomy, or indeed any normative foundational commitment that required the introduction of the consent requirement in the first place.

Pragmatic desideratum of public justification (or public deliberation):

Desideratum of public justification according to which the rules regulating (hypothetical or actual) public deliberation should be characterised in such a way as not to exclude sizeable sectors of the citizenry from the deliberation process. Substantivist liberalism:

Tradition in normative political theory according to which liberalism is best grounded in an account of the values and virtues (e.g. well-being, autonomy, excellence, etc.) embodied and/or promoted by liberal polities. The main exponents of this tradition are David Hume, J.S. Mill, and Joseph Raz.

Contract-based liberalism:

Tradition in normative political philosophy according to which liberalism is best grounded as the object of hypothetical consent on the part of those subjected to its authority. The main exponents of this tradition are John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls.

Achievability (of a normative political theory):

A normative political theory is achievable if and only if its prescriptions can be instantiated in political practice.

Definitions Viability (of a normative political theory):

A normative political theory is viable if and only if, once achieved, its prescriptions can be sustained over time.

Desirability (of a normative political theory):

A normative political theory is desirable if and only if its prescriptions satisfy certain normative requirements and standards.

Feasibility (of a normative political theory):

A normative political theory is feasible if and only if it is both achievable and viable.

Active normative political theory:

A normative political theory is active if and only if its prescriptions are likely to be fully instantiated in political practice. In a strong sense of ‘active’ a theory is feasible (i.e. achievable and viable); in a weaker sense it is either just viable or just achievable.

Passive normative political theory:

A normative political theory is passive if and only if it can only be used as a regulative ideal for institutional evaluation, i.e. if and only if it is not likely to be feasible (strong sense of ‘passive’), or if and only it is not likely to be either viable or achievable (weak sense).