ÁREA Y LÍMITES

Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Finland Germany Greece Hungary Kyrgyzstan Luxembourg the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Moldova Montenegro Netherlands Poland Serbia Slovakia Sweden Turkmenistan United Kingdom

9F Internet piracy 21 Armenia Austria Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Finland Germany Kyrgyzstan Luxembourg the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Moldova Montenegro Netherlands Poland Serbia Slovakia Spain Sweden Turkmenistan United Kingdom

10F Libel and insult (defamation) on the Internet 20 Armenia Austria Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Finland Germany Hungary Luxembourg the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Moldova Montenegro Netherlands Poland Russian Federation Serbia Slovakia Sweden Turkmenistan United Kingdom

11G Expression of views perceived to be encouraging “extremism”

21 Armenia Austria

the former Yugoslav

Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Finland Germany Hungary Kyrgyzstan Luxembourg Republic of Macedonia Moldova Montenegro Netherlands Poland Serbia Slovakia Spain Sweden Turkmenistan United Kingdom 12G Distribution of “harmful content” 23 Armenia Austria Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Finland Germany Hungary Kyrgyzstan Latvia Luxembourg the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Moldova Montenegro Netherlands Poland Russian Federation Serbia Slovakia Spain Sweden Turkmenistan United Kingdom

13F Any other categories of Internet content 21 Armenia Austria Czech Republic Estonia Finland Germany Hungary Kyrgyzstan Latvia Luxembourg the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Moldova Montenegro Netherlands Poland Serbia Slovakia Spain Sweden Turkmenistan United Kingdom

Table 15. OSCE participating States that report having neither general legal provisions, nor specific legal provision which require closing down and/or blocking access to websites.

In terms of the responses received for this study, Albanian legislation in force includes provisions that are applicable for all types of media services regarding specific content which can be taken down or blocked. In Austria, there are no-access blocking provisions as the Media Act does not provide for the blocking of Internet pages as a sanction. However,

according to section 33(1) of the Austrian Media Act, the court on application has to decide on the removal of the part of the website constituting the criminal act. The removal or deletion of parts of a website can also be ordered as an interim measure of protection if proceedings are pending and the detrimental consequences of the deletion are not disproportionally more severe than the interest in protecting the law. A deletion as an interim measure is not admitted, however, if the interest in the protection of the law can also be satisfied by the publication of a notice on the fact that proceedings are pending.753 Furthermore, a deletion order concerning illicit content accessible on the Internet can be executed754 _{under the} conditions of Section 26 of the Criminal Code.755 An obligation to delete certain illicit content, among them child pornography is possible under sections 13 to 17, especially section 16 of the Austrian E-Commerce Act.756 The execution of the deletion in this case is the duty of the service providers.

In Azerbaijan, according to clause 4.2(a) of the “Rules for Using Internet Services,” providers can suspend Internet services without permission by their subscribers in cases that violate the rights stipulated in the law “On Telecommunications.” According to Annex No. 1 “On Agreement on Internet Service Provision”757 of the above rules, a provider can temporarily suspend delivery of Internet services in certain cases.758 _{Furthermore, according} to clause 3 of an order of the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies, a provider can suspend delivery of Internet services in certain circumstances including in times of war, events of natural disasters and states of emergency.759

In Belarus, certain restrictions apply under clause 8 of the presidential decree “On measures to improve use of the national segment of the Internet,”760 and subject to the resolution “On approval of the Regulations on the procedure for restricting access of Internet users to information prohibited for distribution in accordance with legislative acts”.761 Clause 8 states that Internet providers may render their services to restrict access to information geared to the performance of extremist activities; unlawful trafficking in weapons; ammunition; explosive devices; explosive, radioactive, venomous, potent, poisonous, toxic, narcotic or psychotropic substances and their precursors; promotion of illegal migration or human trafficking;

753 _{Section 36 para. 1 and 2 of the Austrian Media Act} 754 _{Compare also sections 33 and 36a of the Media Act.} 755 _{Confiscation – “Einziehung”.}

756 _{E-Commerce Gesetz – ECG.} 757 _{Clause 5.2.}

758 _{In cases where the subscriber, to the detriment of the provider’s other subscribers (private individuals or} legal entities) or personnel, uploads information onto the Internet that negatively affects their authority, and in cases that run counter to the law “On Telecommunications” or other legal acts.

759 _{Order of 24 February 2000. The circumstances include cases that run counter to the rules established by the} legislation of the Azerbaijan Republic and the law “On Telecommunications”; when war or a state of emergency is declared; in the event of a natural disaster or other catastrophe; when services are provided to third parties without the appropriate licenses; in cases where systems that are either defective or uncertified are connected to the network.

760 _{1 February 2010 No. 60. According to Freedom House, “Presidential Decree No. 60 was only a prelude to} suspected blocking and technical hijacking of independent and opposition websites that occurred on 19 December 2010 the date of presidential elections, and the following day. For example, the sites of the news outlets Charter97 and Belarus Partisan were temporarily inaccessible during the two day period.” See Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media, April 2011, at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fotn/2011/FOTN2011.pdf>, p. 59.

761 _{Resolution “On approval of the Regulations on the procedure for restricting access of Internet users to} information prohibited for distribution in accordance with legislative acts,” Operational Analysis Centre under the President of the Republic of Belarus and of the Ministry of Communications and Informatisation of the Republic of Belarus ,29 June, 2010 No. 4/11.

distribution of pornographic materials; and propaganda of violence, cruelty and other acts prohibited by law. Services to restrict access to other information may be provided on the basis of an agreement concluded between the Internet providers and the Internet user.762 According to a legal analysis commissioned by the OSCE Office of the RFOM, the Decree is the first to regulate limiting access to information at the request of the Internet service user.763 Accordingly, at the request of individual Internet users, providers must prevent access to such resources for the users who request it (but not for all other Internet users).764 The Decree also envisages that access to illegal information shall be automatically blocked by government authorities, cultural and educational organizations (for example, universities, schools and clubs).765

Furthermore, Resolution No. 4/11 “On Approving the Provisions on the Procedure for Restricting Access of the Users of Internet Services to Information Prohibited from Dissemination by the Law”766 regulates the procedure for restricting access to prohibited information. The resolution stipulates that ISPs shall limit access “on the basis of a limited access list duly compiled by the Republic of Belarus State Telecommunications Inspectorate of the Ministry of Communications and Informatisation.”767 This process is carried out on the basis of decisions of the heads of the State Regulation Committee, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Operating and Analytical Centre under the President of the Republic of Belarus (OAC), and all state administration bodies. The decisions are adopted by the heads of these bodies within the limits of their competence. Moreover, the resolution allows for a certain limited access list compiled by the ISPs independently. The procedure for compiling such a list is not specified.

In Belgium, the courts may, under national legislation, issue an order for any infringement of an intellectual property right to be brought to an end. In particular, the legislation provides that, where a third party uses the services of an intermediary to perpetrate an infringement of that type, the courts are authorized to issue such an order against that intermediary. The Société belge des auteurs compositeurs et éditeurs (Sabam) applied for interim relief against Scarlet Extended SA, ISP.768 Sabam sought first of all a declaration that the copyright in musical works contained in its repertoire had been infringed because of the unauthorized

762 _{Internet providers, including authorized Internet providers, provide for restriction on access to the} information indicated in part one of this clause when rendering these services to state authorities and organizations (with the exception of the authorities listed in part four, clause 6 of this Decree, other state bodies and organizations determined by the Operational Analysis Centre under the President of the Republic of Belarus), educational and cultural organizations”. During the given period, the relevant rules have not yet come into effect.

763 _{See a legal analysis commissioned by the Office of the OSCE RFOM, Commentary on recent documents of} the Republic of Belarus regarding use of the national segment of the Internet, 2010, at <http://www.osce.org/fom/73455>. The commentary was prepared by Andrei Richter, Director of the Media Law and Policy Institute (Moscow).

764 _{Ibid, p. 16.} 765 _{Ibid, p. 20.}

766 _{Resolution of the Operations and Analysis Centre of the President of the Republic of Belarus and the} Ministry of Communications and Informatisation of the Republic of Belarus No. 4/11 of 29 June 2010 “On Approving the Provisions on the Procedure for Restricting Access of the Users of Internet Services to Information Prohibited from Dissemination by the Law”.

767 _{Legal analysis commissioned by the Office of the OSCE RFOM, Commentary on recent documents of the} Republic of Belarus regarding use of the national segment of the Internet, 2010, at <http://www.osce.org/fom/73455>, p. 20.

768 _{Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release: Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-70/10} Scarlet Extended v Société belge des auteurs compositeurs et éditeurs (Sabam), No 37/11, Luxembourg, 14 April 2011.

sharing, through the use of Scarlet’s services, of music files – in particular, by means of peer- to-peer software. Sabam also sought an order requiring Scarlet to bring such infringements to an end, on pain of a penalty payment, by blocking or making impossible the sending or the receiving by its customers in any way of files containing a musical work, using peer-to-peer software, without the permission of the copyright holders. By a judgment of 26 November 2004, such copyright infringements were found to have taken place. After a report had been obtained from a technical expert, Scarlet was ordered, by another judgment, delivered on 29 June 2007, to bring those copyright infringements to an end by making it impossible for its customers to send or to receive in any way, by means of P2P software in particular, files containing a musical work in Sabam’s repertoire, and to do so within a period of six months, on pain of a penalty payment of €2,500 per day should Scarlet fail to comply with the judgment. Scarlet has appealed against that judgment to the Court of Appeal in Brussels, which must decide whether to uphold the measure adopted against Scarlet. In that context, as mentioned above, the Court of Appeal is seeking a ruling from the Court of Justice on whether the European Union law and, in particular, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, permit a national court to order an ISP to install a system for filtering and blocking electronic communications.769

In Bulgaria, there are no general blocking provisions. However, websites may be closed by a Prosecutor’s order or following a court decision in relation to child pornography or piracy among other types of content.770 Pursuant to the Ministry of Interior Act officials at the General Directorate for the Fight against Organized Crime, “Computer crimes, intellectual property and gambling” section is entitled to send instructions to ISPs ordering them to cancel access to websites in which content depicting sexual violence or sexual abuse have been encountered.771 Furthermore, during state of martial law, state of war, or state of emergency as well as in the case of an imminent threat to national security, the competent bodies of the Ministry of Interior may block, by technical means, the provision of electronic communications.772

In Canada, there are no specific legal provisions to require blocking access to websites or other types of material found on the Internet. However, provisions are in place for the removal

769 _{Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 5 February} 2010 — Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs (SABAM), Case C- 70/10, 2010/C 113/30: A reference for a preliminary ruling allows the courts and tribunals of the Member States, in disputes which have been brought before them, to refer questions to the Court of Justice about the interpretation of European Union law or the validity of a European Union act. The Court of Justice does not decide the dispute itself. It is for the national court or tribunal to dispose of the case in accordance with the Court’s decision, which is similarly binding on other national courts or tribunals before which a similar issue is raised.

770 _{Articles 159, and 172a of the Penal Code.}

771 _{Articles 55 and 56, Ministry of Interior Act, Promulgated, SG No. 17/24.02.2006).}

772 _{Article 301 of the Law on Electronic Communications, Chapter Eighteen, Provision of Electronic} Communications Services During Crisis, State of Martial Law, State of War or State of Emergency: (1) The undertakings providing public electronic communications networks and/or services shall ensure possibilities for the provision of electronic communications services during crises in the sense of the Law on Crisis Management, or during a state of martial law, state of war, or a state of emergency in the sense of the Law on Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2) To guarantee the national security, the undertakings providing public electronic communications networks and/or services shall, if necessary, provide the competent bodies with access to the network and/or the services provided, as well as a possibility to use free of charge electronic communications over the network in the case of an imminent threat to the national security. (3) For the purpose of performing the activities under Art. 91, paragraph 1, and Art. 111, paragraph 1, item 5 of the Law on the Ministry of Interior, as well as in the case of an imminent threat to the national security, the competent bodies of the Ministry of Interior may block, by technical means, the provision of electronic communications.

or forfeiture of content involving hate propaganda,773 and voluntary blocking activity as a self-regulatory measure with regard to child pornography. Since January 2007, the majority of Canada’s large ISPs voluntarily participate in Project Cleanfeed Canada,774 which aims to reduce access to and distribution of child pornography. Through this project, Cybertip.ca maintains a regularly updated list of specific foreign-hosted Internet addresses (URLs) associated with images of child pornography and provides that list in a secure manner to participating ISPs, who automatically deny access to the listed sites. The list of blocked sites is a blind list, meaning that participating ISPs cannot view the content of the list.

In Croatia, although there are no specific laws with the use of particular web applications, a criminal activity taking place on such platforms may be subject to the provisions of the Criminal Code.

In the Czech Republic, there exists a domain name blocking policy. CZ.NIC-CSIRT, a security team operating within the registrar of the CZ.NIC national domain, is responsible for the administration of the Czech national domain. Since January 2010, CZ.NIC-CSIRT has blocked 150 domains ending with .cz. The reasons are connected with the dissemination of harmful software and phishing attacks. CZ.NIC-CSIRT was created with the aim to minimize the risks of potential threats to the national or international computer security and to help eliminate harmful content in the .cz domain space. The team is entitled to block harmful domain names for up to one month and may do so repeatedly. However, there exists no content blocking mechanisms within the Czech Republic.

In Denmark, closing down services, or blocking access to websites is provided by law. According to Section 75(2) of the Criminal Code the following objects (including websites) may be confiscated, where it is considered to be necessary to prevent further crime or otherwise required due to special circumstances:

1) objects used or intended to be used in a criminal act; 2) objects produced by a criminal act; and

3) objects in respect of which a criminal offence has otherwise been committed

Regarding blocking access to websites with allegedly illegal content, the Danish National Police work together with the Danish ISPs in relation to the so-called “child-pornography- blocking-filter”. The police encourage the ISPs to block access to websites containing child pornography. Finally, it must be noted that in each agreement of co-operation with the ISPs, the decision whether or not to block access to the websites in question is exclusively made by the ISPs.

773 _{Section 320.1 of the Criminal Code authorizes a judge to order the deletion from a computer system within} the jurisdiction of the court of publicly-available hate propaganda material. This provision makes it possible to eliminate hate propaganda material from the Internet in cases where the person who posted the material is unknown or outside Canadian jurisdiction.

774 _{Project Cleanfeed Canada is an initiative of the Canadian Coalition Against Internet Child Exploitation} (CCAICE), a voluntary, multi-sector forum comprised of industry, law enforcement, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from across the country. Project Cleanfeed Canada is administered by the Canadian Centre for Child Protection (C3P), a Canadian charitable organization that also manages Cybertip.ca, Canada’s national tipline for the reporting of child pornography.

It is also worth noting that the Danish Supreme Court upheld an injunction against a Danish ISP to block access to the Pirate Bay website in May 2010.775 The injunction was first issued by the bailiff’s court in 2008 and upheld by the high court later the same year.776 The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court that Pirate Bay contributed to serious copyright infringement and that the ISP Sonofon contributed to this infringement by providing its subscribers with access to the Pirate Bay website.

In Estonia, there are no general legal provisions which require closing down or blocking access to websites or any other types of Internet content. However, the public authorities have a general right to make precepts that can also stipulate that the ISPs have to block and close a specific website. For example, Article 146(1) of the Electronic Communications Act stipulates that the Director General of the Communications Board, or his or her deputy, and an