House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
When Limkaichong filed her COC, she stated therein that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. It was not true, according to the petitioners in the disqualification cases, because her father remained a Chinese citizen at the time of her birth. The COMELEC Second Division has sided with Camero and Villando, and disqualified Limkaichong to run as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental for having failed to comply with the citizenship requirement. Accordingly, her proclamation was ordered suspended notwithstanding that she obtained the highest number of votes during the elections. Nonetheless, she was proclaimed by the PBOC pursuant to the policy guidelines of COMELEC
En Banc Resolution No. 8062, and she has since assumed her position and
performed her functions as a Member of the House of Representatives.
I
Whether Limkaichong’s proclamation was valid.
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution.204[50] Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint
Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for
Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion,
if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
In G.R. Nos. 179132-33, Paras, however, maintained that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen who was disqualified to run as a congressional candidate by way of a final judgment of the COMELEC. With that, her proclamation was questionable and the same was done in open defiance of the Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. She also stressed that Limkaichong's proclamation was procedurally defective, it appearing that one of the PBOC members was not present on May 25, 2007, and that it took place in a restaurant and not at the provincial capitol. Finally, she argued that Limkaichong’s proclamation was void in accordance with the Court's pronouncement in the case of Codilla v. De Venecia.205[51]
204[50] COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 19, Sec. 2.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment on the petition of Paras, expressing its support for the position taken by the latter. A perusal of the arguments advanced by Paras and the OSG does not sway the Court to rule against the validity of Limkaichong’s proclamation. No less than the COMELEC First Division has sustained the validity of her proclamation when it dismissed, by way of a Resolution dated June 29, 2007, the petition filed by Paras to nullify the proclamation. Not only that. The COMELEC First Division has also adopted Limkaichong’s argument that following her valid proclamation, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the disqualification cases has ceased and that the same should be threshed out in the proper proceedings filed before the HRET. Notably, the dismissal of Paras’ petition was affirmed by the COMELEC in its Omnibus Order dated January 28, 2008.
In addition, the validity of Limkaichong's proclamation is in accordance with COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 8062. The disqualification cases filed against her remained pending as a result of her timely motion for reconsideration. Villando (in G.R. Nos. 179240-41), however, maintained that Resolution No. 8062 is invalid; hence, it could not be used as basis to validate Limkaichong's proclamation. He argued that it must be published since it is a “policy-guideline” in the exercise of the COMELEC’s rule-making power. As such, it cannot supersede the Joint Resolution of the Second Division which was rendered pursuant to the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial power.
His argument is specious. Resolution No. 8062 is not only a policy- guideline. It is also an administrative interpretation of the two (2) provisions of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (i) Section 17,206[52] Article VI
(ii); Section 2(2),207[53] Article IX-C; Section 6208[54] of R.A. 6646; and
206[52]Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party- list system represented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. 207[53]Section 2(2), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective, regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
208[54]Section 6, RA 6646, otherwise known as “An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other Purposes,” states: SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification
Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Sections 241209[55] and 243,210[56] Article XX of the OEC. As such, it does
not have to comply with the due process requirement. The term “administrative” connotes or pertains to “administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things.” It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.211[57] This is to be distinguished from
“quasi-judicial function,” a term which applies, among others, to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.212[58]
Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELEC’s constitutionally mandated power to promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of the elections.213[59] In adopting such policy-
guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and fair play. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Whereas, in this case, the COMELEC Second Division having failed to act on the disqualification cases against Limkaichong until after the conduct of the elections, with her obtaining the highest number of votes from the electorate, her proclamation was properly effected by the PBOC pursuant to Resolution No. 8062.
The Court has held in the case of Planas v. COMELEC,214[60] that at
the time of the proclamation of Defensor, the respondent therein who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final. As such, his proclamation was valid or legal, as he had at that point in time remained qualified. 209[55]Section 241 of the OEC provides: SEC. 241. Definition. - A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns.
210[56]Section 243 of the OEC provides: SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-
proclamation controversy. - The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in pre-
proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers.
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code.
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When the substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
211[57]Villarosa v. Commission on Elections and Atty. Dan Restor, 377 Phil. 497, 506
(1999), citing the Concurring Opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva
Caceres v. Martinez, 56 SCRA 148 (1974).
212[58]Id. at 507, citing Midland Insurance Corporation, 143 SCRA 458 (1986).
213[59]Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Limkaichong’s situation is no different from that of Defensor, the former having been disqualified by a Division Resolution on the basis of her not being a natural-born Filipino citizen. When she was proclaimed by the PBOC, she was the winner during the elections for obtaining the highest number of votes, and at that time, the Division Resolution disqualifying her has not yet became final as a result of the motion for reconsideration.
II
Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Limkaichong argued that her proclamation on May 25, 2007 by the PBOC divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to her qualifications, and that jurisdiction now lies with the HRET.
Biraogo, on the other hand, believed otherwise. He argued (in G.R.
No. 179120) that the issue concerning Limkaichong’s disqualification is
still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc to resolve because when Limkaichong was proclaimed on May 25, 2007, the matter was still pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.
We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.215[61] It follows then that
the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250216[62] of the OEC underscores the exclusivity
of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.217[63]
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
215[61]Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007,
520 SCRA 166, 179, citing Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405 (2005); Guerrero v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000).
216[62]SEC. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and
city offices. - A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
217[63]Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, supra note 61, at 178, citing Rasul
Corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules of the
HRET, as amended, which states: