A nivel local

y towards his church or its community. The

a threat I would suspect that in the media they would be differentiated and they would hint that it’s a success of some kind...

Therefore, fear is acknowledged as motivating, to some extent, differential state and public attitudes towards the Palestinian Arab minority. As such, the Palestinian Christians are not considered to represent the same level of security threat as Palestinian Muslims. However, opportunism is also understood to be an important factor, not only for the sake of international credibility and favourable public opinion but also for the sake of significant internal gains. While creating dissension within the minority aids and promotes state control over a feared minority, facilitating increased Christian autonomy similarly removes a number of clear financial burdens off the shoulders of the state. By facilitating increased autonomy on the p

ct.

I suspect that it was like a mutual kind of interest. Because the Christian communities have their own resources, I mean, they were left with a lot of their properties, so they rent a lot of places that they sell here and there and they also get a lot of money sometimes from abroad. So, they are established, and they don’t need the government money to handle their own affairs and that’s also convenient for them, because not having the government regulating them does not make them have to submit to any kind of standards or supervision or file certain documents, the government would not know what’s happening, so that’s kind of conv

how well we’re treating these Christian communities, giving them absolute autonomy to handle their own internal affairs.

Therefore, a degree of complicity between the

Church Leaders 

Within the church leadership segment, attitudes concerning the nature of Israeli state attitudes and policies differ. One representative from the Anglican Church, for example, did not attribute a discriminatory aspect to state polic

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fact t ports confir

[T]hey live regularly... they’re not being discriminated against because they are Druze, or

ographic or political perspective, as they do Muslim

ain factor shaping state policy towards the churches is the role of

differ ious

intent

identifies intra-governmental and intra-Jewish politics as determining a greater influence on policy

hat Palestinians in Israel are citizens of the state in possession of Israeli pass ms, to his mind, their equality in society.

Muslim or Christian. They are living as minorities, but they have their own representatives in the Knesset. There are a lot of things that are common with the Israelis, with the Jews.9

However, given that Israel, and the world in general, does not consider Palestinian Christians to be a “tentative bomb”, from either a dem

s, has, in his analysis, significantly improved both their relations with the state and their situation in society at large.

From his perspective, the state’s approach has, furthermore, been dictated and limited by the role of historical precedent as well as of various status quo agreements. At most, Israel is understood to have added to, or exacerbated, existing tensions and problems which predated the state’s establishment. “Israel added to the problem, but it was not the cause of it or its initiator.” In particular, the extension of official state recognition of the Anglican Church in 1970 was seen as a positive step towards mutual recognition and the practical administration of his church’s affairs. With regard to the unresolved issues of church taxation (the arnona tax) he goes so far as to identify the state’s attitudes towards the churches as being one of tolerance and respect. While this viewpoint makes reference to the international power of Christian churches, this respondent departs from all previous analyses by suggesting that the m

ent personalities within the Israeli government rather than any particular malic ion towards them.

Maybe one minister will issue a statement blaming the church for what they are doing or one of the employees will, you know, take a stand against this church because they have done so and so. It’s a rather personal rather than a general policy.

Similarly, in discussing the changeover of ministerial responsibility for the Department of Christian Affairs from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to the Ministry of the Interior, he

than any consideration of the minority themselves. “It’s a political issue, between rivals in the Israeli government itself rather than having something to do with anything else.”

9 _{Interview with Nabil Zumot, 12/03/2008.} 

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However, other church representatives offered radically different views. The Rector of the Latin Seminary in Beit Jala, suggested two main factors which have influenced the

state’s attitu ity

and th uing

impor

Christians in a different way also. Because Jews suffered from Christians during the ages, they consider that the persecution they endured a

Jesus. So, if

try visa is a lengthy and delayed procedure meaning that trips abroad are difficult to organise. These extra restrictions have made life very difficult for Arab clergy

Christian churches privileges, particularly tax exemption on church land holdings which they

des towards Palestinian Christians, and negatively at that: their Arab ethnic eir Christian religion.10

However, both are moderated, in his view, by the contin tance of Israel’s foreign policy commitments and strategic relations.

One view is they look at us as Arabs. It is true that they have an Israeli passport, but they still are Arabs. It means that they’re different. So they want to make a Jewish state. The Arabs in a Jewish state seem to be foreigners. It is built on a Jewish state. This is one thing. Another thing is that they look at

fter the death of Christ are motivated mainly by the fact that they are accused of killing they want to be very severe towards us they may consider us as traditional enemies. But now as they are supported by the USA, this feeling of… this anti-Christian feeling, doesn’t appear clearly.

While the political bias against Palestinian Christians as Arabs remains clearly evident to him, the “hidden feelings” of anti-Christian bias are, on the whole, generally only experienced by church representatives and clergy. This bias is particularly evident for him in relation to the difficulty which Christian clergy have had in securing visas to come to Israel in order to administer to religious and personal affairs of their communities. This bias is understood as having become increasingly tangible in recent years. After the creation of the state, he recounts that it was relatively easy to acquire multiple-entry visas for Christian clergy in Israel. However, this situation has now changed with the cancelation of multiple- entry visas for all clergy except the very top leadership levels. In addition, an Arab bias has been introduced to the extension of visas. In the first instance, Arab clergy find it more difficult to acquire visas. Now they are granted only one-year visas, with the stipulation that if they should plan a trip outside of Israel within that year, their visa is cancelled and re-entry refused if they don’t apply in advance for a separate re-entry visa before their departure. The application for a re-en

and the administration of religious services to Christian communities which are spread across territorial boundaries.

In discussing the reasons behind the failure to implement the Fundamental Agreement between Israel and the Vatican, he mentions Israel’s reluctance to continue giving the

10 _{Interview with William Shomali, 18/03/2008.} 

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have traditionally enjoyed as part of the status quo arrangements. Once more, this change of attitude by the state towards the churches is observed as being a recent development origin

towar

Turks and the French and the British, and they accept a compromise. In this case they will win, and we will lose something but we will not lose everything.

f the churches in Israel, signifies both a test-case of those relations and a potenti

the general freedom

Franciscan Custos, by contrast, suggests that ignorance, resulting from their demographically small size, is a more accurate description of both the state’s and the general Israeli Jewish ating in the last ten years. In explaining possible reasons for this change of policy ds the church, he provides a number of possible interpretations.

Maybe this displays the hesitation inside Israel itself to give privileges... as Israelis are not all agreed together on this. This is one thing. Then, the change of Ministers… There [are] a lot of changes in the Director General of the representations to these negotiations. This is [another] reason. But it is not enough to justify all this slowness in giving a final decision. Maybe they don’t want to give us these privileges. Or the slowness is a kind of pressure: we can continue this way for years, you will not have what you want, so you have to accept a compromise. Maybe it’s their way to [push] for a compromise. Maybe… So in this way they say, ok, we don’t remain in the status quo, in the privileges given to us by the

And this compromise maybe they are looking for it, both of them, now. They’ve understood that…

It would, therefore, appear that the international power of influence which Christian churches traditionally had over Israel, particularly during the early years of the state, has declined. The Israeli state is portrayed as being increasingly independent and indifferent to international and western Christian opinion. The balance of power in church-state relations is gradually shifting, and this confrontation with the most powerful church in Israel, the Latin Church, which has a leadership role among the rest o

al watershed for future relations depending on the outcome or compromise reached in these negotiations.

Although church-state relations in Israel are observed by this respondent to be deteriorating, not all aspects of Israeli state policy are considered negative. On the positive side, he mentions the economic support given by the government to Catholic schools in Israel. The state, he observes, picks up sixty-five per cent of the budget of these schools which represents an important contribution in his eyes. Furthermore, he praises

of religion which is enjoyed in Israel, and the steps which the state takes to allow full Christian worship whether it is in terms of holy days or religious processions.

While some respondents suggested that fear, opportunism or anti-Christian bias represent key factors motivating Israeli state policy towards Palestinian Christians, the

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public attitude towards Christians. “In Israel, first of all, most of Israelis don’t see Christians and don’t know anything about Christians.”11 He then adds:

The attitude of the state, the first is ignorance. They don’t care about Christians. We don’t bring enough votes. But the church is important for foreign policy for if it speaks everyone listens… and generally speaking they don’t like us so much. This is what I feel.

This suggests that both pragmatism and foreign policy considerations do influence state attitudes to some extent. However, ignorance remains the primary trait. This ignorance is influenced by a number of factors. Firstly, the changing demographics within Israeli society have resulted in fewer Jewish officials who are of European background who have direct experience, awareness of, or sensitivity to Christianity and Christian issues and are, thus, sufficiently informed or open-minded to engage with the churches. Secondly, there is a noticeable rise in the number of religious Jewish groups in government, who care little about promoting or even discussing Christian matters. Finally, their demographic small size, together with these other forces, have rendered Palestinian Christians an increasingly negligible community in political terms. “The state of Israel first of all does not think about the Christians, but when it thinks about the Christians, it thinks about the Christians mainly in Jerusalem.” This last factor demonstrates the close intersection between international Christian interest and the Jerusalem question. The fixation of international Christian interest on Jerusalem has provided the authorities with more freedom and independence in the manner in which it engages with Christian communities living in other areas.

Like the Latin Rector, the Franciscan Custos also integrates into his analysis an understanding of the role of differentiated internal Israeli Jewish politics. Generally speaking, the churches and the Palestinian Christians rarely experience state policy directly. The point of contact which they have for important issues of visas, land issues et cetera is generally not at the ministerial level, but at the level of local authorities. In describing the attitude of local authorities towards the church, he suggests that “[t]hey don’t understand the Christian significance of the Holy Places, for instance... I don’t think this is cynicism. Simply they don’t understand the significance.” Elsewhere he commented that “I don’t think it’s a deliberate policy. Sometimes maybe so, but generally speaking it’s ignorance”.

The parish priest of the Christian village of Mailiya, by contrast, reflected on state policy towards his village and its parishioners and identified it in strongly negative terms.12

11 _{Interview with Pierbattista Pizzaballa, 28/03/2008.} 

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One particular aspect of discrimination he identified was with respect to land. He mentions how the government has designated significant tracts of village-owned land in Mailiya as “green” areas on which the villagers have no further rights to build, farm or develop their land. He also mentions the negative impact that the construction on their village land of the Jewish village, Hela, which was built only twenty years ago, has caused. His own family’s personal history tells an additional story of suffering. Originally from the destroyed village of Kfar Bir’am, his family became internal refugees before eventually settling in Haifa. The memories of these experiences stay with him. Finally, he considers the state’s policy towards further education as deliberately, albeit indirectly, discriminating against the Palestinian minority, including the Palestinian Christian segment of it. He argues that due to a minimum age restriction for enrolment in many university degree programmes – which is set at twenty- one years of age to coincide with the average age of Israelis who complete military service – a three-year vacuum for Israel’s Christian and Muslim youth is created. Given this void, economic pressures oblige many Palestinian youths to enter the work-force immediately, a situation from which they have great difficulty extricating themselves three years later. They face various choices; they must either “put their lives on hold” until they are twenty-one, forego further education altogether, or continue their education abroad if they can afford it. If they choose the latter opportunity, the likelihood of returning to Israel diminishes starkly. Emigration continues to be a threat even to those who do receive further education in Israel as a result of the lack of suitable professional work opportunities for Palestinians inside Israel.