In this section, I redefine substantive representation in the light of the claim-making framework. As I have already argued, previous literature on ethnic representation defines substantive representation as “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 209). In this section I challenge the way each of the components of this definition – acting for, interests dimension and responsiveness – has been operationalised.
First, following Saward, I argue that substantive representation is not about true and essential interests but about claims to “know” these interests that aim to cause the articulated
interests to be perceived as such by the constituency. This moves us from an essentialist copy-
and-paste or mimetic understanding of representation towards acknowledging its creative aspects, namely in the constitution of interests and the kind of demands to be made upon them. In claiming to “know” minority interests, representatives create what they claim to merely present, and thus treat as being already there. In so doing, they engage in the performative and the constative dimensions of representation in one and the same claim. In Saward’s words, albeit representatives might present themselves as doing this, they cannot simply “read off” their constituents’ interests; these interests need to be “read in” (Saward 2010, p. 310). This understanding of substantive representation as a creative activity has been widely adopted in the gender representation literature (Celis, Childs et al., 2008, p. 106). The ethnic representation literature, however, has mostly accepted the naturalised version of interests that is often the end product rather than the starting point of the representative process.
Second, if minority groups and their interests are constructed during the representative process, then, as Disch rightly maintains, “responsiveness to those interests is hardly a reliable indicator that democratic representation is functioning well” (Disch, 2012a, p. 600). Although Pitkin’s definition of substantive representation was operationalised as congruence between representative behaviour and constituencies’ pre-existing preferences, even Pitkin was aware of some of the pitfalls involved in such an understanding. While Pitkin saw responsiveness as a central criterion of representation in cases of transparent and clear interests, she was keen to stress that where the represented were unaware of their interests or had distorted views, the representative’s task was not to follow their preferences but to do what, in their judgment, was best for them (Pitkin, 1967, p. 164). In such cases, responsiveness was not an adequate criterion for measuring substantive representation, but rather,
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accountability, i.e. the explanation and justification of representative decisions to the represented (Brito Vieira, 2017b, p. 27-28). Contra Pitkin, I suggest that there are no essential or objective interests out there to be discovered, but that representatives actively construct what is to be recognised as such in more or less convincing ways. This involves a complex and contested process of establishing what is at stake in a given policy; what is in the interest of a constituency and why; what ought to come first in their hierarchy of interests; who gains, and eventually who loses, with the greater weight given to those interests, etc. Hence, substantive representation cannot be understood as simply an issue of responsiveness to preferences set apart from their more or less competitive political articulation (see also Cianetti, 2014).
Third, representatives need to portray themselves as those who can access or get to know minority interests and act upon them in relevant ways if they want to convince the audience of the authenticity and consequence of their claims. This is where the interplay between descriptive and substantive representation comes to the fore. Both descriptive and substantive representations include claims about and for minorities and their demands (formerly, “representations”). Yet, to position themselves as descriptive representatives, claim-makers need to convince the audience of their belonging in and with the constituency, which can then be used as a resource in making claims about minorities and making demands on their behalf. Claims to substantive representation depend on the successful depiction of representatives as those who can know minority interests and are capable of acting upon them based on their particular relationship with the minority community – in this case, one of identity, as constituted through embodiment and their claim to be and act as descriptive representatives. In this process, representatives tend to treat both identity and interests as natural or necessary, thereby deliberately hiding from view their role in the creation of both. Goffman accurately captures this process,
When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to believe that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess, that the task he performs will have the consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are what they appear to be (Goffman, 1956, p.10).
The fourth point I want to make in reconceptualising substantive representation relates to the meaning of its acting for component. Rather than merely portraying minority interests, substantive representation is conceived as an advancement of these interests, i.e. an activity with consequences. In line with this, the literature on minority representation tends to operationalise substantive representation in terms of the congruence between constituents’ preferences and their representative’s voting records (Cameron, Epstein et al., 1996, Ueda, 2008). Yet, in adopting such a static measurement, and in presupposing the pre-existence of
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the thing that the action is measured against, this literature fails to capture the performative aspects of the representation of interests. On the other hand, gender scholars who have adopted a more constructivist understanding of representation define acting for as denouncing a situation that is disadvantageous for women, formulating proposals to improve the situation of women or that claim a right for women (Celis, 2006). While they embrace the performative and aesthetic aspects of the constructivist view of representation, their understanding of what might count as actions seems to remain rather restrictive. Representatives make claims not only about constituencies’ interests but also about what it means to act for these interests – and what it means to achieve something of value through that action. Empirical research must therefore ask how claim-makers claim to act for their constituents rather than work with pre-established notions of what counts as a legitimate
action upon minority interests. In contrast to those scholars who argue that making interests
present is not an instance of substantive representation (Severs, 2012), I suggest that representatives may frame even simply publicizing or speaking about such interests as their way of acting upon minorities and changing things in their favour. “Action and not just words” establishes an opposition that they overtly reject: words do things, and things can be made in saying something, especially where this something reaches or indeed disturbs relevant audiences. In contrast to Severs, further, who criticises Saward for not specifically defining activities performed on behalf of the represented (Severs, 2012, p. 173), I argue that a lack of a specific listing of what counts as acting for is not a shortcoming but a necessary move if we adopt an aesthetic and dynamic view of representation, which looks into the how, and learns from it, rather than pre-determines it through categorisation.
Therefore, in my understanding, substantive representation refers to claims to act upon minority interests, which involves a creative process that consists of: 1) the construction of minority groups and their interests as bearing a natural or necessary relation; 2) the construction of a representative as the one who can know the minority’s true or vital interests; 3) and the construction of the array of actions that count as, and should be recognised as counting as, legitimate actions upon minority interests.