Absorción del conocimiento de los instrumentos

was essentially an upgrade of existing networks and not the promulgation of a new road network. SANRAL commissioned the University of Cape Town’s Graduate Business School to undertake a feasibility study surrounding the GFIP (Parliament of South Africa, 2011). In short, it found that the ORT system would be beneficial to the South African road user, as it would mobilise capital for the GFIP and related infrastructure projects. Additionally, the study found that the ORT system would be well served to recoup the initial investment by SANRAL in the GFIP and that it would be more effective than regular taxation.

The year 2008 saw the price escalation of the GFIP to R11.4 billion, almost double the original estimation of R6.8 billion, which was made only two years earlier. On 28 March 2008, six of the seven major roads that would have been affected and upgraded as planned in the GFIP outline, were announced as toll roads in the Government Gazette, with the final road (the R21), following at the end of July, due to the fact that the road needed to have its status changed from a provincial to a national road. In May 2008, the last remaining sections of the GFIP awarded tenders to their respective companies, the most notable of which was the awarding of a R6.6 billion contract to the Electronic Toll Consortium (ETC), which was expected to facilitate the e-Toll collection once the system became operational. The tender was awarded to the ETC and its parent company, KAPSCH telecom, who own a majority share in the company. This was the first mention of the e-Tolling system in the GFIP programme and was still to be confirmed by parliament and cabinet, because certain law changes were needed in order to implement the process. It is only once the relevant toll fees were announced in 2011 that the public outrage took shape. The awarding of this tender contract was largely overlooked by most citizens in South Africa and could perhaps have formed a more adequate opposition to the tolling system, had opposition been mobilised at this time.17 With construction ready to begin, SANRAL launched a radio marketing campaign to raise awareness for the work that would shortly commence on Gauteng’s freeway network.18 _{The goal of this radio marketing campaign was to both highlight the}

benefits of the GFIP and how it would impact the average road user during the construction phase.

3.7 CONSTRUCTION BEGINS

17_{The public opposition to the e-Tolling system is explained in greater detail in Chapter Five.}

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Construction commenced in July and August 2008, with completion tabled for early May 2010 (shortly before the commencement of the FIFA Soccer World Cup). Following the completion of the feasibility study carried out by the UCT Graduate Business School, SANRAL published the findings of the study. The study determined that the GFIP and its related upgrades to roads in the Gauteng area would increase Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by R29 billion nationally, of which R13 billion would be accounted for on a provincial level. Following the findings of the feasibility study, the cost benefit analysis of the GFIP found benefit to be at 8.4 to 1, or more simply, for every rand spent on the GFIP, R8.40 would be made by the country. These benefits would come in many forms, as mentioned earlier. Safer roads equate to faster journey times and less spent on vehicle maintenance; similarly, better roads lead to fewer accidents and the associated financial burden that it places on individuals and on the country (Standish, Boting & Marsay, 2010).

The GFIP and its upgrades to roads were also accompanied by investment in smart traffic management systems, improved lighting, real-time signage and incident management systems that would improve the overall road experience for users (GFIP fact sheet, 2008)19.

By the time of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, most of the road improvements had been completed. These improvements can be seen on Figure 3.2, and included the William Nicol interchange, the N1/N17 link at Soweto, the Maraisburg ramp, the Rivonia interchange, the R21 flyover towards Polokwane and the R21/Hans Strijdom interchange (SANRAL Annual Report 2011:4). These projects were fast tracked in order to be completed before the soccer tournament took place.

Although not all of the projects were completed on time but the concrete barriers which had been put in place to increase worker safety had been removed in order to facilitate an environment where road users could enjoy the newly upgraded roads to their full potential. The remainder of the work recommenced on 12 July 2010, after the World Cup had ended and all construction work was planned to be completed in time for the original launch date of June 2011 (Hale, 2014).

The following chapter will discuss in detail the economic ramifications of the GFIP, the operationalisation of which has been set out in Chapter Two. Once the economic situation has

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been analysed, Chapter Five will look at the role that public support has played in determining whether or not the Gauteng e-Tolling project can be viewed as a successful or failed mega project.

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CHAPTER FOUR: ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS OF THE

GAUTENG E-TOLLING PROJECT

This chapter will seek to outline the economic ramifications of the Gauteng e-Tolling project specifically in relation to the construction phase of the project up to the present day. The analysis will be completed using the analytical framework that was outlined at the conclusion of Chapter Two. This framework for analysis focuses on four main points: underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, negative economic effects and a lack of promised economic multipliers.