Aquinas expressly rejects the principle that from one being, only one simple being can be produced in the context of creating.409 In response to the claim that conformity between effect and cause requires that only one simple being be produced by one simple being, Aquinas responds that conformity may simply mean likeness. There is some likeness between creatures and God, but this fact does not mean that there is, in Aquinas’s terms, equality between creatures and God.410 The fact that God is a simple, unified being does not mean that creatures must also have those qualities. Aquinas seems to be denying that God’s nature as a simple, unified being limits God’s creative emanation to one creature that, like
408 Aquinas, ST Ia.45.1 resp. Avicenna similarly claims that God does not use any pre-existing matter (or beings) to emanate the First Intellect; however, he rejected the notion that God created ex nihilo because he took ex nihilo production to imply that there was a time when God existed but the universe did not. Avicenna objected to this notion for two reasons. First, before the production of the universe, there would have been no time—time cannot exist without motion, and motion cannot exist without material beings. If God were the only being in existence, there would be no matter, no motion, and no time. Second, Avicenna asserts that the universe is sempiternal. As long as God exists, God’s effect exists. Since God always exists (because God is a necessary being and cannot fail to exist), the universe also always exists (as something which is necessary through another—that is, it is (theoretically) possible for the universe not to exist, but because God wills the universe to exist, it must exist). See Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VI, IX.
409 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.15. resp; see also Wayne Hankey’s comments in “Ab Uno Simplici non est Nisi Unum: The Place of Natural and Necessary Emanation in Aquinas’s Doctrine of Creation,” in Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Reverend Doctor Robert D. Crouse, eds. Michael Treschow, Willemien Otten, and Walter Hannam (New York: Brill, 2007), 309-333, especially 317.
410 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.16 obj 7; ad 7.
God, is simple and unified.411 Aquinas substantially loosens the requirement that an effect be like its cause when he asserts that material objects can be similar to their simple, immaterial creator.
An entirely simple agent is bound to emanate one and only one thing, Aquinas says, when that agent acts by its nature and produces some effect equal to itself.412 This statement, mentioned above, raises an interesting question, namely, whether it ever occurs that a simple agent is bound to emanate one and only one thing. In order to answer this question,
Aquinas’s doctrine of the Trinity, particularly the doctrine of the procession of the members of the Trinity, is required.
a. Excursus on Emanation in the Trinity
Aquinas holds the orthodox Christian belief that God is a simple, immaterial, eternal, changeless, unified being who is three persons, all of whom share the same substance. To understand the Trinity in such a way that one thinks that three independent gods exist is incorrect; yet, it is equally incorrect to assert that only one of these stated divine
411 Perhaps this denial is unsurprising in light of some of the philosophical difficulties associated with Avicenna’s claim that the First Intellect is a simple being. Avicenna asserts that God produces the First Intellect, which is simple and unified like God. However, as can easily be deduced from McGinnis’s discussion of Avicenna’s creation account, it is puzzling that Avicenna makes the claim that the First Intellect is simple:
Avicenna himself claims that the First Intellect is a being that has a dual ontological status—it is possible in itself but necessary through another. Avicenna claims that this dual ontological status is the source of numerically and qualitatively different beings in the universe. McGinnis seems to suggest that Avicenna cannot mean that the First Intellect is simple because Avicenna acknowledges that the First Intellect is both necessary through another but possible in itself. In response to the suggestion that Avicenna does not, in reality, hold to the belief that from one simple being, one simple being can be produced, I would argue that McGinnis does not place enough emphasis on Avicenna’s claim that, for God’s part, God creates a being that is simple. The duality in the First Intellect arises from the fact that the First Intellect is a created being—and thus, it cannot be necessary in itself. In my estimation, Avicenna argues that God produces the First Intellect, which is a simple being; yet, at the moment of production, it necessarily takes on this dual ontological status. The dual ontological status does not stem from God’s productive effort; instead, it is a byproduct of the fact that the First Intellect is created. Whether this defense is satisfying is certainly up for debate. But, given the tensions surrounding Avicenna’s claim that from one simple being, only one simple being can be produced (that one might find in Ghazali’s critiques or Averroës’s response to those critiques), it might be unsurprising that Aquinas would abandon this model purely for the sake of philosophical ease. That this is the only reason he might do so is not what I believe.
412 Aquinas, ST Ia.47.1 ad 1.
persons—God the Father, God the Son, or God the Holy Spirit—is god.413 As one might expect, much ink has been spilled in an attempt to explain the doctrine of the Trinity. Of particular concern for Christians, historically speaking, has been the difficulty which arises from asserting that these three persons share one substance.414 In the context of this study, the important concern is how there come to be three divine persons which are composed of the same substance.
To address the issue of how three persons share one substance, Aquinas speaks of the first person of the Trinity, God the Father, generating the second person of the Trinity, God the Son. The third person of the Trinity, God the Holy Spirit, is spirated by God the Father and God the Son.415 Aquinas speaks of the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit in terms of emanation.416 Aquinas says that the procession of the second and third persons of the Trinity can be understood “according to an intelligible emanation, namely, of the intelligible word [emanating] by speaking, which remains in the person.”417 The emanation of the Son and the Holy Spirit is not an outward emanation; instead, it is an emanation which produces something within God.
The internal emanation of God the Son can be called generation of a certain sort.418 Aquinas distinguishes two types of generation. The first type of generation is common to
413 Aquinas, ST Ia.27, 32-43.
414 This issue has been of concern for Christians since before the doctrine of the Trinity was expressed in creedal form in the fourth century. Some notable and highly influential philosophers and theologians who have attempted to articulate this doctrine clearly include Augustine and Boethius (and, obviously, Aquinas).
415 Aquinas ascribes to the Roman Catholic doctrine that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son. This position, called filioque after the term inserted into the Nicene creed in the eleventh century, is not universally held among Christians. Aquinas, however, speaks of the procession of the Holy Spirit in terms of a procession from both the Father and the Son. See Edward Siecienski, The Filioqe: History of a Doctrinal Controversy (New York: Oxford, 2009).
416 Aquinas, SCG IV.11; Hankey, 329.
417 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.1 resp: sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso.
418 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.1 resp.
everything that is subject to generation and corruption, and the term applies to a change from non-existence to existence. The second type of generation is common to all living things, and the term applies to the origin of a living being from another living being. The former type of generation does not apply to the emanation of the second and third persons of the Trinity, but the second does. Aquinas makes a further distinction, asserting that some things to which the second type of generation applies are also things which are begotten.
When something is begotten, it is generated “by way of similitude.”419 A dog begets puppies, but a dog does not beget its fur. The thing begotten must be the same sort of thing as that which begets it. That is, something which is begotten has the same nature as the thing which begets it. Because the members of the Trinity share the same nature—which means that each member of the Trinity is a being that lacks passive potency—the second and third member of the Trinity are generated insofar as they are living beings. The second member of the Trinity, the Son, is said to have been begotten because the Son and the Father share the same nature. The generation of the Son occurs via the intelligible emanation discussed above.420 The procession of love between the Father and the Son is the third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit.421 This procession is best called spiration, however, and not
generation.422 There are, then, two emanations within the Godhead: the begetting of the Son and the proceeding of the Holy Spirit.423
These intellectual emanations “cannot but be.”424 These emanations are necessary, for it is necessary that God has self-knowledge. God’s self-knowledge necessarily results in
419 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.2 resp (rationem similitudinis).
420 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.2 resp.
421 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.3 resp.
422 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.4 resp.
423 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.3.
424 Aquinas, On the Power of God 2.4 resp.; Aquinas, ST Ia.41.2. ad 5.
the emanation of the Son by the Father, and the self-knowledge of the Father and the Son necessarily results in their emanating the Holy Spirit.425 God, being God, cannot fail to exist in three persons.426
Aquinas asserts that God the Father emanates God the Son because of the nature of God. God the Father does not emanate the Son because the Father wills it; instead, the Father emanates the Son because it is the Father’s nature to emanate the Son. According to Aquinas, when an agent emanates by nature, the agent’s emanation is determined to one effect.427 God’s will, of course, is not contrary to the emanation of the Son. As Aquinas states, something can be understood to be made by will either because (a) the thing willed is
concomitant428 with the one who wills or (b) the thing willed is produced by expressed action upon the agent willing it. An example of (a) would be me willing myself to be human. I am not a human as the result of my will to be human; I am human and that I will to be human.
425 Aquinas, In Sent I.6.1.1; ST Ia.41.2; Aquinas, On the Power of God 2.4 and 10.2 ad 5; Hankey, 329.
426 In Aquinas’s answer to the question, “Can a multitude of things proceed from one first thing,” in On the Power of God 3.16, Aquinas says that if the first thing’s effective power “is not determined to one effect save to that which were equal to him, and this cannot be sufficient to any effect” (Nam cum eius activa potentia sit infinita, non terminatur ad unum nisi ad id quod esset aequale sibi, quod nulli effectui competere potest.). Here, Aquinas is discussing what is possible in the context of an emanation outside of the Godhead. When he
discusses the procession of the divine persons in the tenth question of On the Power of God, Aquinas asserts that the emanation of the Son and the Holy Spirit occur because God is an intelligent and living being (10.1). God, as an intelligent and living being, cannot but emanate the Son and the Holy Spirit. I would say that Aquinas distinguishes between emanations within the Godhead and outside the Godhead, and although the internal emanations are natural and necessary, they are not subject to the claim Aquinas makes earlier about the first thing’s effective power not be sufficient to any effect. God cannot produce something equal to God outside of God for two reasons, which are consistent with Aquinas’s philosophy but neither of which are offered by Aquinas in his reply to On the Power of God 3.16. First, this second being would be created, and thus it would not be entirely sufficient. A being which is entirely sufficient is not equal to God (since God is entirely self-sufficient). Second, (if we set aside the first reason) the existence of this second being would mean that there are two Gods. According to Aquinas (who follows Maimonides and Avicenna on this point), there can be only one God (ST Ia.11.3). In one sense, the emanations within the Godhead are equal to God: the persons of the Trinity share the same nature. However, it is clear that Aquinas’s statement about God’s inability to produce something equal to God is directed at an external emanation rather than an internal emanation.
427 On the Power of God 2.4 resp; 10.2 ad 4; ST Ia.41.2 resp; This statement is somewhat puzzling, for Aquinas asserts that there are two emanations within the Godhead. Despite the difficulties this statement might present, it is clear that Aquinas believes that the procession of the second and third persons of the Trinity is a necessary emanation based on the nature of God. I discuss the difficulties associated with this statement below.
428 Aquinas does not use the term ‘concomitant’ in a technical sense (like Avicenna’s use of concomitant discussed in chapter two) here.
An example of (b) would be a worker willing to produce a home: the home exists as the result of the worker acting upon the volition to produce it.429 According to Aquinas, when one wills in the manner of (a), one can be said to be acting by nature and not will. It is my nature to be human, so if I will my nature, my will is not a causal factor in me having that nature. When Aquinas says that God the Father begets Son by will, Aquinas means that God the Father “is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son.”430 God the Father does not will to beget the Son in the manner of (b), and thus (for clarity’s sake) it is said that God the Father begets the Son by nature and not by will. The necessary
emanations within the Godhead, however, are preconditions of the creative emanation.431 b. Trinitarian consideration of whether from one simple being, one
simple being is produced
Here, it seems that Aquinas has contradicted himself. Aquinas clearly states that there are two processions within the Godhead, and yet by asserting that these processions occur by God’s nature, Aquinas is saying that there should be one effect of God’s
emanation. Wayne Hankey, in discussing the emanations within the Godhead, suggests that the claim that God the Father emanates the Son by nature entails that Aquinas embraces Avicenna’s principle that from one simple being, only one simple being can be emanated.432 Hankey asserts that by specifying that God the Father emanates the Son (and both emanate the Holy Spirit) necessarily and by nature, Aquinas is endorsing the notion that one simple being produces one effect.433 Hankey’s comments unfortunately overlook the fact that
429 Aquinas, ST Ia.41.2 resp.
430 Aquinas, ST Ia.41.2 resp.
431 Hankey, 329-330; G. Emery, La Trinité Créatrice: Trinité et creation dans les commentaries aux Sentences de Thomas d’Aquin et de ses précurseurs Albert le Grand et Bonaventure (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1995), 280.
432 Hankey, 329.
433 Hankey, 331.
Aquinas asserts that there are two productive emanations within the Godhead, and thus the Father is responsible (at least partly) for two effects. The claim that Aquinas endorses Avicenna’s principle that one simple being can emanate one simple being must at least account for the double emanation within the Godhead, and Hankey offers no such analysis.
If one were to take seriously the claim that Aquinas means to endorse the claim that from one simple being, one simple being can be produced, one would have to assert that when Aquinas says that an agent whose action is determined by nature is determined to one effect, Aquinas means that the agent whose action is determined by nature is determined not to one single effect but to one type of effect. This, of course, is a plausible interpretation of that claim. When Aquinas gives examples of agents acting by their natures, Aquinas
references agents reproducing. 434 Reproduction is done according to kind: humpback whales birth humpback whales, and oak trees produce acorns (which grow into oak trees). A whale can produce more than one calf, and an oak can produce more than one acorn; however, neither could produce something other than a member of their own natural kind. Thus, it seems possible that Hankey might have been able to argue that because the Son and the Holy Spirit share the nature of the Father, the two emanations which produce them are productive of one type of effect.
However, if one were to take seriously Hankey’s claim that Aquinas means to endorse the notion that from one simple being, one simple being can be produced, one would have to reinterpret what it means to be ‘one simple being.’ Aquinas (and any orthodox Christian) clearly asserts that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct persons. That is, while the members of the Trinity share the same substance, they are not the same person. The
434 Aquinas, ST Ia.47.2.
members of the Trinity are distinguished by the relations among those members: the Father begets the Son, and the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit.435 Despite the existence of the three persons, Aquinas (and orthodox Christian teaching) asserts that there exists one God. So, Hankey’s claim raises interesting and problematic interpretational questions. Is it true that in these two emanations, more than ‘one simple being’ is produced? Additionally, is it true that because there is one God in three persons, no matter the number of emanations, there cannot be more than ‘one simple being’ produced? Ultimately, these answer to these questions hinge on the distinction between what it means to produce a being versus what it means to produce a person. In the case of the production of the members of the Trinity, this distinction is essential for determining whether Aquinas does adopt Avicenna’s principle that from one simple being, one simple being can be produced. This fact, coupled with Aquinas’s expressed aversion to the principle in every other context in which he introduces it, suggests that Hankey’s assertion that Aquinas adopts the principle is hasty at best. There is
members of the Trinity are distinguished by the relations among those members: the Father begets the Son, and the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit.435 Despite the existence of the three persons, Aquinas (and orthodox Christian teaching) asserts that there exists one God. So, Hankey’s claim raises interesting and problematic interpretational questions. Is it true that in these two emanations, more than ‘one simple being’ is produced? Additionally, is it true that because there is one God in three persons, no matter the number of emanations, there cannot be more than ‘one simple being’ produced? Ultimately, these answer to these questions hinge on the distinction between what it means to produce a being versus what it means to produce a person. In the case of the production of the members of the Trinity, this distinction is essential for determining whether Aquinas does adopt Avicenna’s principle that from one simple being, one simple being can be produced. This fact, coupled with Aquinas’s expressed aversion to the principle in every other context in which he introduces it, suggests that Hankey’s assertion that Aquinas adopts the principle is hasty at best. There is