Although the White House received extensive intelligence support before and throughout the Six-Day War, this chapter focuses primarily on intelligence that President Johnson received between May 23rd and May 26th. This brief period was chosen for two reasons: first, it is difficult to gauge attitudes towards intelligence in other cases due to Johnson’s reading routine. His most common form of intelligence consumption occurred during his “night reading” sessions before bed (Priess, 2017b, pp. 48-49). While sparse reports from Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President, are available, they are neither a reliable nor a consistent measure of attitudes towards the intelligence, especially that on specific topics.
Second, Johnson’s reaction to intelligence during the crisis is relatively well-documented. The documents that L.B.J. viewed are marked with a cursive “L” for Lyndon or “PS” for
President Saw on the top of the first page. For instance, Figure 4-2, a cover page for a situation
report from June 9th, 1967, shows the document was received and read by Johnson at 9:35 pm (note the “L” in the top right corner of the document):
Figure 4-1: President Has Seen15
Not only did the intelligence documents have Johnson’s “L,” but White House staff, foreign ambassadors, and Johnson himself have written on his reaction to intelligence during this period of the Arab-Israeli Crisis. For instance, Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, and others who interacted with him during this time have described his words, physical indicators, and
behaviors. As such, the limitations are not as much of a hindrance in this case, as opposed to other time periods, and there is ample historical evidence of both Johnson’s attitude and the intelligence he received. Thus, the period of May 23rd to May 26th, 1967, provides sufficient data to determine Johnson’s attitude towards intelligence preceding the crisis. In the following
section, I provide a brief overview and timeline of the intelligence Johnson received over those four days.
On May 23rd, 1967, the day after Nasser announced the closing of the Straits of Tiran, the C.I.A. began to prepare for the unfolding crisis. Helms established “a 24-hour Arab-Israeli Task Force to work in our C.I.A. Operations Center, to focus all available intelligence and expertise on the responsibilities for current reporting.”16 This prudence quickly became apparent, as Johnson pulled Helms from a House Armed Services subcommittee briefing to vent his frustration (Freshwater, 1969). President Johnson had just received a phone call from an irate U.S. ambassador to Israel, Arthur Goldberg. Goldberg was upset about the lack of warning and fearful that Israel was militarily outmatched. As a result of the conversation with the ambassador, Johnson directed Helms to produce intelligence on the military balance of the Arab-Israeli crisis as soon as possible. Leveraging his foresight, Director Helms promptly delivered two papers to the President by the regular Tuesday lunch, only four hours after his request (Freshwater, 1969; Robarge, 2005).
The papers, titled “US Knowledge of Egyptian Alert” and “Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities,” provided significant insight into the crisis before the administration had made public commitments or policy changes. The first of these documents remains significantly redacted; but the second, often referred to as the “who will win” memorandum was the most impactful. The overall assessment was as follows:
The judgment of the Intelligence Community is that Israeli ground forces “can maintain internal security, defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts, or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth.” In the air, the judgment is less clear: the Israelis “probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel’s air facilities were not damaged beyond repair.”17
16 Helms, Richard, “Draft Briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Helms for the President’s Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board,” June 14, 1967. Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry Files: Job 80–R01580, Box 10, Folder 210, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified], LBJ Library.
17 Central Intelligence Agency, “Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities,” May 23, 167. National Security
The paper also provided troop numbers and a basic qualitative assessment based on Egypt’s experience in Yemen since the 1956 Suez incident. From May 23rd to the early evening of May 25th, the situation remained relatively stable and there were no major developments.18
At 6:00 pm on May 25th, 1967, Rostow sent a memorandum to the President (Figure 4- 2):19
Figure 4-2: Rostow Memo to President Johnson
Attached to the memo was an Israeli intelligence estimate sent by an unnamed, high-ranking, Israeli spy. The second attachment was a C.I.A. assessment of the Israeli intelligence. 20 While
18 Presidential Daily Brief, May 24, 1967, obtained here:
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005973818.pdf.
19 “Memorandum for the Record,” National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II., Box 106,
Memos & Misc. 5/26-30/67 [4-4] No classification marking, LBJ Library.
the C.I.A. essentially dismissed the Israeli estimate as a ploy to attract U.S. support, Rostow conveys the commonalities between the U.S. and Israeli estimates. In his own handwriting, Rostow wrote as follows:
P.S. The two estimates – Israeli and C.I.A. – both show how explosive are: –Israeli anxieties;
–Nasser’s hopes of picking up prestige;
–U.S.S.R. desires for gaining prestige, short of a war.
Just two days before, Johnson had had a clear intelligence view of the crisis; but the Israeli document made Johnson and his administration doubtful (Robarge, 2005).21 As a result, L.B.J. requested that his staff “scrub this thing down,” or re-evaluate the information, and provide a new assessment (Helms, 1982b). The resulting paper, “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States,” was a joint C.I.A./D.I.A. memorandum. The report doubled down on the estimate given earlier, in “Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities,” that Israel would win quickly and decisively. Attached to the memorandum was a note from Helms, claiming this was the I.C.’s response to the request for a “scrub down.” The headline of the memorandum was as follows:
Israel could almost certainly attain air superiority over the Sinai Peninsula in 24 hours after taking the initiative, or in two or three days if the U.A.R. [United Arab Republic, referring to Egypt and Syria] struck first. In the latter case, Israel might lose up to half of its air force. We estimate that armored striking forces could breach the U.A.R.’s double defense line in the Sinai within several days. Re-grouping and re-supplying would be required before the Israelis could initiate further attacks aimed at driving to the Suez Canal. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period.22
This piece provided more in-depth analysis of the relative military capabilities of both sides than the May 23rd report had. In addition to ground, logistical, and naval sections, the memorandum
21 In addition, Rostow’s cover letter of the two estimates calls the Israeli analysis as “highly disturbing.”
22 Central Intelligence Agency, “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States,” National Security File, Country
File, Middle East Crisis, CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 5/67–7/67. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified], LBJ Library. While this piece of intelligence is shockingly accurate, this dissertation does not focus the role of accuracy and attitudes towards intelligence.
concluded with a selected order of battle.23
At 1:30 pm on May 26th, 1967, Johnson held an emergency N.S.C. meeting on the Middle East Crisis in preparation for an upcoming meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, later that afternoon. After General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.), provided an update of the military picture and several staff members reported, the President asked how to deal with Eban. Among the important results of the discussion was the group’s agreement that, given the current intelligence assessments, Johnson should stress that if Israel decided to act, it would act alone. From 7:15 pm to 8:40 pm, Johnson and his senior military officials met with Eban; Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Avraham Harman; and Minister Ephraim Evron. After the meeting, Johnson attended a late-night dinner, and the
President’s Daily Diary described his reaction to the meeting:
They came loaded for bear, but so was I … Secy McNamara said he just wanted to throw his cap up in the air, and George Christian said it was the best meeting of the kind he had ever sat in on.24
Even before the intelligence estimates proved to be shockingly accurate, Johnson had an overall favorable attitude towards intelligence on the Arab-Israeli crisis.