3. FINES DE LA EDUCACIÓN EN LA PRIMERA METAFÍSICA: De la Verdad Socrática a la
3.3. Acerca de los fines de la educación en la primera metafísica
5 Cf. id., Furori i 3, pp. 119-121, as quoted on p. 100 n. 3 above, with id., Sigillus i 45, i 46, i 48, pp. 188.20-189.14, 189.16-190.18, 191.7-21.
instrum ents” of the divinity in a way that im plies his disagreem ent with the
fundam ental Christian requirement that the good Christian should have faith in the
Scriptures, and that he should be passive and obedient towards what is perceived as
G od’s will. For the expression Bruno picks up on in the Eroicifurori — religious men
as passive “receptacles and instruments” — is also em ployed by St Paul and in the
principle of iustitiasolafide promoted by Martin Luther (1483-1546) and Calvin. ^
In the Cabala Bruno similarly criticises those who are passive “vessels” .^ There he
attributes “santa ignoranza” and “divina asinitade” to persons who block the process of
contemplation of the divinity under the pretence of religion.^ Bruno depicts such
people in the Cabala like those characterised as “vessels” in the Eroici furori, who are
also called “asses” , and who do not really undergo the process of deificatio but feign
1 Ad Romanos 9,20-21: “O homo, tu quis as qui respondeas Deo? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? An non habet potestatem flgulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem aliud vero in contumeliam?”; Ad Timotheum ii 2.20-21: “In magna autem domo non solum sunt vasa aurea et argentea, sed et lignea et fictilia: et quaedam quidem in honorem, quaedam autem in contumeliam. Si quis ergo emundaverit se ab istis, erit vas in honorem sanctificatum et utile Dom ino ad omne opus bonum paratum.” For the use o f the metaphor among Protestants, see LUTHER, De servo arbitrio, p. 787.13-14: “Dominus vero ... illuminet te et faciat vasculum in honorem et gloriam” ; CALVIN, Institutlo religlonis christianae. III xxiii 4, col. 701: “Occurremus enim cum Paulo (Rom. 9: 20 [sic 20- 21]) in hunc modum: [‘]o homo, tu quis es qui disceptes cum Deo? num figmentum dicit ei qui se finxit: cur me fmxisti sic? annon habet potestatem figulus, ut ex eadem massa faciat vas aliud in honorem, aliud in contumeliam?[’] Negabunt ita vere defendi Dei iustitiam, sed subterfugium captari, quale habere soient qui iusta excusatione destituuntur.” For a discussion o f Bruno’s attitude towards this metaphor in Protestant doctrine, see CiLIBERTO, Giordano Bruno, pp. 161-162; ORDINE, ‘Introduction’, pp. CXCIV-CXCVIII. GRANADA, ‘Bruno et la dignitas hominis\ pp. 77-80, suggests that Bruno may be thinking o f Protestant doctrine in his discussion of “receptacles and instruments”.
^ BRUNO, Cabala declamazione, pp. 23-25. 3 Ibid., declamazione, p. 23.
to do so.i An example of this in the context o f religion can be found in the twelfth
contraction in the Sigillus. There “our not very ingenious apocalyptics” are said to
generate melancholic spirit inwardly, whereby they appear to others like “pious
prophets and revealers” . They are, in fact, “asses” , like the people they convert.^
Another example is in the fourteenth contraction, also in the Sigillus. There a monk is
said to have increased melancholic humours in him self and thereby, in the eyes of his
fellow monks, turned into a prophet and a great theologian. Bruno’s drug, however, cured him and revealed him as the “ass” which he had always been.^ These examples
suggest that the theory of melancholy had become part of a religious culture detested
by Bruno because it belittles the innate rational faculties in man. It is through them that
the soul can communicate with the divine.
Bruno renewed his criticism of such practices in his De magia naturali. There he states that one kind of magic seeks to evoke “gods, demons and heroes” through
“prayers, consecrations, fum igations, sacrifices, dress of certain kinds and
ceremonies”. This is, presumably, an allusion to Christian religious rites. In this kind
of m agic, Bruno continues, the practician turns him self into a “receptacle or instrument”. This form of magic is the “magic of the desperate” Bruno probably
included Christian rites and practices among them.
1 For “vessels” in the Furori, see id., Furori i 3, pp. 119-121, as quoted p. 100 n. 3 above. For “asses” in the Furori, see ibid., i 3, p. 121; “come I’asino che porta sacramenti”. For the theme o f “santa ignoranza” and “divina asinitade” in the
C abala and other o f Bruno’s works, see ORDINE, La cabala, pp. 55-71. ^ BRUNO, Sigillus i 46, pp. 189.15-190.5, as quoted on p. 3 4 n. 1 above. ^ Ibid., i 48, pp. 191.24-192.5, as quoted on p. 38 n. 2 above.
4 Id., De m agia naturali §2.17-24, p. 162 (= BOL, vol. 3, p. 398.8-16): “Si isti [magia] accessit cul tus seu invocatio intel 11 gent! arum et efficientum exteriorum seu superiorum, cum orationibus, consecratlonibus, fumigiis, sacrificiis, certis habitibus et ceremoniis ad Deos, daemonas et heroas; tunc vel fit ad finem contrahendi spiritus in se ipso, cuius ipse fiat vas et instrumentum, ut appareat sapiens rerum, quam tamen sapientiam facile pharmaco una cum spiritu possit evacuare — et haec est magia desperatorum”. An example o f such a “desperate” person being cured by a drug
given by a “wise man” might be the story about the monk cured by Bruno in Brescia, reported in BRUNO, Sigillus i 48, pp. 191.24-192.5, as quoted on p. 38 n. 2 above.
Ch a p t e r 4
Co n t r a c t i o n a n d m e m o r y
1. Interpretations of Bruno’s idea of memory
Plotinus’ essay on m atter led Bruno to assume the im m anent existence of Ideas in matter. These Ideas also exist in the human memory, Bruno claims. Therefore there
are two roads to the intelligible reality, due to the nature of the human soul. One
consists in the contem plation and veneration of living nature, where Ideas exist intrinsically within matter. Bruno praises this approach to the divine in the Spaccio as
a form of religion practised by the Egyptians and fated by the eternal vicissitude of
things to recur again (in fact, in Bruno’s philosophy). In the previous chapter we have seen how contemplation o f the sensible universe is one way o f approaching this
intelligible reality. The other road, the theme of this chapter, consists in summoning
Ideas in the soul through the inventiveness of the higher memory, as described in the
mnemonic works.
W e can account for this second road in three ways. First, B runo’s idea of memory
in his early m nem onic w orks owes more to Plotinus than has hitherto been
recognised. Second, even though Bruno does not lin k mem ory to contraction
explicitly, his idea of noetic ascent through a “contracted similitude” of the intelligible
realm is applicable to Bruno’s idea of noetic ascent through memory. Finally, we must
ignore Sturlese’s claim that the mnemonic images in Bruno’s De umhris are nothing
experimentation with nmemonic signs prescribed in Bruno’s mnemonic works implies
that he conceived of these images as means of noetic ascent.
Bruno mentions Plotinus in several episteraological contexts in De umhris and the
SigillusA Plotinus was, Bruno says, the “prince o f Platonists” .^ W hat was, then,
Plotinus’ role in relation to the idea of memory in these works? In his monumental
study o f B runo’s Latin works dating from 1889, Felice Tocco discussed Plotinus’
presence in these two mnemonic writings of Bruno. Tocco, however, concluded that
A ristotle’s psychology was more influential than Plotinus’ in Bruno’s two works.^
Ever since Tocco several scholars have made important observations about Plotinus’ contribution to B runo’s notion o f m em ory — though w ithout any significant
revaluation of Plotinus’ importance in regard to Bruno compared to that of Aristotle.^
The most influential studies of B runo’s m nem onics after Tocco have identified
Bruno’s idea of memory with Aristotle’s doctrine in De memoria et remlniscentla and the account of memory in the pseudo-Ciceronian A d Herennium, or derivatives of
these sources.^ In this way Plotinus, even though Bruno praises him extravagantly
1 Br u n o, De umhris §§54.6, 61.3, 71.2, 72.3, pp. 47, 51, 55, 56; Sigillusi 32, i 33, ii 3, pp. 175.22, 178.7, 196.13. The last reference concerns ontological issues. The other references concern epistemological ones.
^ Id., De umhris §71.2, p. 55: “Notavit Platonicorum princeps Plotinus”.
^ TOCCO, Le opere, pp. 46-48, 362-365, emphases Plotinus’ importance for the idea o f noetic ascent in De umhris, but underlines Aristotle’s De memoria et reminiscentia
and the pseudo-Ci ceroni an Ad Herennium as sources for the art o f memory, including Bruno’s (ibid., pp. 21-23).
4 DEBERNART,/mmagmazione, pp. 22-23; STURLESE,‘Le fonti’, pp. 112, 119-122; VÉDRINE, ‘Im age’, pp. 48-49; BORSCHE, ‘Denken in B ildern’, pp. 9 5 -1 0 2 . Borsche makes many relevant observations concerning phantasia in Plotinus’ and Bruno’ mnemonics, which indirectly concern Plotinian com ponents in Bruno’s mnemonics.
^ T o c c o , Le opere, pp. 21-23; YATES, ‘The Ciceronean art o f memory’, pp. 874- 877, 901; id.. The art of memory, pp. 45-50, 73-89, where Yates integrates this empirical concept o f memory into her interpretation o f Bruno’s use of mnemonic
several times in his epistemological theories in De umhris and the Sigillus, has been
largely ignored, whereas Aristotle, whom Bruno mentions in De umhris rarely and in
philosophically unimportant passages, has come to be seen as the m ain source o f
B runo’s mnemonics in De umhris and the Sigillus.
T he interpretation that I would like to propose in this chapter is, in brief, that
Plotinus’ concept of memory, like his philosophy as a whole, comprised important
Aristotelian traits, but that Plotinus’ concept contained additional elements which also
occur in Bruno’s mnemonic works. The Aristotelian elements in Bruno’s mnemonics
derive partly from Plotinus, who incorporated elements of Aristotle’s psychology, and partly from Aristotle and Aristotelian or scholastic psychology, and we cannot very
often be sure which source Bruno is following. This means, in turn, that it is as
untenable to identify Bruno’s notion of memory with that of Plotinus exclusively, as it
is to do so with that of Aristotle. Bruno draws from both sources. He does not clarify his view in a systematic m anner anywhere, but uses w hat fits into his various
philosophical aims and contexts. W hat I shall do is to point out where in Bruno’s early
mnemonic works Plotinus’ theory of memory may play an unnoticed role.
First, I shall outline Plotinus’ discussion o f A ristotle’s account of sensation and
memory, pointing out where Bruno sides w ith Plotinus and where with A ristotle
(Section 2). Afterwards I shall explain Plotinus’ view of memory, taking into account
his doctrine that imagination and memory in the human soul are twofold. This doctrine
was central to Bruno’s doctrines of memory and noetic ascent (Sections 3 and 4). I
images as magical devices; id., Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic tradition, pp. 195- 199; ROSSI, Clovis universalis, pp. 29, 31-38; VASOLI, Tm m agini’, pp. 345-346; STURLESE, T1 De itnaginum, signorutn et idearum compositione’, pp. 184-185; FELLMANN, ‘Bild und Bew usstsein’, pp. 23-25, 31; WÏLDGEN, Das kosmische Geddchtnis, pp. 129-132; MATTEOLI, ‘L ’arte della memoria nei primi scritti mnemotecnici di Bruno’, p. 76 n. 5, who adheres to Y ates’ Art of memory as fundamental to Bruno’s mnemonics, and ibid., pp. 86-87, maintains, though without identifying a source, that memory in Bruno’s mnemonics ultimately depends on sense data as in Aristotle.
shall then explain the role of memory in Plotinus’ account o f noetic ascent and argue
that this account of memory and noetic ascent may have influenced Bruno’s theory of
noetic ascent (Section 5). Finally, I shall show how this reading fits into Bruno’s
original interpretation of the traditional metaphor of the Golden Chain (Section 6).
2. Plotinus’ discussion of Aristotle’s doctrine on memory
Bruno draws, as mentioned above, on two m ain sources in his notion o f memory,
N eoplatonic and A ristotelian, and he m anages to do so regardless o f the deep
philosophical differences betw een them on the issue of memory. A ristotle had presented a coherent theory of sensation, imagination, reasoning and memory in his
De anima and De memoria et reminiscentia. In the form er he had asserted that
reasoning man makes use of mental images derived from sensation: “No one could ever learn or understand anything without the exercise o f perception, so even when we
think speculatively, we must have some mental image [<|>otvi:ot(Tpi(x] o f w hich to
think, for mental images [<|>cx.VTOiO’jj,otTOi] are similar to objects perceived except that they are without matter”.^ Scholastic authors used phantasm ata as their translation of
the Greek word.
This empirical theory of know ledge is the basis of the doctrine of m em ory
presented in De memoria et reminiscentia. Here A ristotle connects sensation,
imagination and memory as follows: “It is obvious, then, that memory belongs to that
part o f the soul to which imagination [<j>«.VT ottnoi] belongs; all things which are
imaginable are essentially objects of memory, and those which necessarily involve
im agination are objects of memory only indirectly”.^ To the question of how we
remember things that are not actually present, he answers that “it is obvious that one
must consider the affection which is produced by sensation in the soul, and in that part