La línea como primer acercamiento al proceso artístico Este método de representación se constituye como uno de los principios básicos

Its full name is 2,3,5,8-tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin, or TCDD for short. The 55- gallon shipping containers that contained TCDD had an orange ring painted around the top edge, lending it the notorious moniker, “AgentOrange.” Of the 75 known forms of

dioxin, TCDD is the most toxic.1 _{Few chemicals on Earth are deadlier.}

Continuing scientific research has demonstrated a range of diseases and disorders connected with exposure to TCDD. Exposure increases risks of birth defects2

and has been conclusively linked to non-Hodgkins lymphoma,3 _{soft tissue sarcoma,}4

chloracne,5 _{and other acneform diseases.}6 _{Although the research is still preliminary,}

exposure has also been linked to diabetes,7 _{prostate cancer,}8 _{and endocrine disorders,}

even at very low concentrations.9_{TCDD was one of many “rainbow” herbicides liberally}

sprayed over the jungles of Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s, each deriving their names from the colored ring around the edge of their containers. Over 6 years of the Vietnam war, 45 million liters of the substance was sprayed, and some estimates suggest that roughly 10% of Vietnam was directly hit.10

Herbicide use in Vietnam was a military decision. The dense vegetation of

Southeast Asian jungles provided strategic cover for the revolutionary forces in Vietnam, and the elimination of this tactical advantage benefited the more conventional warfare used by the United States military. When herbicides did not work, the United States used other chemical agents to modify the landscape, even igniting large areas of jungle to make it easier to locate, track, and attack guerrilla forces. These operations were ubiquitous failures. The dense canopy of the jungle refused to be destroyed. As Edwin

36

Martini suggests, military commanders “treated the natural environment less as a combatant to be destroyed than as an object to be pacified and, ultimately,

controlled.”11 _{However, even using most advanced military technologies the United}

States could not control nature.

It is difficult to tell just how many individuals were exposed to TCDD. Personnel in large bases located in cities received very little exposure, while those in defoliated areas were exposed through a combination of direct and indirect methods, such as soil contact, drinking water, or bathing. Importantly, there is a lack of understanding when it comes to how defoliants traverse the environment. This makes determining how

personnel were exposed to TCDD almost impossible. Those who were most exposed to TCDD were in direct contact with herbicides through the mixing, loading, spraying, or clean-up activities associated with the chemical. This variety of dangerous encounters with TCDD complicates scientific, medical, and legal questions pertaining to exposure. The science behind Agent Orange remains unsettled, and this uncertainty poses challenges for veterans suffering from the effects of exposure. In 1979 Public Law 96-15t directed the Unites States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to conduct

epidemiological studies of Agent Orange health effects, but was a massive failure.12

Researchers at the VA had to announce they were unable to perform the study because of inadequate data. Congress then told the VA to turn over control of the study to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Tens of millions of dollars and several years later, the CDC reported that the military records available could not provide useful exposure data. They determined that an epidemiological study of Agent Orange was simply infeasible.13

37

A 1987 CDC study of dioxin levels in Vietnam veterans who served in heavily sprayed regions, compared to those who did not serve in Vietnam, was unable to distinguish between the two groups. However, veterans who were directly involved in Operation Ranch Hand (the name of the defoliation operation) had negative health effects that were proportionally distinguishable from other groups of veterans. By 1991, scientific evidence conclusively linking a range of illnesses with Agent Orange exposure began to emerge, thus prompting the creation of the Agent Orange Act, which has been the basis for disability compensation for veterans. Nonetheless, many veterans succumbed to the effects of Agent Orange exposure long before the Agent Orange Act, in part because of the uncertainty surrounding its effects.

Following the institution of the Agent Orange Act, the VA began accepting claims

for disability based on exposure. Current VA regulations have a “reasonable doubt”

doctrine, meaning that the VA adjudicates each veteran’s claim individually and

determines if any illness or injury is more likely than not to be caused by the exposure. In this system, a veteran’s claim must meet the following four criteria: 1) There is

credible evidence that the exposure involved is scientifically accepted as being associated with their specific injury/illness, 2) there is evidence that the relevant exposure happened during active military duty, 3) the illness or injury was initiated or exacerbated during active duty, and 4) there is evidence of an unusually large or prolonged exposure, demonstrating that it was at least as likely not to be the cause of the illness or injury.14

38

Veterans face significant problems trying to satisfy these four conditions. It can be difficult or impossible for a veteran to marshal the evidence needed for exposure occurring decades earlier, especially if the military misplaced their service records. Before the widespread implementation of computer record-keeping, this posed a serious problem. One veteran I spoke to for this chapter explained how easily his records had been misplaced:

I had to go to Washington to talk to our legislators and congressmen and

everybody. I hand you the paper. You’re the clerk, you give it to the second in

charge, then he gets it to the ladies, whoever’s in charge. That’s four people handling it. In case the clerk misplaces it, it’s in a file somewhere else. It’s not computerized…I go down there now, she just gets my name in right on the

computer, pops up. Don’t have to look at no files. But before, I know they lost

my file the first time.

Before computerized record-keeping, document hand-off posed a problem for many veterans applying for disability compensation from injuries sustained from Agent Orange exposure. Even if their records made it through this complex system unharmed, these veterans still faced other evidentiary hurdles. For example, evidence

demonstrating minimal exposure might be enough to argue that exposure relates to an associated health problem, but not enough to clear the threshold of being at least as likely as not to have been the cause, compared to all other possible causes (Brown, 2011).15 _{Mark Brown provides a useful example: A veteran who served for 2 years is}

39

to benzene as a civilian.16 _{Because benzene is only a single and minor cause of leukemia}

and because leukemia is not an uncommon disease, to prove that exposure to benzene during military service was more likely than not to be the cause of their leukemia, this veteran would need to prove an unusually large or prolonged period of benzene exposure during military service. How this veteran would substantiate this claim is unclear, nor is it clear what the threshold for “unusually large” exposure is. A veteran can only bypass these criteria if they suffer from a “presumptive” service connection,

giving them the benefit of the doubt if they have a specific set of illnesses.

This network is rife with uncertainty. First, it is almost impossible to tell where the US military sprayed Agent Orange, although researchers have made some noble attempts at using geographic information systems to determine exposure

opportunities.17 _{Therefore, it is difficult to run experiments to determine exposure}

effects when it is unclear how much exposure occurred, how long this exposure occurred, or the way exposure occurred. Unlike other wartime injuries, many military personnel are unaware of how their exposure took place, making first-hand accounts highly speculative. This was the case for one veteran I talked with for this chapter:

It’s hard to say [how often I was exposed]. I’d say in 13 months, I’m guessing

they probably sprayed a couple, three times in the tour of duty I did. And now

whether they sprayed while we were on patrol or not, that I don’t know. That I don’t remember.

Another veteran expressed the same uncertainty during our conversation for this chapter:

40

At the time, I didn’t even know what it was and you would think, as the

information officer, I would have had a clue, but they didn’t even tell me.

Veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange can usually piece together a rough estimate of when and how they were exposed, but few are able to thoroughly document the extent of their exposure.

In addition to these difficulties, because even basic information like flight

patterns for the planes that sprayed TCDD are spotty and slim at best, a strong scientific basis for determining how much exposure produces negative health effects is difficult to determine. Researchers continue to make progress on this front, but it remains

problematic to make credible determinations as to whether exposure or other factors

cause Agent Orange veterans’ health problems. Many exposed veterans are in their 50s or 60s. Thus, it can be difficult to for researchers to ascertain whether health problems like certain kinds of cancer are related to exposure or not, since this population is more likely to face health problems in general. In other words, there are innumerable

confounding factors that make attempts to prove direct exposure difficult for many veterans, especially faced with the intricate system in place for VA disability

compensation.