III. ANTECEDENTES
3.1. ACETOGENINAS Y ALCALOIDES EN ANNONA PURPUREA
In 1972 Gaddafi called for the evacuation in the Mediterranean of any military presence, and in particular had invited the closure of the British military base in Malta. Britain considered this to be a hostile act against its strategic interests in the Mediterranean.126 At that time and for Britain and NATO, Malta was a strategic link to the empire east of Suez and one of the main Western naval forces in the Mediterranean. Malta was in need of improving its economic situation, and for that had looked to Britain and NATO to help her, but nothing was done to improve the Maltese economy. Mr. Dom Mintoff who was the Maltese Prime Minister threatened to end the British presence in Malta unless more money was paid for the rent of the British base. He went on to say that 'foreign armed forces would be brought to Malta without specifying their nationality[...]Mintoff had announced that 15 January 1972 would be the final deadline for the withdrawal of British troops, and Britain had said it had no intention of meeting it'.127
Mintoff visited Libya, met with Gaddafi and discussed the British base issue and the Libyan support to the Maltese. After Mintoff's visit to Libya, Gaddafi announced that 'we [the Libyans] support the Maltese government's drive to keep out of foreign alliances, Eastern or Western. We have, therefore, started a new chapter of cooperation with Malta and will extend aid to her'.128 Gaddafi took this opportunity and offered
economic assistance to Malta if the British base was evacuated. For this purpose
126 Metz, Libya, pp. 230,231
127 Lewis, J W., The strategic balance in the Mediterranean, foreign affairs study, (United States, 1976),
P
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Mintoff made several trips to Libya for talks with Gaddafi. Both sides agreed to receive Libya Maltese workers and in return provided technical training for Libya.129'During which time it is believed Libya passed emergency credits of a rumoured £5 million to the cash-starved Maltese government’.130
Britain began to evacuate British service families from the island, at the same time, a group of 44 Libyans and Egyptians arrived on Malta, to help the Maltese operate the control tower of the Royal Air Force base, which also served as Malta’s only civilian airport.
The United States mediated to solve this issue and after intensive consultation with NATO allies, a British-Maltese agreement was signed as a seven-year defence agreement. 'Britain and NATO agreed to pay Malta $36.4 million in annual rent, with the United States paying $9.5 million of this. Another $23 million in bilateral aid came from NATO countries'.131 At the Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries in Algeria in 1973, Gaddafi called again to evacuate the Mediterranean region of military bases and fleets, and in particular Gaddafi attacked the military presence of NATO in the Mediterranean Sea.132 In addition, and during Jallud's visit to Moscow, it was agreed
that the Soviet Union strongly supported the request of Libya to evacuate the Mediterranean region of military bases and any foreign military presence. The Soviet Union and Libya said that 'the presence of military bases in the area constitutes a permanent threat to the peace and security of Mediterranean states and hinders their
129 Metz, Libya, p. 231
130 Malta finds the development market coy, The Times, Jan 03, (1972) 131 Lewis, J W., The strategic balance in the Mediterranean
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development and progress'.133 This share in common interest between Libya and the
Soviet Union must have been perceived to be against US and Western interests, especially the British interest, in the Mediterranean basin.
Gaddafi did not stop making trouble for the British government, as it was the case in the problem of the British military base in Malta. In the view point of Mr. Tripp, Gaddafi was making difficulties for the British government because of his financial claims. However, he said that it seems that even if the financial claims were settled in full, Gaddafi would pursue his ideological beliefs. He was inflexible in his policies, imposed his views, and did not listen to his officials and ministers.134Tripp went on to
say that 'While Gaddafi remains in charge there is unlikely to be any moderation of Libyan policies'.135
In spite of all this, there was great suspicion of Colonel Gaddafi's apparent keen interest in the island and his willingness and generosity, while the Maltese had not much to offer Libya. In this context, why did Gaddafi take this line to support the Maltese against the British? The Times argued Gaddafi's reason to support the Maltese and addressed two main purposes as follows:
First the Libyans might find the excellent harbour and dockyard facilities in Malta of value for their own oil industry. Secondly, the Libyans are especially anxious to see the Mediterranean completely defused in military terms. In other worlds they might be prepared to dig into their coffers for the simple purpose of providing for Malta's immediate needs and eliminate not merely Britain but more especially the Soviet Union from using the base facilities and in turn influencing the island.136
133 TNA, FCO 39-1067, on the stay in the USSR of the Libyan government delegation, 9 March 1972
134 TNA, FCO. 93-19, Anglo/Libya relations, letter from Tripp to A D Parsons, 26 April 1973 135 Ibid
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However, there was another important reason missed, and that was the deterioration in British-Libyan relations over several issues, such as the outstanding issues, nationalisation of BP and the British refusal to resume negotiations to settle the outstanding matters. All of these issues occurred at the same time and must have had an impact on British-Libyan relations, and helped to encourage some of Libya's hostile actions against British interest in Malta and elsewhere. The British document, shows that Libyan hostilities against British interests were part of the impact of British-Libyan disputes during the early 1970s.137
The question that should be raised here: would Gaddafi oppose British interests in the region, if there was no disagreement between him and Britain on outstanding issues, and if Britain agreed to supply him the Chieftains? Indeed, no single document has answered this question or even secondary sources as there is no study that has looked at this matter. However, many primary key texts correlate Gaddafi hostility towards British interest with the conflict over the outstanding issues. This will be highlighted in the following chapters.