This is a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA finding petitioner Rommel C. Briones (Briones) guilty of the crime of robbery.
On January 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., while S/G Molina and S/G George Gual (S/G Gual) were manning the northwest gate of BF Homes Northwest, Parañaque noticed Romulo Bersamina, a homeowner, being mauled by four (4) individuals, two (2) of whom were later identified as Briones and his brother, Vicente Briones (Vicente), who were both residents of BF Homes. S/G Molina and S/G Gual approached the group to stop the mauling; it was at this point that S/G Molina lost his firearm to Briones. The police arrested Briones after conducting an investigation. However, Briones denied any participation in the mauling and the firearm grabbing, and claimed that he was in his house when the incident happened.
On January 8, 1998, a criminal information was filed against Briones before the RTC, Parañaque City, for robbery, where the accused pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. RTC found Briones guilty only of simple theft as the elements of violence and intimidation – the attendant circumstances that must be present in the crime of robbery – were not duly proven. On appeal, CA found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293, in relation to paragraph 5 of Article 294, of the RPC, and not of theft. The CA ruled that force and intimidation attended the taking of S/G Molina’s firearm, as Briones approached S/G Molina with the intent of taking his firearm away.
Briones thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and Motion to Dismiss, and Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and Motion to Dismiss (collectively, Omnibus Motion) with the CA where he confessed his physical presence and
83 participation on the alleged robbery of the firearm, but claimed that he was merely protecting his brother, Vicente, when he took the firearm. The CA denied the Omnibus Motion; hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there are factual and legal bases to support his conviction of the crime of robbery
2. Whether or not a new trial is justified under the circumstances.
HELD:
1. NO. The distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft.
Hence, only the crime of theft was committed in the case as the witness - S/G Gual’s testimony does not show that violence or intimidation attended the taking of the firearm; S/G Gual only testified that Briones merely grabbed the firearm and ran away with it. Thus, Briones can only be convicted for the crime of theft for taking S/G Molina’s firearm without his consent. Theft is produced the moment there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking with intent to gain.
2. NO. For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established.
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below. The determinative test is the presence of due or reasonable diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial.
Under the circumstances, Briones failed to show that he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the firearm; his allegation in his Omnibus Motion that he told his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm, which yielded negative results, is purely self-serving. He also now admits having taken the firearm and having immediately disposed of it at a nearby house, adjacent to the place of the incident. Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the location of the subject firearm, but did not do anything; he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial below.
In any case, recovery of the firearm may not be considered material evidence that will affect the outcome of the case; the recovery of the subject firearm does not negate the commission of the crime charged.
SALUDAGA VS. GENIO G.R. NO. 184537 APRIL 23, 2010 Facts:
Quintin Saludaga, municipal mayor of Lavesares, Northern Samar and SPO2 Fiel Genio were charged in the Sandiganbayan of violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019) by
84 causing undue injury to the government. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential element of the crime charged.
The Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to study the possibility of having the information amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan. The OSP re-filed the Information. Now, charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government.
Aside from arguing that the second Information constituted substituted Information and contained substantial amendments, the petitioners also highlighted that newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case which necessitates a new preliminary investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the presence of newly discovered evidence necessitates a new preliminary investigation.
Held:
NO. Under Section 2 of Rule 121, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.
The piece of evidence sought to be considered by the Petitioners cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’ Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation, offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject project.
LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 182555 FEBRUARY 8, 2011
Facts:
Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos, Cesar Fortuna and Rameses de Jesus were found guilty by the Supreme Court for the murder of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla. They filed separate motions for reconsideration. They seek to be admitted the affidavit of Orencio G. Jurado, Jr., one of the police officers initially assigned to investigate the case who claims that he was prevented to testify to the court that the movants are not the same persons arrested by them. The movants argued that the said belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by the police authorities in the apprehension of the likely perpetrators.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of Jurado be admitted as newly discovered evidence.
85 No. Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument that there was no positive identification of Abadilla’s killers. To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was "newly discovered" pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below.
The movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially attended the out-of- court identification of the accused, the same was cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.
PAYUMO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 151911, JULY 25, 2011
Facts:
A composite team of Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police units allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly killing one civilian and wounding seven others, including Edgar Payumo. The accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the trial, the accused interposed the defenses of lawful performance of duty, self-defense, mistake of fact, and alibi. They insisted that the incident was a result of a military operation, and not an ambush as claimed by the prosecution.
The Fifth Division promulgated its judgment dated November 27, 1998, convicting the accused of the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The accused filed their Supplemental Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial because there was serious irregularity during the trial due to the erroneous admission of the testimonies of the witnesses of the petitioners, such should be taken anew and to afford the accused the opportunity to present in evidence the records of the Judge Advocate General Office(JAGO) relative to the shooting as to whether it was an ambush or the result of a military operation. The omnibus motion was granted.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for nullifying the order of conviction and granting new trial, Edgar Payumo and et. al, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the scheduled hearings for a second new trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new trial in favor of the accused.
Held:
Yes. Rule 121, Section 2 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerates the grounds for a new trial, to wit:
86 That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been commited during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
It must be emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted; would not have changed the decision.
The records of the JAGO relative to shooting incident do not meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met:
1. that the evidence was discovered after trial;
2. that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
3. that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
4. that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment.
It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.