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As the Ergenkon trial progressed, the government was reaping the benefits of a more docile army. At this stage, AKP held both Prime Ministership and the Presidency, it was in complete

political control of Turkey. Emboldened via its new alliances, AKP set out to reorient the bureaucracy by chipping away at its autonomy in a unique manner. AKP started swapping out top tier bureaucrats by either purging or recruiting existing bureaucratic elite. This created an opening in middle level and upper level bureaucracy. These positions were specifically given to Gülenist allies already within the bureaucracy. For instance, if a Deputy Governor position was available and the next person in line based on seniority was viewed as a Kemalist, they were skipped in the pecking order for the promotion. Instead a junior officer, who had verifiable Gülenist leanings was chosen to fulfill the role. This intrusion into formerly independent institutions was unheard of in Turkish politics before AKP.

Majority of such positions were at the Department of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as in the paramilitary forces called Gendarmerie. Figure 6.3 illustrates the network of governance in Turkey during this period of time. The Deputy Ministers or Administrative Governors are senior bureaucrats in each ministry, similar to the Secretaries and Joint Secretaries in Pakistan. During this time, the government had the power to purge or suspend these senior bureaucrats at the Deputy Minister, Administrative Governor or Deputy Governors levels, but they could not appoint them from the outside. For instance, if an Administrative Governor position was available due to the purge, that position had to be fulfilled by a career bureaucrat. The AKP government could not recruit someone from the private sector based on qualification equivalence65. So, the solution was to search for the next in line Gülenist and promote them.

65 _{In post 2016 Turkey, the Government can hire professionals from the private sector into the}

government as bureaucrats based on qualification equivalence. The logic is if you have enough private sector relevant experience, you are qualified enough to be hired laterally into the

bureaucracy. This change was necessitated due to the large-scale purge after 2016. Pakistan does not have such hiring practices while Taiwan recently allowed for lateral hiring at the Deputy Minister level which has caused resentment among the bureaucratic elite. I explore that in the

This is where the alliance with the Gülenists was critical for the AKP. The party itself lacked the numbers and network of highly educated and technically trained professionals needed to fill the openings they were creating through purges or recruitments. AKP was also avoiding promoting existing bureaucrats who were seen as a Kemalists/seculars, under fear that they might support another coup attempt.

The green nodes in Figure 13 highlight the Gülenist bureaucrats. As Turkey was still a parliamentary system at the time, the deputy ministers reported to the relevant minister and were insulated from dealing directly with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister’s agenda came through the Minister and was then expected to be enforced via the relevant Deputy Minister’s departments. This insulation gave some semblance of institutional autonomy and integrity to bureaucratic elites who had remained neutral albeit secular leaning, throughout the purges and AKP’s political power plays. The Deputy Ministers and the Administrative Governors in each ministry also controlled numerous autonomous organizations that were constitutionally independent and apolitical. Organizations like, Directorate General for Personnel in Justice Ministry66 and Internal Auditing Unit in the Ministry of Internal Affairs67, had the power to investigate the government at any level and could file references against them. AKP used these organizations to investigate and then convict hundreds of senior bureaucrats, serving and retired generals between 2007 and 2011. As part of the alliance, Gülenists were handed control of these organizations after 2010.

next chapter as it has strained the relationship between the ruling coalition and the KMT leaning bureaucratic elite.

66 _{Justice Ministry of Turkey http://www.justice.gov.tr/Ministry/resimler/teskilat_b.jpg} 67 _{Ministry of Internal Affairs of Turkey http://www.mia.gov.tr/new-organization-chart}

By the end of 2011, Gülenists in the Justice Department and Internal Affairs started going after the AKP and its stalwarts using the exact same organizations AKP68 had previously used against the military and secular bureaucratic elites (Taş, 2018). For the Gülen Movement, this was seen as a way to renegotiate the terms of alliance with AKP and carve out clear policy space on issues of concern. However, AKP viewed this as an attempt by the Gülen Movement (GM) to dictate policy agendas by using autonomous institutions against them. AKP became convinced that institutional autonomy means a political threat from bureaucratic elites who are willing to use the constitutional space granted to them to challenge the governance policies AKP wished to introduce to consolidate its political standing. This tussle lasted essentially till the failed coup of 2016.

68 _{The scandals unearthed by the Internal Affairs and Justice Department at the time created a}

serious political crisis for the AKP. This was also the time the Gezi Park protests were taking place and AKP viewed these as an attempt by its enemies to sow discord

https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/why-turkeys-mother-of-all-corruption-scandals-refuses-to- go-away/ & https://www.dw.com/cda/en/from-ally-to-scapegoat-fethullah-gulen-the-man- behind-the-myth/a-37055485