Actividades Ilícitas en la Cadena de Suministros Internacional

Mubarak had a set of contradicting personal traits that some of them played to his advantage in the first 20 years of his tenure, while the others were counterproductive in his last 10 years in power (as will be shown in the next chapters). Mubarak was known to have a cautious personality, particularly compared to former President Sadat. He deliberated and discussed at length before making choices. Another personal aspect was Mubarak’s military generation; having not been part of the 1952 revolution Free Officer’s cohort, he was the first professional, de-politicised army officer to govern Egypt as both Nasser and Sadat left the army early and were fully politicised. Mubarak’s disciplined upbringing and nature granted Egypt with much needed stability. Another consequence was that, as Mubarak was not politicised, he was more pragmatic in his consideration of domestic politics and his ability to deal without sworn animosity with different political factions; i.e. the MB, the Nasserites, the liberals, etc (Al-Awadi, 2003).

Mubarak’s personal character might well have made him the most suitable candidate to replace Sadat. Mubarak’s background in the military gave him a serious bearing, yet calmer nature. This reflected Egypt’s desire for more stable and peaceable times, given Nasser’s revolutionary Arab nationalism, Sadat’s own political, economic and social upheavals, alongside the growing conflict with the Islamists. This created an intense thirty-year period of disruption, which it was hoped Mubarak would bring to order, increasing Egypt’s assuredness and stability (Osman 2011, pp.180–181). There also appeared to be less vanity in Mubarak’s personality, striking a marked contrast to Sadat. Mubarak’s style of self-referencing, his discourse and addresses, all differed to Sadat’s. He appeared more focused on his job to deliver practical solutions to Egypt’s problems, rather than the personal esteem in which he was held, or his bequest to future generations. Sadat had worn a military uniform designed by Pierre Cardin; he invoked the legacy of ancient Egypt in

carrying a pharaonic cane, while constantly switching between his place of retreat and palaces (Osman 2011, p.181).

Mubarak was indeed successful in consolidating his power during much of his rule and consistently managed to eradicate any potential competition from opposition or allies alike. He has consistently rotated individuals out of positions of political influence, if they have been considered as rising too highly in popularity. For example, and however useful Moussa’s charisma for the regime’s overall legitimacy, as it was shown earlier in this chapter, it was harmful for Mubarak’s own legitimacy. Moussa was touted as a potential Presidential successor, with petitions even circulated calling for a free and open presidential election; such was his admiration within the politically astute sectors of society. Despite Moussa’s high regard among the Egyptian population, Mubarak’s inner circle saw that very fact as troublesome, a prominent cabinet minister with a possibly significant independent base of support. Mubarak moved to replace Moussa with Ahmad Mahir in May 2001, whose popular appeal was significantly less. The esteemed Amr Moussa and Ahmad al Guwalli were both excluded from influencing Egyptian politics and polity, by being transferred to the Arab League. Another perceived threat to Mubarak was Field Marshal Abu Ghazzala, who proved to be a significantly revered figure. Consequently, for over ten years he was put under house arrest, excluded from public view and unable to garner attention or support. Mubarak also carefully chose those who were in positions of significant power. The technocratic Habib al-Adli, as Minister of the Interior, presented as uncharismatic, unlikely to attain popular favour, so less threatening to Mubarak. Former Prime Minister Atif Ebied’s personal reputation was also damaged, tainted through his association with the Egyptian public’s suffering from the 1990s neoliberal economic programme, Fathi Surur, a former Speaker of Parliament, also suffered similar detriments in his personal regard by ordinary Egyptians. While General Tantawi as Defence Minister was a decorated veteran of three Israeli-Arab Wars, creating a potential for a personality cult to form around him, he was largely innocuous (Zahid 2007, p.152).

4.4 Conclusion

It was normal and logical that Egypt’s new President, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, would depend more on other sources of legitimacy rather than the eudemonic and ideological legitimacy. After the 1967 War and the changes that Sadat made to Egypt’s foreign policy orientation and which negatively affected the state’s ideological legitimacy, it was inevitable for the state, if it wanted to

preserve a minimal level of its legitimacy, to invest in institutional legitimacy, through enhancing the status of democratisation, rule of law and the role of institutions.

This chapter was divided into three sections. Institutional legitimacy, as the most primary source of the Mubarak regime’s legitimacy, was the subject of research in the first section. It was argued that Mubarak endowed the state with what could be termed ‘institutional stability’. At the time Mubarak came to power the achievement of stability was crucial. The attainment of stability in practice could be viewed as a significant success of the Mubarak era. Egypt experienced myriad dramatic and radical transformations under Presidents Nasser and Sadat, leading to profound and far-reaching changes in the political, societal and economic spheres. Mubarak came to power amidst a severe crisis which had culminated with President Sadat’s assassination, part of a failed Islamist coup d’état. Mubarak therefore fully acknowledged the risks resulting from the absence of co- existence between different political and social forces. His rule was thus characterised by an approach of governance which could be termed the ‘the semi-open society’.

Secondly, the lesson of the Bread Riots in January 1977 can be considered a primary reason why Mubarak opted for slow-paced economic reform. For as long as he could, Mubarak maintained the remnants of the Nasserist populist social contract between the Egyptian state and its constituencies, particularly the state’s bureaucracy. Consequently, the second part of this chapter sought to investigate Mubarak’s economic record. More specifically, it was explored how Mubarak continued reforming Egypt’s economy- even presiding over heightened economic performance post-1991- while preserving the social base from which he garnered legitimacy, avoiding significant unrest until a few years prior to the January 2011 uprising.

The third section of this chapter discussed how Mubarak attempted to cope with the weakness of ideological legitimacy. Sadat was assassinated by Islamist military officers who were outraged by Sadat’s negotiation of a peace deal with Israel. Resultantly, Mubarak thus instrumentally used both Egypt-First and Arab identities to counter-balance the transnational ideational calls from Islamists and extreme Arab Nationalists. The state under Mubarak adopted a moderate foreign policy that balanced between its immediate interests with the West and Israel and its historical ties with the Arab world. Mubarak also vehemently opposed political Islam and fought terrorism. This was despite allowing, or at least not seriously preventing, a consistent Islamisation of society, which reflected the strategy of political compromise that the Mubarak regime employed. Indeed, the severe threat posed by radical Islamists suggested that regime legitimacy claims were not reaching the strata attracted to these movements. This strata of young people who joined the Islamist movements, was recruited from the classed that were affected by the roll-back of the state.

The Islamist social welfare networks managed to attract many people who suffered from the negligence of the state’s social role.

Chapter Five

Mubarak’s Legacy II

The ‘Tawreeth’ Project

As it has been discussed in the last chapter, Mubarak, until the year 2000, had to rely more on institutional legitimacy to compensate for the shortage in the state’s eudaemonic and ideational legitimacy. Nevertheless, the Mubarak regime was keen to keep its claims to both sources of legitimacy. By controlling the economic reforms and slowing its pace, the state was able to continue claiming that it is still the ultimate protector of the poor and the bureaucratic middle class. Simultaneously, by maintaining a nationalist tone in foreign policy, the regime managed to absorb much of the resentment previously caused by Sadat’s bolder reorientation of Egypt’s foreign policy. However, as argued in the last chapter, the main mode of legitimacy under Mubarak - which was also claimed by the regime to be its ‘original’ contribution to Egypt’s political life - was democratic openness and rule of law, in other words, institutional legitimacy. However, things have changed in the 2000s, especially with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and his neoliberal policies. This chapter’s task is to offer a narrative for the period from 2000 to 2011, in terms of intra-regime politics (the rise of Gamal Mubarak and its impact on the the state’s institutions particularly the army), in addition to the impacts of the foreign policy, and neo-liberalisation of the economy. The following chapter will offer the analysis of the same period with regarding to the legitimacy of the regime.