of Other Minds
I want to conclude this thesis in part by summarising its central claims, and in part by drawing together, if only very briefly, some strands of the material that would benefit from further discussion. I do this in order to make explicit some commitments that have perhaps, until this point, been only implicit. I start, though, by recapping.
The question posed at the outset was: what are the cognitive abilities that must be attributed to infants around the age of 14-months to explain their ability to use and to understand others' uses of words in communicative interactions?
In the Chapter Two I considered the fact that in order to use and understand words, one must be able to grasp the referents of those words – that is, the objects for which they stand. According to associationist accounts of learning, an infant learns the referent of a word when it hears that word while attending to an object, and comes to associate the sound that it hears with the object of its attention. No cognitive abilities beyond associative
mechanisms are said to be necessary for associationist learning. However, I argued that associationist accounts of learning the referent of a word must overcome some very substantial difficulties if they are to be credible. This is because infants don't just hear the names of objects to which they are attending; they often hear words that have nothing to do with the objects of their attention. If infants learned words just by associating them with the objects of their attention, then one would expect them to make characteristic mistakes in their learning. However, they make such mistakes only rarely. Furthermore, since infants are very good at learning the names of objects even in circumstances where existing accounts of associative learning could not explain their word-learning, we have good grounds for thinking that more sophisticated abilities are in play.
In Chapter Three I considered Paul Bloom's claim that infants learn the referents of words because they grasp speakers' 'referential intentions'. Although sympathetic to this claim, I argued that Bloom lacks an account of the cognitive abilities that one would need in order to grasp others' referential intentions. Furthermore, I argued that although grasping a speaker's referential intention would typically be necessary for grasping her communicative uses of words, it would not normally be sufficient - since words with the same referent could be uttered as a means of communicating very different messages. In order to understand others' uses of words in communicative interaction, one must be able to be grasp the perlocutionary intentions with which speakers utter.
In Chapter Four I argued that Bloom's idea of referential intentions should be replaced with a richer notion of communicative intentions, where these are here understood as perlocutionary intentions. I developed an account of what it is to act with or grasp a communicative intention, and of the cognitive abilities that this would require, with reference to Paul Grice's account of speaker meaning. With reference to recent empirical studies of infant pointing, I argued that infants of 14-months possess the cognitive abilities
Gricean structure.
In Chapter Five, I considered two of John Searle's objections to the Gricean account of communicative intentions that I developed in the previous chapter. Against Grice, Searle argues that communicative intentions are not perlocutionary intentions – that is, intentions to make others do or think something – but illocutionary intentions. These are intentions to be understood as having performed a speech act with a certain illocutionary force, and are (according to Searle) characterised by an intentional structure different from the account defended in Chapter Four. Furthermore, Searle argued, Grice's account of speaker meaning fails to account for the role of linguistic conventions in communication. Against Searle, and with reference to some recent empirical studies, I argued that there is insufficient evidence to attribute to young infants the ability to act with or grasp illocutionary intentions. Furthermore, I argued that while the Gricean account might fail to account for the role of linguistic conventions in communicative interactions in which speaker and hearer possess mutual knowledge of linguistic conventions, it might still be the right account for characterising infants' earliest communicative interactions, in which this mutual knowledge is lacking.
Finally, in Chapter Six, I considered the nature of the cognitive abilities that would be necessary for learning linguistic conventions – at least some knowledge of which is necessary for being a user of language. I argued that infants could learn linguistic conventions in virtue of possessing imitative abilities. Having identified the perlocutionary intentions with which others utter, and the words that they utter as a means to the achievement of those perlocutionary ends, infants might reproduce the words that they have heard others utter in pursuit of their own perlocutionary goals.
Over the course of the thesis, two abilities in particular have emerged as necessary for learning to use and understand others' uses of words in communicative interaction. In order
to grasp others' uses of words, infants must grasp the perlocutionary intentions with which they utter and in order to use words themselves, they must be able to use at least some words and sentences to communicate their own perlocutionary intentions. (Something like knowing how to use words in this manner is presumably necessary for knowing the meanings of those words and sentences, but I do not claim that it is sufficient.)
At the heart of the thesis lies the claim that infants are able to learn to use words because prior to their first uses of language, they already possess some insight into the minds of others. Independently of knowing the meanings of words, on at least some occasions infants grasp that others are trying to communicate, and what it is that they are trying to communicate. This view of the infant's understanding of other minds contrasts with one that would make our understanding of other minds a consequence of our knowledge of language. In the opening sections of Chapter Two, I quoted Daniel Dennett on the subject of human intersubjectivity:
We human beings share a subjective world – and know that we do – in a way that is entirely beyond any other creatures on the planet, because we can talk to one another. … Conversation unites us. (KoM, p.12; my italics)
A natural way to construe this comment is as saying that the rich intersubjectivity of human life – the deep knowledge that we have of one another's minds – is to be explained by our ability to talk to one another. It's because we engage one another in conversation, and thereby share our thoughts and feelings, that we come to share in one another's mental lives in a way that other animals – even our nearest chimp relatives - do not. The implication seems to be that the world of the pre-linguistic infant, in which knowledge of language is absent, would not be a shared subjective word – not, at least, in the way that the adult world is.
that he proposes does not presuppose any such insight. He sketches out an account of how an infant could learn words with which to communicate without its having any knowledge of what its caregivers are trying to achieve by speaking, in virtue of statistical correlations between the utterances of words and the objects of an infant's attention. As became apparent in Chapter Two, though, this acquisition story is fraught with difficulties. It struggles even to explain how infants could learn the referents of the words that they hear others use. The problems with this view motivate trying to explain the infant's learning to do things with words by attributing to it a richer set of cognitive abilities – in the form of an understanding of something of the mental lives of others - at the outset.
To claim that even prior to their first uses of words infants already have some understanding of the mental lives of others is not to deny that our ability to use language to communicate enriches our knowledge of our interlocutors' minds in important ways. However, it is to suggest that language is not the foundation of our intersubjectivity. Rather, linguistic communication builds on a foundation of intersubjectivity that exists prior to and makes possible our learning to do things with words. But what is the nature of this intersubjectivity? What sort of understanding of others' minds must be attributed to infants in order to make sense of the possibility of their learning to do things with words?
One question that arose in Chapters Three and Four concerned whether infants possess a 'theory of mind' prior to their acquisition of language. Whether or not they do all depends, of course, on what is meant by this phrase. Certainly it has not been claimed that infants' understanding of minds consists in their literal knowledge of a theory, in virtue of knowing which they would explain others' behaviour by attributing to them conjunctions of rationally coordinated beliefs and desires, in the manner claimed by Gopnik and Meltzoff (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997, Gopnik, Kuhl & Meltzoff 2001) and discussed briefly in Chapter Two. Furthermore, it has nowhere been claimed that infants must possess a concept of belief, requiring knowledge of the possibility of false belief, in order to learn to do things with
words.37 It may be that infants of fourteen months do possess such knowledge, but the
cognitive abilities that I've argued are necessary for their learning to do things with words do not include this knowledge. An infant need not be able to pass a false belief test in order to learn to use words in communicative interaction. A third construal of the phrase 'theory of mind' is employed by Paul Bloom. As he uses the term, possessing a 'theory of mind' amounts just to being able to grasp others' referential intentions. On the account that I have defended, this ability is both necessary for learning to do things with words, and possessed by infants of 14-months. However, of the three uses of the phrase discussed in Chapter Three, Bloom's is the least common.
Rather than looking for a catch-all and potentially misleading phrase by which to characterise infants' understanding of other minds, it might be more fruitful just to say what their understanding of other minds consists in. The claim that I have made is that on at least some occasions, infants know when others are trying to communicate with them, and what it is that they are trying to communicate. Not only do they understand others' referential intentions; additionally, they grasp others' perlocutionary intentions – what it is that their interlocutors, by speaking, would have them attend to, think, or do (and so on). This is both necessary for learning to do things with words and something that infants can do. The empirical claim here is supported by a substantial body of empirical work, discussed
37 Here there exists a parallel between the position that I defend and a recent, as yet unpublished, claim developed by Ruth Garrett Millikan. Millikan writes that:
[N]o representational theory of mind is needed to understand that another’s speech is purposefully produced and directed towards some effect, and to attend to what that effect might be, for example, to what part of the world a speaker is purposefully exhibiting to the child using words[.] (Millikan, unpublished talk, p.4)
By ‘representational theory of mind’, Millikan means a conception of the mind that requires a concept of belief. In future work it would be worthwhile to develop the comparison of my own account with
in Chapter Four, which demonstrates that from around 12-months infants both point with and grasp others' pointing with a variety of different perlocutionary intentions – for example, to share information, or attention, or to make requests and give orders. None of these perlocutionary intentions have contents that must be specified by appeal to a concept of belief.
Additionally, at the age of 14-months, infants possess imitative abilities. This makes it possible to explain their learning of words in virtue of their being able to imitate the communicative actions of their peers. The appeal to imitation highlights a further difference between the account that I have elaborated and the account attributed to Dennett in Chapter Two. On Dennett's account, infants repeat to themselves the words that they have heard others speak – but they do so blindly, without any reference to the purposes with which those words were uttered by their speaker. Recalling a distinction made by Tomasello and Carpenter (Tomasello & Carpenter 2005) and introduced in Chapter Six, on the Dennettian account infants merely mimic the words that they hear. I have argued, by contrast, that key to using words in communicative interaction is understanding the role of those words in the purposive activities of their speakers. On the story that I have sketched out, this understanding is built in at the start: infants don't merely mimic others' utterances; they imitate them – reproducing the words that they hear in pursuit of the perlocutionary intentions to which those words can be used as a means.