Actividades inherentes al desarrollo de la propuesta

In the social science literature analysis presented in chapter 3 several elements were proposed that may influence the amount of mutual trust in the EAW cooperation scheme. It is appropriate to select cases in accordance with the effects on trust and network effectiveness that these variables imply, and to cover as much as possible of the existing heterogeneity of the actors studied (Campbell, Cook & Shadish, 2002, p.23-24). For this reason, the explanatory variables should be taken into account when selecting the different countries to be studied.

The first variables on which the case study should be based concerns the cultural dimensions of Hofstede. Annex 1, table 1 to this report includes the different scores of the EU countries (excluding Cyprus, for which no data is available). The Netherlands itself scores 38 on Power Distance Index (PDI), 80 on the individualism/collectivism index (IDV), 14 on the masculinity/femininity index (MAS), and 53 on the uncertainty avoidance index (UAV). Table 2 of that same annex shows the differences between the Netherlands and other Member States on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The fifth column totals the differences by adding up the distances per cultural dimension for any given Member State and the Netherlands. In particular the Scandinavian countries, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia score similarly to the Netherlands on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, with total distance ranging from 31 for Latvia to 49 for Sweden. Also notable is that out of the larger Member States, in particular Germany scores relatively close to the Netherlands. On the other hand, Greece, Portugal, Poland and the East European states Poland, Bulgaria and Romania score substantially dissimilar. All these countries score higher than 140 as regards distance on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede, with Slovakia topping out the list due with an combined distance of 192. In particular, Slovakia receives a far higher Masculinity rating than the Netherlands, this dimension accounting for nearly half the distance between the two countries. Another Notable detail of Slovakia is that, while total differences between this country and the Netherlands are indeed rather large, the difference on the UAV dimension is only 2.

The second variable for which variation should be achieved in the country selection is corruption. In recent years, three countries in particular seem to score relatively poor as regards perceived control of corruption in the WGI composite indicator: Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. These countries show the only negative scores in the EU table (respectively -0,25, -0,24 and -0,27 in 2012). However, considering the standard errors in the data for these countries range from 0,12 to 0,16, it is difficult to definitively establish which country is perceived as more corrupt by the survey participants. Scoring relatively highon the WGI composite indicator, on the other hand, are the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark and Sweden (respectively 2,13, 2,22, 2,39 and 2,31 for 2012).61_{Again, the differences between these 4 countries are hard to pinpoint}

exactly due to the existence of standard errors of around 0,16. Nonetheless, these four countries

61_{Note, that while Denmark has an opt in with regard AFSJ measures, it has chosen to implement the EAW}

45 consistently score in the top of the EU Member States with regard to the perceived control of corruption in the WGI. Of the three largest European Member States,62_{Germany ranks highest on the WGI indicators,}

with a score of 1,78.

The results of the two Eurobarometer questions are roughly consistent with the WGI scores, with many of the same countries present in the top and bottom portions of the score list. Again, the Scandinavian countries score high, along with Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany. With regard trust in judicial institutions when faced with a corruption case, Austria also scores relatively high. The bottom scores now also include Lithuania and Slovenia for both Eurobarometer questions. It is furthermore notable that trust in judicial institutions when faced with corruption cases is remarkably low in the United Kingdom. The lower brackets also show some consistency with WGI measures, with both Eurobarometer measures indicating low scores for Bulgaria and Slovakia. Noticeably inconsistent with the WGI composite indicator is the relatively high score received by Romania and Greece in the Eurobarometer questions. While the WGI place Romania and Greece consistently as one of the poorest performing countries with regard to perceived performance in the combat of corruption, the Eurobarometer scores Romania 7th_{lowest as}

regards perceived amount of corruption in the judiciary and only 12th_{lowest as regards trust in judicial}

institutions in corruption cases. Greece performs perhaps better than Romania in this Eurobarometer, with respective scores being 6th_{lowest and 17}th_{lowest. Poland has a mixed score when looking at the}

Eurobarometer questions. It is 12th_{lowest for the abuse of power for personal gain in the judiciary}

question and 19th_{lowest for the question on whether respondents have trust in the judiciary.}

Considering the overlap and differences found between the corruption Eurobarometer and the WGI, the Scandinavian countries (that is to say Sweden and Finland) and Germany on the one hand, and Bulgaria Romania and Poland on the other, seem relevant for our case selection as regards variation on corruption due to their consistent scores over the three measures used. These results are similar to the case selection considerations devoted on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede, perhaps suggesting a co-variation between corruption and culture, which, although important to note as a potential weak point of the presented research methodology, will not be discussed further in this research save for the discussion at the end of the report.

The final variable to account for in the case selection is the centralization of the judiciary, which will be established for the Member States mentioned in the previous paragraph. The Asser institute has conducted an EU-wide investigation of EAW implementation, which inter alia makes note of the competent courts and prosecutors. It seems that the Netherlands is one of the most centralized of all European Member States. Only Finland and Sweden also show a relatively high degree centralization of its issuing institutions, with the issuing of warrants for the purpose of the execution of a sentence being performed by central authorities. Otherwise, the EAW system is implemented in a rather decentralized fashion in all nine countries. Considering this, it is opted to include the most similar of the large Member States as the third similar country for the analysis. Germany, while having a decentralized system both for its issuing tasks and its executing tasks, is reasonably similar to the Netherlands on both the cultural dimensions and the corruption indices and is therefore added as the third similar country.

It was already noted that Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria all possess significant dissimilarities with the Netherlands in the areas of culture and corruption. All four Member States are also highly

46 decentralized with regard to the execution and issuing of warrants. While the Polish and Romanian implementation of the EAW does include a central coordinating and supporting authority for the issuing aspects of the EAW, the competence to issue a warrant lies with decentralized prosecutors. Considering that Slovakia has only three EAW cases available, however, the final choice for the three dissimilar countries is Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.

The intermediate cases will therefore be chosen on the basis of being culturally and corruption-wise moderately dissimilar, but having a centralized tenet in its EAW implementation. The Kingdom of Spain, while decentralizing the competence to issue warrants, has centralized the execution of EAW’s. The country scores somewhat differently from the Netherlands on the other two variables, with WGI indicators providing a corruption score of 1.05 for 2012 and Eurobarometer corruption-related questions scoring Spain roughly as a middle EU country. Furthermore, the scores of Spain on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede are moderately dissimilar. Spain has no extreme scores on the different cultural dimensions and the total score difference with the Netherlands is 109 points. The United Kingdom (UK) is furthermore an interesting case to include in the selection, being one of the largest EU Member States and being reasonably dissimilar from the Netherlands on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. With a score of 1.68 on the WGI indicators and, an 8th_{place on the Eurobarometer perception of pervasiveness of corruption question}

and a 24th_{place on the trust in the judiciary Eurobarometer question, the country scores highly varying}

on corruption indexes. Furthermore, it employs a decentralized judiciary for EAW purposes. Thus, the country roughly scores in the middle between similar and dissimilar from the Netherlands. Its common law system provides an interesting extra difference with the other state included in the country selection. Finally, Belgium will be included as the third intermediate state. The country scores halfway on differences with the Netherlands on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede and also scores halfway for all EU countries on the three corruption indicators. Like the UK, Belgium has opted for a decentralized implementation of the EAW. Its close proximity to the Netherlands is an extra reason to include the country in the dataset. This leads to the following set of countries with the following attributes:

Netherlands

Corruption Cultural Dimensions Judicial centralization low/medium/high WGI 2012 Eurobarometer perceived spread of corruption Eurobarometer trust in judicial authorities in corruption case

PDI IDV MAS UAV Issuing for trial Issuing for execution of sentence Execu ting

2,13 16% 53% 38 80 14 53 Low High high

Finland

Corruption Cultural Dimensions Judicial centralization low/medium/high WGI 2012 Eurobarometer perceived spread of corruption Eurobarometer trust in judicial authorities in corruption case