Actores del proceso constituyente

As we have touched upon earlier, Russia belongs to several of the groups in the energy chain. This means that Moscow needs to take into consideration Russia’s interests as an energy producer, consumer and transit state simultaneously when deciding upon which energy security course to take. Central Asia plays a role in several of these considerations. Russia imports Central Asian gas to supplement its own consumption, and Central Asian

hydrocarbons are exported through Russian pipelines to Europe and Asia, meaning that Russia serves as both a re-exporter and transit area for Central Asia’s energy. Last but not least, both Russia and Central Asia are net energy exporters (see tables below), meaning that they are de facto competitors on the international energy market. Therefore, Russia has to approach Central Asia in such a manner as to balance the different considerations outlined above, while still fulfilling the main principles of ensuring energy demand and market access. In practical terms, it seems possible to argue that the main role of the Central Asian states has been related to two of the abovementioned aspects, namely to ensure the aims of market integration and diversification. These will be discussed in the following.

Figure 3: Central Asian and Russian proved natural gas reserves45

At the end of 2009 At the end of 2010

Trillion cubic meters Trillion cubic meters Share of world total Kazakhstan 1.9 1.8 1.0 %

Turkmenistan 8.0 8.0 4.3 %

Uzbekistan 1.6 1.6 0.8 %

Total Central Asia 11.5 11.4 6.1 %

Russia 44.4 44.8 23.9 %

Figure 4: Kazakhstani and Russian proved oil reserves46

At the End of 2009 At the End of 2010 Thousand Million

Barrels

Thousand Million Barrels

Share of World Total

Kazakhstan 39,8 39,8 2.9 %

Russia 76,7 77,4 5.6 %

45 _{Data for both tables retrieved from BP (2010).}

46 _{Although both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also possess some oil reserves these are modest; each}

65 Russo-Central Asian energy integration

As was shown in section 3.1.4., one aspect concerning Russia’s energy framing of Central Asia related to the creation of a regional Eurasian energy space. Although not evoking any notions of a neo-Soviet approach, something that was clear from the fact that this space was to be construed on the basis of a realpolitikal and business-like manner that took into account the growing power of the Central Asian states. Naturally, it would be erroneous to equate this with a direct Russian control over Central Asia’s energy resources. Rather, the reintegration would allow Russia to influence or at least monitor decision making processes in the Central Asian states. Although the newly built Chinese pipelines had disrupted the Russian control of Central Asia’s energy resources, Russian still had an infrastructural edge. By further

integration with the Central Asian states Russia could maintain its preferential access to the region’s energy sources. In turn, this would allow Moscow to control the direction and volumes of energy exports from Central Asia. Moreover, the integration could be an opening for Moscow to display a Russian power to act, hereby legitimizing the Russian foreign policy framing of Russia as being a regional driving force.

Given that Russia and Central Asia occupy partly similar positions in the energy chain as producers and exporters, it is obvious that the proposed Russo-Central Asian energy integration does not include any energy end markets besides the Russian one. Rather, by being able to monitor and influence other energy producers, Russia could retain some control over the Central Asian states’ energy policies, and in the prolongation of this also over energy importers.

Diversification

In line with what we outlined above, the Russian goal of diversifying its exports should be seen as a mechanism for ensuring that Russia had access to markets which Russian oil and gas could be sent to. By establishing stronger bonds with the Asian markets Russia could decrease its export dependence on the European market while also gaining increased access to the increasingly growing Asian one. However, this also meant being able to keep an eye on the actions of other energy producers. By being able to coordinate its actions with Central Asia, Moscow could dissuade the Central Asian states from establishing stronger bonds with the EU. It could also be argued that the Russian endorsement of Central Asian energy export diversification towards Asia serves as a point in favor for just this, as it ties up energy

resources that otherwise could be exported to the European market, where Russia had a strong standing.

This underlines the importance for establishing closer bonds with Central Asia, as this arguably would make it easier for Russia to convince the Central Asian states of this move. However, it should also be noted that this also was the result of pragmatism: The rise of China made Beijing’s presence in Central Asia almost unavoidable. By spurring the Central Asian states to orient themselves towards the east, Moscow signaled that there was room for both parts on the Asian market, something that becomes even clearer when taking into

consideration the fact that growing development of the Asian economies would trigger a larger demand for energy. This meant that both parts’ market shares could be protected. At the same time, and as noted above, Russia wanted to keep its preeminence on the European market to a large an extent as possible.

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Chapter 4: Central Asia in the EU Discourse on Energy Security