Another common misinterpretation of the CA concerns the quality of valued options which are comprised in the capability space. The value of freedom of choice (the CA‟s core proposition) varies between cultures and individuals. Thus, the CA is
capping freedom of choice with the phrase people value and have reason to value, and thereof options added regardless of their value may end up being borderline useless. Secondly, freedom of choice is not idem with freedom of intrinsic importance. Indeed, however valuable or not options may be, “an increase in „freedom of choice‟ may crowd out our ability to live a “peaceful and unbothered life” (Sen, 1992: 63 in Alkire, 2005: 121). As Sen clarifies it: “Indeed sometimes more freedom of choice can bemuse and befuddle, and make one‟s life more wretched” (1992: 59 in Alkire, 2005: 121). Without these fine clarifications the CA would not only be culturally insensitive, but also insensitive to the adverse psychological affects possible of having too many options of choice62. This includes the feeling of being lost and guideless-ness, but also of living in constant self-doubt with ones decisions (which concerns „did I do the right choice‟ and „what if‟ questions)63
.
Another clarifying comment has to be made in regard to freedom versus control. Self-determination is an ethical imperative of the CA, and thus the individual is assigned the levers of control for choice. This ought not to be confused with control of one‟s own destiny, and, to a lesser philosophical degree, of “who actually controls the levers of operation” (Sen, 1992: 65 in Alkire, 2005: 121 (italics added for emphasis)). Congruously,
given the choice, we would choose to work in a smoke-free environment, then ceteris paribus a public program to prohibit smoking in shared working areas does indeed enhance our freedom, even if we were not asked directly about this manner, because in the absence of this public program we would not have the effective freedom to work in a smoke- free environment” (Alkire, 2005: 121 (italics in original)).
This relates directly to the aforementioned capabilities of choice. Choosing a non-smoking environment has been a capability of qualitative choice, whereas in fact
62 For instance, German school graduates do face no less than 12.300(!) degree options to choose from for
university study. This constitutes a freedom of choice which can be justifiably labelled befuddling (http 7)
63
the quantitative number of choices possible diminished (we lose the freedom to smoke indeed, a freedom considered, however, of holding no value).
A last misunderstanding concerns the concept of equality and justice. While the CA demands equality in a space in which it is considered justifiable, the capability set, it doesn‟t mean that in real life everybody would subsequently end up with the same vector of achieved functionings. In fact, two people with identical capability sets are very likely to achieve very distinct types and levels of functionings, because they made different choices or used the capabilities at their disposal very distinctly (Robeyns, 2003a). Thus, the CA will not solve the probably inherent problem that in vertically stratified social arrangements someone always has to be at the bottom (Oyen, 2003). However, these stratifications are socially and therefore somewhat externally defined64, thus a person might live well at that “bottom”, if there she is firstly provided by basic capabilities (as in Sen‟s definition), and secondly with what she considers important to live a fulfilling life (by innate criteria). This must include the functionings of appearing in public without shame and self-respect, both probably most problematic of getting achieved when someone is located beneath others, and when innate criteria have to be appeased with external ones (and vice versa).
Additionally, this has to be further scrutinised in detail against the aforementioned danger of adaptation and mental conditioning. The basic aim remains however, that that positional objective, context-specific “bottom” needs to be made
subjectively bearable for the individual, while acknowledging that social differences
will remain (and probably should also be embraced). Important is only that every person has the freedom for changing ones positioning on that positional objective latter, if she feels subjectively urged to do so.
64 Although these criteria are context specific (emic), they remain external to the individual (etic), even
As a liberal philosophical framework, the CA thus respects the various understandings of a good life, and is not judgemental in regard to what has been achieved with the capability set (Robeyns, 2003a: 14). In fact, the CA is lesser (if at all) concerned with the transformation of capabilities into functionings, as long as there are no social-environmental factors preventing an aspired capability transformation. Thus, the CA would not judge the career or development of a person subsequently to the capability provision necessary for ones reasoned agency; it rather assesses whether that person has had that provision to begin with. It is of this liberal stance towards life that capability expansion and not achieved functionings are the appropriate policy focus.
This stands in fine contrast, however, to the question of whether socio- environmental factors or group dynamics have prevented a capability transformation into a functioning. If, for instance, socio-environmental factors prevent women from having access to aspired jobs they are well-qualified for, than this constitutes a real deprivation or unfreedom of concern for the CA. It is thus decisively of this reason that the CA is more interested in equity rather than equality (as in equal treatment of all people).