There is an ongoing discourse in Ethiopia related to traditional systems and state structures, mainly in areas that were subjected by the central power, acting as a colonialist power. Customary institutions are formal from the point of view of local actors, who very often don't recognize other forms of power, if not legitimated by these institutions.
Custom is a culturally grounded pattern of behaviors. It has a historical dimension, since culture is rooted in the past through the notion of tradition. By definition custom can change through adaptation and re-interpretation of traditional features in new contexts. Institutions can be understood as a complex set of norms, notions, and behavioral patterns regulating social life. They are clearly perceived by the social actors and are often identified through specific names (for instance the gadaa and qaalluu institutions). They are embedded in cultural codes, often expressed through ritual, symbolism, procedures and other visible manifestations. Customary institutions are therefore key knots of ideas, beliefs and behaviors regulating social life, having a root in the specific tradition of each people. Customary institutions are therefore key knots of ideas, beliefs and behaviors regulating social life and rooted in the specific tradition of each people. Customary institutions change over time, but there must be mechanisms by which the change is socialized and accepted by the larger community234.
231 Global IDP (2005) “There are reports that for example the Gurra call themselves Oromos in Mada Wolabo,
one of their places of origin, while they claim to be Somalis in Filtu and Haya-Suftu.”
232 Wilding R., The historiography of pastoralism and the emergence of the Borana Oromo, JEPSS Research
Report, ILCA, Addis Ababa 1985.
233
The Bon and the Migdan, together with the Tumaal and the Yibir, are mentioned among the low castes of Sab. The Migdan were hunters, and the Bon were craftsmen or servants, and they have an outcast status in Somali society. They are probably the survivors of proto-somali groups (Steiner, 1994).
234 Bassi Marco, Customary Institutions in Contemporary Politics, Borana Zone, Oromia, Ethiopia, University
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Customary identity doesn't refer only to ethnic issues in Ethiopia. For instance religious identity was a key factor during the Somali irredentism, when Muslim Oromo and Somali both sided with the Somali front. National identities (such as Oromo and Somali) have instead been prevailing during the struggle against the Derg and in the current ethnic federalism. The Oromo and the Somali have for many centuries interacted along a 1000 kilometre line. From the political point of view they are internally segmented, but explicit national identities slowly grew in relation to the construction and developments of the modern state, during the colonial and post-colonial experiences. The referendum held in 2004 was designed to institutionally address the competition developed over the demarcation between the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia (Region 5) and Oromia (Region 4). The national and local fabrication of ethnic discourse pointed to the collocation of primary identities within the national identities (Oromo, Somali, etc), focusing on origin, language, religious or cultural affinity. These primary identities have existed from the pre-colonial time through the modern period.
There is a direct correlation between the persistence of primary identities and customary institutions. Any society must convey to its member a sense of continuity over time. The long-term survival of a pastoral or agro-pastoral group must be combined with the immediate need of the productive units (families, lineages, etc) to have access to the natural resources for their livelihoods. The interaction with the environment determines the definition of groupings co-operating in productive activities and defines norms of access to and exclusion from accessing natural resources. Therefore full-fledged systems of governance develop235. In the study area each primary identity gathers a number of productive units with its own sets of rules, norms, myths, decisional procedures and enforcing mechanisms. Primary identities provide the aggregative principle to form a unit of resource management with its own governance mechanisms and customary institutions. The group must have access to a number of complementary resources for the viable survival of its members. It may enter either into competitive relations with similar groups, engaging in territorial disputes and conflicts, or in complementary relations, such as in the case of pastoralists and hunter-gatherers sharing diverse resources of the same territory. From the individual‟s point of view, having a primary identity and customary institutions is a matter of survival. At the collective level, customary leaders have the responsibility to assure access to the natural resources required for livelihoods and survival, in the case of pastoralists enough grazing land and water sources.
235
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Boranaland was incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire at the end of the 19th century. The armed settlers slowly built an administrative structure by co-opting Borana elders to the position of balabat. The balabat were acting as a bridge between the Ethiopian imperial structure and the local community. They were State-appointed traditional elders, but not customary leaders. The two major qaalluu were offered the highest positions but they refused the appointment and transferred it to one of their closer family members. They perceived a contradiction between the old religious role of assuring the well-being, fertility and prosperity of their own people and the new duty of supervising the collection of taxes and the transmission of orders from above, reinforcing the exploitation by the Ethiopian State. By rejecting the accumulation of titles, the qaalluu were protecting the internal social processes from external domination236.
In western Oromia the gadaa system was tolerated during imperial times, while repressed during the Derg at the beginning and then tolerated again, with an informal but reciprocally acknowledged division of competences between the administrative and the customary structures. Customary institutions were managing the natural resources asset and livestock production. In addition, they continued to regulate family and interpersonal relations in the rural areas. Governmental institutions and laws were regulating trade, including cattle commerce, tax, military conscription and inter-ethnic social relations, mainly in towns. Gadaa represented a crucial governance factor in Ethiopia, although not formally recognized by the Ethiopian State237.
Since the turn of the millennium there was a theoretically grounded attempt to systematically co-opt customary institutions in modern governance. This is taking shape in different fields, including both discourse on poverty and development promoted by the World Bank and the IMF, and in relation to advocacy and policy making, or more informally, in management of conflict and electoral processes. In relation to poverty and development, the issue is specifically addressed in the IFAD-commissioned international report to support the PCDP (Pastoral Community Development Project), based in the Ministry of Federal Affairs and financed by the World Bank, IFAD, and the Government of Ethiopia. According to the report, “the PCDP is based on the assumption that pastoral livelihoods can be improved by strengthening the self-management capabilities of indigenous institutions”. The report focuses on local level social-institutional issues (both governmental and indigenous) among Somali,
236 Donham D. L., James W., The southern marches of Imperial Ethiopia, Oxford, James Currey Eds., 2002. 237 Gemetchu Megerssa, The Oromo and the Ethiopian state ideology in a historical perspective, Smithsonian
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Afar, Borana, and various ethnic groups of South Omo, and on the types of capacity building needed to support them238.
The post-Derg governments of Ethiopia were aware of the potential of indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution. Attempts to institutionalize the contribution of elders in this field had already been made in Oromia before the year 1992239. More structured attempts to involve elders with advisory roles were established in Afar and in the Somali regions240, and a conference to resolve the Somali-Oromo conflict in Borana Zone was held in September 2000 at Addis Ababa University and attended by several elders241.
The metaphor of customary institutions as a bridge to the community informs other propositions directly related to the political field. At the operational level, the Pastoralists Communication Initiative (PCI) was established. It was originally born in connection to the attempt to obtain a chapter dedicated to pastoralism in the national poverty reduction paper (PRSP). In line with the poverty reduction strategy of ensuring citizen‟s voice and institutional responsiveness, PCI was established in Ethiopia with funding from DFID, expertise from IDS (University of Sussex) and in coordination with UN Agencies in Addis Ababa. PCI supported the efforts to improve dialogue between the pastoralists and the Government of Ethiopia attempting to work through the customary institutions and involve the customary leaders. From February 2004 PCI paid attention to the Oromo speaking pastoralists as a result of a policy formulated and adopted by the Oromia Pastoral Development Commission (OPDC), explicitly referring to the need to integrate the customary institutions of the pastoralists. In 2004 PCI, aside from various initiatives in the formal political sector, facilitated a number of local scale meetings between the Borana, the Gabra Miigoo and the Guji Oromo pastoralists with representatives of the government of Ethiopia. A larger meeting was held in Yabelo, the administrative center of Borana Zone, in June. Later PCI escalated its activity by facilitating the Global Pastoralists Gathering in Turmi (South Omo, Ethiopia) in 2005 and the Horn of Africa Regional Pastoralists Gathering, held in Qarsaa Dambii from July 11th to 18th 2006, again in Borana Zone. The PCI team systematically tried to involve the customary leaders of Borana, Guji and Gabra242.
238 Waters-Bayer, A. Local Level socio-institutional issues and capacity building in pastoral community development, Consultant Report, ETC Eoculture for IFAD, 2003.
239 Leencho Lata, The Ethiopian state at the crossroads, Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1999.
240 Lister Sarah, The processes and dynamics of pastoralist representation in Ethiopia, IDS Working Paper 220,
March 2004.
241 Vaughen, S. and K. Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sidastudies N.
10, 2003.
242 Lister Sarah, The processes and dynamics of pastoralist representation in Ethiopia, IDS Working Paper 220,
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The self-expression of pastoralists‟ needs and priorities was also promoted in Ethiopia in connection to Pastoralist Day, from 1998 onwards. The initiative began with local meetings organized by civil society and with the participation of governmental officers. In 2002 a large gathering was organized in Dire Dawa under the leading role of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, with the participation of several customary leaders, including gadaa leaders.
Whatever efforts were made, the practical outcomes may deeply differ from the theoretical assumptions and propositions. For instance, The Indigenous World 2006 was very critical in regards to the role taken on by the Ministry of Federal Affairs during the Pastoralist day of 2005243. The official policy documentation showed contradictory statements by different governmental institutions and weak or generic predicaments, and the practice, displayed gaps with the policy statements. Lister (2004) mentions the nature of elders' co-option in the governmental structure. She refers to the practice to compensate collaborative elders, well established in Somali Region, in order to receive advise on matters relating to customary issues and conflict resolution. Criticism is raised about the elders‟ capacity to put forward an independent articulation of interests within their own community. Rather, they have extensively been utilized to mobilize political and electoral support for the leading party. Secondly, there are doubts about the real incorporation of the elders‟ views in official decision-making. Lister is also overconfident about the overlapping of customary offices with administrative positions at lower administrative levels, such as the kebele.
3.4 The history of movements and territorial spaces among people living in the target