As mentioned above, the military elite in Korea served Japan, and most technocrats were also survivors of and educated in the period of Japanese occupation. However, they usually denied or remained silent about their Japanese linage (Atkins, 2010, p. 12), and Korean scholars are not eager to excavate the colonial linkage regarding its economic growth. According to Kohli (1994, p. 1270), the strong nationalism among Korean scholars created blind spots to deny the colonial influence on Korea‘s fast economic growth. He argues that ―Japanese colonial influence on Korea, in 1905-194549, was decisive in shaping political economy that later evolved into the
high-growth South Korean path to development‖ [emphasis added] (Kohli, 1994, p. 1270).
49 It is assumed that Kohli used 1905 as an initiating year of Japanese rule because the Japanese Protectorate Treaty was signed in that year. However, the Annexation of Korea by Japan took place in late August of 1910. Thus, it is correct to change it to ‗1910‘-1945. The author of this thesis did not find any other publication using 1905 as the beginning year of Japanese colonisation of Korea.
However, his colonial linage determinism fails to explain the dismal economic growth of North Korea. If North Korea, where the identical colonial influence took place during the same period, does not show the same high-growth economic development, colonial experience cannot be the ‗decisive‘ explanatory factor of economic growth. Hasan (1976, p. 26) also argues that even though the 35 years of Japanese occupation significantly influenced the culture and society of Korea, it was ―only limited segments of Korean life‖ and the impact on economic structure was also limited because of ―the restrictions placed on Korean participation in economic and political planning and management.‖
In addition, whereas Kohli (1994, p. 1286) suggests export-oriented policy in Park‘s regime as a specific colonial linage from Japan to Korea, he fails to recognise that Park had pushed import- substitution strategy as a national development model prior to the export-oriented one. Export- oriented strategy was adopted only after import-substitution strategy was implemented and proved to fail in Korea (Kim, Gwanghee, 2008). Therefore, it is logical to conclude that export- oriented policy was adopted by trail-and-error, instead of by the Japanese colonial linage in Korea. Furthermore, even though a number of observers such as Suh Sang-Chul (1966) and Schumpeter (1940) explain that Korea‘s economic growth under Japanese rule, which was 3 per cent per annum, was export-led growth, the pattern of trade was an epitome of extractive colonial trade. It was dominated by the forced export of high-quality rice to Japan and import of cheap rice to replace the domestic demand (Kuznets, 1977, p. 11). Therefore, the mere fact that Park‘s government also chose the export-led growth strategy does not mean that the regime returned to colonial origins in economic policy making.
Even though Kohli‘s argument that Korea‘s economic path would not have been adopted without its colonial experience from Japan has a significant degree of fallacy50, one cannot deny that
Korea‘s military elites were influenced by Japanese military culture. Regarding the wealth and security of the state, one outstanding and lasting ideology of Japan is technology supremacy as a tool to build a state stronger and richer. Samuelson (1994), in his book Rich Nation, Strong Army, explains that Japanese industrialisation started with military industries with an aim of strengthening the nation through technological advancement under the slogan of ‗Rich Nation, Strong Army‘. Behind the military industry-led industrialisation, over centuries there was a strong Japanese belief that the nation cannot be militarily strong without advanced technology. Samuel (1994, p. x) named the Japanese belief ―technonationalism‖, which refers to ―the belief that technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenised, diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong.‖ This technology supremacy influenced elites in Korea during the era of Japanese occupation. For most technocrats in Korea the Japanese model was the model Korea should copy identically (Kim, Chung-Yum, 2006, p.145). The technonationalism became more obvious when the elite in Korea decided to turn its economic course towards heavy-chemical industry in the later stage of its industrialisation in the 1970s in the midst of deteriorating regional security. The US announced the Nixon doctrine of ‗Asian defence by Asians‘ by which the role of the US army in South Korea was planned to be scaled down in the late 1960s and, at the same time, North Korea‘s provocation was increasing (Moon, 1999, p. 3).
50 The fallacy, in part, is believed to be caused by the limited access of literature on Korea, especially publications written in Korean. As Kohli (1994, p. 1289) admits, he only examined English language literature, and the lack of language capability would lead to a biased conclusion, especially in qualitative researches as his.
In sum, whereas, traditionally (and up to today), political elites in Korea despised the colonial lineage and Japanese impact on Koreans and especially on them, it was impossible for elites in Korea in the 1960s to be free from Japanese influence. Even though the thesis refutes the idea that Japanese colonial experience was the decisive factor in Korea‘s economic growth, the Japanese perspective on economic growth, notably regarding technological supremacy, influenced elites in Korea in Park‘s regime, and it is observed in Korea‘s turn to heavy-chemical industry in the middle of increasing security concerns.