Adaptación de los modelos de calidad al sistema educativo

What kind of place does Kierkegaard have in Heidegger’s first Freiburg lecture courses? Throughout the first part of my thesis, I have aimed to understand what Heidegger is initially searching for during the period under consideration. In the second chapter of this thesis, I claimed that in connection with the question of access, Heidegger articulates a two- directional task for philosophy. I further claimed that in the lecture course Basic Problems of Phenomenology he takes up the first of these directions, that is, he articulates proper access within the pre-theoretical sphere. In the present chapter, I claimed that in his following lecture courses he takes up the second task given in his KNS lecture course. For this claim I needed to show that the three methodological moments which Heidegger puts forward should not be integrated into the notion of philosophy as it was set out in the third chapter. Rather, Heidegger offers two different ways of accessing with respect to philosophy. Both modes either express or articulate the pre-worldly (intentional moment, basic characters, relational sense, or the how-content). That is, they access what philosophy aims at. The difference lies in the mode of accessing what is aimed at. In intensification, the pre-worldly is actualized, lived through and as such brought to expression “in the living situation of gliding from one world of experience to another genuine life-world, or in moments of especially intensive life” (GA 56/57: 88 [115]). With the methodological moments, however, Heidegger provides concrete steps which must be followed in order to bring the pre-worldly to articulation. By following these steps the pre-worldly can be brought out. Following these steps does not mean actualizing the pre-worldly, nor does actualizing the pre-worldly mean that these steps are followed, nor does actualizing the pre- worldly mean that the pre-worldly is articulated. In this respect, it is rather the case that the proper actualization and what is achieved in it must be further investigated and properly articulated for Heidegger.

I showed in chapter three that Heidegger considers Kierkegaard among those who have attained the self-world and thus actualized and expressed the proper access within the pre-theoretical sphere. In the present chapter, I showed that Heidegger praises Kierkegaard for his consciousness of methodological rigor and yet, in the comparison of Kierkegaard’s indirect communication and Heidegger’s formal indication, Kierkegaard is seen to fail to

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bring out methodologically what needs to be articulated according to Heidegger. Thus, in Heidegger’s opening lecture courses of his first Freiburg period, Kierkegaard occupies a place as someone who has brought to life proper actualization of factical life within the pre- theoretical sphere. This actualization, however, must be brought to philosophical articulation. In what follows, I will show that Kierkegaard continues to have significance for Heidegger as having actualized the proper access to factical life. This actualization Heidegger will clarify, nonetheless. He will destroy, explicate, and indicate it formally.

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PART TWO

Since the central phenomenon for philosophy is factical life, it can be said that for Heidegger philosophy must find an access to life as factical. Philosophy must find an access to the pre-worldly (intentional moment, basic characters, relational sense, or the how-content). The pre-worldly was shown to be interconnected with the worldly – it is what is potentially worldly, the intentional moment or relational sense of the phenomenon. In the previous part of this thesis, I brought out through three of Heidegger’s lecture courses from the years 1919 to 1920 that with respect to the problem of access Heidegger rethinks philosophy in two directions and how he does this.

It was shown that, on the one hand, Heidegger articulates philosophy in terms of philosophical investigation. In this way he addresses the question of how philosophy must proceed in order to gain an access to its theme, factical life. It was brought out that for this purpose he articulates three methodological moments (phenomenological destruction, phenomenological explication, and formal indication), through which philosophy should approach its theme. On the other hand, Heidegger aims to establish access in the living situation: from the way factical life is actualized. In this way he addresses the question of where in life itself lies the possibility of philosophy – the possibility to win access to its theme, factical life. In this respect, philosophy is described as intensification: a mode of actualization. In what follows, I will call this a mode of accessing in and through factical life.

In addition, as came out of the analysis of the previous lecture courses, for Heidegger both ways of finding an access must account for the loss of this access. As far as philosophy has lost the genuine access to its theme, the task of rethinking philosophy is brought out by Heidegger as a necessity. In this respect, considering philosophy in the living situation leads to the thematization of authentic and inauthentic actualization. Similarly, with respect to philosophical investigation, Heidegger articulates the need to start with destruction.

In what follows in part two, I will aim to show that throughout his three next first Freiburg period lecture courses Heidegger on the one hand will continue to address philosophy within the overall structure which has emerged from his previous consideration. On the other hand, however, he simultaneously rethinks the account of philosophy in each of the following courses.

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Thus, on the one hand I insist that Heidegger continues to develop his account in two directions. In this respect, there is an interesting movement observable in the following lecture courses. First, in the lecture course on Augustine (GA 60), Heidegger applies his methodology and explicates Augustine’s actualization. In this lecture course he is predominantly occupied with the possibility of philosophy in and through factical life. Next, in the lecture course on Aristotle (GA 61), Heidegger aims to bring the two directions together by unfolding them as parts of one inquiry. However, it will be shown that in the aim to unify the two sides, both of them still clearly come out and are articulated separately. Finally, in the last lecture course of his first Freiburg period (GA 63), Heidegger thematizes hermeneutics as an investigation, which at the same time is claimed to be self-interpretation with the task of developing wakefulness in philosophy. As such, with hermeneutics the two manners of accessing are aimed to be brought together. And yet, in this lecture course too Heidegger addresses the question of access in two ways: he asks about the proper manner of investigation and articulates how proper access is found within the concrete work of interpretation. Through the latter, hermeneutics can be seen as a further development of the account of accessing in and through factical life.

On the other hand, I claim that in each of his following lecture courses Heidegger rethinks both philosophy as the proper investigation and his account of accessing in the living situation. With regard to the overall aim of this thesis, that is, finding Kierkegaard’s place in Heidegger’s first Freiburg period lecture courses, this is significant, whereas it is not self-evident that each time Heidegger rethinks his account of philosophy Kierkegaard should regain his position. And yet, as I will show, this is exactly the case. Kierkegaard continues to have the same position he has already been given.

Previously I have claimed that in what Heidegger has established Kierkegaard gains a specific place: he has significance for Heidegger with respect to the latter’s search for the possibility of philosophy in the living situation, that is, in and through factical life. Kierkegaard has been brought out by Heidegger as a thinker who has actualized the proper access: he has brought into expression the attainment of the self-world. In what is to come I will argue that Kierkegaard continues to have significance to Heidegger within the same sphere, also during the latter part of his first Freiburg period lecture courses. However, while in the previous lecture courses Kierkegaard was mentioned by Heidegger only once, in the following lecture courses Kierkegaard’s presence becomes more palpable. As I aim to show, Kierkegaard can be seen to become Heidegger’s constant partner in his unfolding

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of the possibility of philosophy in and through factical life. That is, despite the fact that Heidegger rethinks his account in each lecture course, he nevertheless always draws on Kierkegaard and does so continually when considering access in and through factical life. With the aim of exhibiting the extensiveness of Kierkegaard’s impact, in what follows I will also make excursions to Kierkegaard’s treatises. These are chosen in each case by considering what Heidegger explicitly brings out about Kierkegaard. Here, as Heidegger rethinks his philosophy, different treatises of Kierkegaard also come to the fore as of significance to him. In order to show where and how Heidegger exactly leans on Kierkegaard, I will thus start to track Heidegger’s path through his following lectures courses.

In chapter five, I concentrate on Heidegger’s lecture course Augustine and Neoplatonism (SS 1921). In this lecture course Heidegger explicates Augustine’s Confessions, Book X. The fact that Heidegger explicates Augustine’s book in this lecture course is already telling, with respect to the claims made in the first part of this thesis. It says that Augustine’s actualization is investigated philosophically (or clarified) by Heidegger. In addition, as I will aim to show, Kierkegaard is persistently present in Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine’s Confessions. Within this deliberation I also show that a necessary adjustment must be made in the published text of the lecture course in order to point out a text which has been ascribed to Heidegger as his own, but which will be proven to be nothing less than his summary of the second part of Kierkegaard’s treatise The Sickness unto Death.

In chapter six, I turn to Heidegger’s next lecture course: Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle (WS 1921–1922). With respect to claims made in part one of this thesis, it will be shown that in this lecture course Heidegger again addresses the problem of philosophy in two different ways: it is asked 1) how one must proceed with philosophical investigation and 2) where lies the possibility of philosophy in the living situation (as it is actualized). These different sides are brought forth as parts of the same question, and yet analyzed distinctly. In showing that this is the case I will suggest a slightly different layout for the published text of the lecture course and bring out Kierkegaard’s significance for Heidegger with respect to the latter’s rethought account of philosophy in and through factical life. In order to highlight Kierkegaard’s role for Heidegger’s account I will make an excursion to Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety.

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In the final chapter of this part, I will analyze Heidegger’s last lecture course of his first Freiburg period: Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity (SS 1923). I will bring out both Heidegger’s articulation of the meaning of hermeneutics and his account of the concrete work of interpretation. With respect to Kierkegaard, it will be shown that Heidegger once again is influenced by Kierkegaard when he articulates what is established through the concrete work of interpretation: a rethought account of possible access in and through factical life. Furthermore, in this lecture course Heidegger explicitly attests Kierkegaard’s importance to his work. Whether this attestation coincides with what has emerged from the analysis of his lecture courses remains to be seen.

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5.

Kierkegaard in Heidegger’s lecture course “Augustine and