Adaptación de las tareas de Usabilidad al modelo en Espiral

Meanwhile, taking advantage of its increased control over Iran's oil industry, the NIOC followed the example of a number of non-Persian Gulf OPEC members and offered some of its surplus oil to international bidding.

Given the world panic about a prospective energy shortage, and the heavy dependence of Japan on the Persian Gulf in general in Iran in particular

Japanese companies offered the highest bids for Iranian oil: one barrel

of it was sold as high as $17.8. This certainly determined the

independent value of Iranian oil in the world market, though it was

artificially enhanced by the prevailing circumstances. It provided the

Shah's government, along with other Persian Gulf producers with a solid base for bargaining against the companies in the forthcoming negotiations

over the implementation of OPEC 35th Conference's resolution. Although

the companies at first resisted any further price increase, and regarded it as violation of the Tehran Agreement, they finally opened negotiations

with six Persian Gulf members of OPEC on October 8. The Gulf states'

position was, as press reports put it at the time, that posted prices should be increased from the current average level for the Gulf states of

about $3 per barrel to $4.20.81 However, while the companies were

reluctant to accept such a price, in view of the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli War on October 6 and the Iraqi nationalisation of US

interests in the Basrah Petroleum Company, the talks between the two

sides broke down on October 12. But this breakdown marked the beginning

of a period in oil politics, during which the Shah skilfully took advantage of the Middle East War and its consequences to lead OPEC in imposing the sovereignty of producers over price fixing, and taking away any power which the companies exercised in this respect once and for all. How did this happen?

The use of oil as a political weapon" by Arab producers in a forthcoming Arab-Israeli war had been on the cards for some time. President Sadat of Egypt had hinted strongly at such a possibility

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as early as April 1973. This had, subsequently, added to growing speculation by press and certain political and economic quarters in the West, about a possible Arab embargo and the question of whether the

O O

West could cope with it effectively. The Iranian official reaction to all this was, however, one of cautious silence. The Shah's

government issued no specific statement clarifying its position in the wake of an Arab embargo. If seen in the light of the Shah's refusual to participate in the Arab boycott in 1967, and his repeated disapproval of the use of oil for political purposes, which the Arabs had been

seeking to advance, as well as his strong assurances to the West and Japan of continued Iranian oil supplyfthe silence was not very important.

It could have been safely assumed that Iran would not take part in any future Arab embargo measures. But, if the silence is considered in view of the dramatic improvement of relations between Tehran and Cairo since the two sides re-established diplomatic ties in 1970, Tehran's apparent changing position in favour of voicing a stronger support for the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict and its growing friendship and cooperation, at least at OPEC level, with other Arab states, except

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Iraq, it certainly benefited Tehran in two important ways. On the one hand, it helped Tehran maintain its cooperative relations with the Arab states which were desirable and necessary for the Shah to realise Iran's potential as an oil power. On the other, it made concerned Western quarters uncertain as to what Iran's decision would be in the wake of an all-round Arab embargo. Thus, while preventing any undue complication with the Arab states, Tehran provided the companies and major Western consuming countries and Japan with no solid grounds to take it for granted that Iran would definitely not respond favourably to

doubt, which strengthened its position further against the companies. Tehran maintained its silence right up to the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war.

The fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out on October 6, 1973. in

order to retaliate against Western, particularly US support for Israel, Iraq and Libya nationalised certain US oil interests in their respective

oil industries. Moreover, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, a close ally of

the West, warned that Arabs might use their oil in concerted actions 85

against the West. Certain joint Arab embargo measures now seemed

inevitable. At this point, however, the S h a h ’s government promptly

sought to clarify its position by resorting to what may be looked at as

a dual policy approach. Tehran reiterated its past policy of non­

involvement in the Middle East conflict for two major reasons: one,

Iran was a non-Arab state, though a Muslim country; another, Iran did

not believe in the use of oil as a "political weapon".86 But, unlike

the past, this time Tehran was very careful not to condemn the use of

oil as a political weapon, nor to question its effectiveness in the context

of the Middle East conflict. On the other hand, Tehran assured the

Arabs that it would do nothing which could undermine their embargo 87

measures. Subsequently, during the Arab embargo measures, Tehran

refrained from increasing its porduction by an amount sufficient to offset the effect of Arab measures.

This dual approach enabled Tehran, once again, to maintain, at least on the surface, a balanced and central position between the West and the

Arabs. Taking advantage of this position and the growing world panic

about an energy crisis', pending the Arab embargo measures, as well as the Western world's pre-occupation with the Middle East war itself,

the Shah took the lead in urging other Persian Gulf members of OPEC to take unilateral actions to implement OPEC's 35th conference's resolution, talks over which between Gulf producers and companies, had broken down

at the start of the war. The Iranian delegation put the Shah's proposal

to OPEC at its conference in Vienna on October 12. Given that all other

Gulf members were Arab and they had enough grievances against the West under the prevailing circumstances, the Shah's proposal received their unanimous approval.88

Consequently, on October 16, one day before the Organisation of Arab

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)89 announced its decision that

the Arab producers would cut their production by 5 per cent monthly until Israeli forces withdrew from the Arab territories they occupied during

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the 1967 war, the six Persian Gulf producers, led by Iran, unilaterally

announced a 70 per cent increase in the posted prices of their crude. The increase m the posted prices was approximately $2 per barrel (from about $3 to $5), with an effective increase in payments by the oil companies to the producing governments of about $1.25 per barrel (from

approximately $1.75 to $3).91 m effect, the producing governments'

share of the posted prices increased from 40 per cent agreed in Tehran,

in February 1971, to 60 per cent. in the case of Iran, the government

raised its posted prices to $5.09 per barrel, from which its share was

to be $3.05 per barrel. The Iranian Oil Minister, Amuzegar, however,

argued that with the removal of the effect of the posted prices on the actual market price of oil in the Persian Gulf, the increase in the

latter amounted to only about 17 per cent. Either way, in real terms

government income increased by about 70 per cent per barrel. This

had been modified twice, in January and June 1972. Meanwhile,

Amuzegar warned the companies that if they, either individually or in a group, refused to transport the Persian Gulf oil on the basis of new prices, then the Gulf producers "would be unanimously prepared to offer their oil", on the basis of the new prices, "to any customer who want to buy". "Therefore", he declared, "all the consumer nations have been assured that OPEC does not consider the matter of an oil embargo at all". Amuzegar stressed that the Persian Gulf price increase, in which Iran played the leading role, must not be associated with the embargo measures, adopted by OAPEC on October 17 and thus Iran must not be implicated in

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the Arab embargo actions. However, one cannot overlook the importance of Iran's actions in relation to the Arab embargo. There are several reasons to suggest that in many ways Iran helped and participated, at least indirectly, in the Arab embargo. It must be remembered that the Persian Gulf Arab producing states, which Iran led in the move

for the price increase, were members of OPEC and OAPEC at the same time. It was exactly one day after they had unanimously approved the Shah's proposal for a unilateral price increase that they endorsed a 70 per

cent increase in OAPEC oil prices and committed themselves to OAPEC's embargo measures, which consisted of 5 per cent monthly production cuts and, subsequently, a total oil embargo against the US and Holland. Moreover, the Iranian-led Persian Gulf price increase was decided on at

an OPEC meeting held at the same time and place (Kuwait) as OAPEC's meeting to formulate its embargo. There is no doubt that the embargo measures were entirely decided by OAPEC, but the leadership for the price increase was initially provided by Iran, which had a fair knowledge of what OAPEC was about to decide next day. In view of this and the fact that the Shah stood by his assurance to Arab producers that Iran would do nothing

to undermine their embargo measures, Iran cannot be totally divorced from the Arab actions and their consequences. In this respect, Iran's role, at the time, was overshadowed by Iran publicly disassociating itself from Arab embargo measures and reassuring the West and Japan of Iran's uninterrupted oil supply. It was also overshadowed by the world's pre-occupation with the Middle East and Arab producers' militancy.

Therefore, Iran's role received less publicity and analysis in the West.

Once, however, OAPEC's embargo measures took effect, an oil

shortage in the world market became very acute, and the West and Japan were forced to value Iran more than ever before as their only major OPEC supplier, the prevailing circumstances shifted more to favour the Shah's policy of price increase and price control. In the next meeting of OPEC in Vienna on December 20, the Iranian delegation, speaking on behalf of the producers, recommended "that oil be priced at $12 to $15

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a barrel ...". Although this was sharply criticised by the companies 94

and American government, nevertheless during an OPEC meeting held in Tehran from December 22 to 23, the oil ministers of six Gulf member-

countries decided to set the "take" of the "host" or producing government at $7 per barrel of Arabian light 34-degree API (the standard quality), as against about $3 which was fixed in accordance with the October price increase. This meant that for such oil the relevant posted prices would be increased from January 1, 1974 to $11,651 per barrel

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