The previous section explained the workings of the security apparatus employed by a repressive regime. In this section I offer an extended presentation of neopatrimonialism and the economic effects of this system. A relational dimension of neopatrimonialism in Egypt has been partly described as cronyism (Adly 2009). This featured, and most likely still features, interdependent power relations between the Egyptian political, military and business establishment (see Kechichian and Nazimek 1997; Bellin 2004). This situation had provided the MB’s business elite, which in large part consisted of merchants and expatriate professionals, with an opportunity to exercise a form of moral economic management boosting their credibility among many religiously conservative Egyptians.
It has long been obvious that the neopatrimonial relations are hierarchical and, in the case of Egypt’s political elite (usually demobilized army officers), it has an authoritative advantage over others (Heydemann 2004). This relational mechanism includes a system of rewards and a solidarity mentality where the risks of losing such privileges might create resistance and even defection.45 It is not possible to know with any amount of certainty whether this scenario played out in Egypt in the wake of Hosni Mubarak’s resignation. It seems that the military’s power advantage and relatively untainted image with the public enabled the immediate take-over of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (see 08CAIRO2091 2008; 09CAIRO1468 2009 official documents).
In the case of economic or business elites, their primary interests are “in profit, [leading them to be] far more concerned with a regime's effectiveness than with its openness: they want a state weak enough to loot but strong enough to be worth looting […] businessmen profit more from lobbying the state than from competing in the market, they divert both entrepreneurial and financial resources from productive investment to rent seeking, that is, building political influence for economic profit” (Crystal 1994, 272). Such arguments are also connected to the social impact of economic underdevelopment, which has traditionally been analyzed in the light of a disempowered and “patrimonialy” bounded labor force (see Richards and Waterbury, 1994, 140). In the end it must be remembered
45 For comparative purposes, see Kalyvas (1999b) who shows the former communist system’s complexity of personal networks and defection during the loss of privileges.
88 that the vast majority of the Egyptian work force consists of self-employed workers running small businesses and/or small agricultural enterprises.
On the other hand, a large proportion of the political elite in the late Mubarak-era was synonymous or, at least, closely linked with the economic elite. This claim has partly been supported by the numerous cases of financial embezzlement among appointed political figures allegedly violating constitutional provisions of executive power (see (Al-Ahram Online 2011; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d). It is plausible to assume that financial elites with broad economic interests operating in an authoritarian political system usually comply with a repressive regime’s policies. Large business owners and financiers are, most likely, not interested in calling for political plurality and freedom of expression, due to the very nature of their operations. The financial elites in Egypt have, in this process of adjustment, gone even further and in many cases merged with the political elites. As such, the financial actors have directly contributed to the resilience of the authoritarian regime by adding to its financial strength and making the financial sector deeply imbedded within the political decision making processes of the state, thus adding to the disempowerment of the general public (Salman and Assies 2007, 218-219; Sadiki 2009, 200-210).
Islamist dissent against repressive regimes across the MENA region in general, and in Egypt more specifically, has been critical of such development in the political system attracting a substantial number of supporters. It has become clear that the substantial part of populations in Egypt and Tunisia consider the Islamist alternative as a pragmatic and (certainly politically untested) antithesis to the corruption and nepotism of authoritarian regimes (. For instance, “[c]ommentators in Egypt have noted that the Brotherhood changed [or rather diversified] its slogan from “Islam Is the Solution” to “Fighting Corruption Is the Solution,” which contributed to huge gains in the legislative elections held in 2005 (Bayerle and Hassan 2009, 265). Moreover, it is possible to trace social strains, political dissent and public frustrations back to the deteriorating economic situation (Meital 2006, 258-260). Dissident SMOs and political parties have often referred to the deteriorating living conditions in order to reiterate their ideological framework, which, accordingly, is supposed to offer a much brighter alternative and solutions to poverty and inequality (Bayat 1998; Caromba and Solomon 2008, 121).
89 In order to have a more comprehensive overview of Egyptian Islamist dissent as it relates to socio-economic grievances it is necessary to revisit the political climate of the mid-1970s. The liberalization of the Egyptian economy can be traced back to the initial period of Sadat’s presidency (1970-1981). The ‘economic opening’ (infitah) policy during the mid-1970s followed the path of increased privatization or de-Nasseratization (e.g. selling off state owned companies) allowing for the (re)birth of a powerful economic elite which has since been linked to the ruling regime (Abu-Rabi‘ 2004b, 90).
The policy of infitah has had many socio-political consequences, too many to be discussed here. However, one that is relevant to the case of social movement mobilization is the state’s abandonment of its traditional role as the leader of an economic monopoly. This included the state’s role as the initiator of societal development projects and the primary provider of employment (Al-Awadi 2004, 34-35, 143-144; Sadiki 2009, 113-114).
With infitah, the Sadat regime relaxed its policies on religious activities which brought about the rise of salafi/puritan religious movements in the form of the Islamic Societies (Gama’at Al-Islamiyyah)46 which came to flourish due to increased freedom to prosletize among, primarily, university students (e.g. salafi-students winning many posts in student unions) (Ismail 2006, 142ff). At the same time, the MB increased their membership base through student unions after a long period of repression by the Nasser regime. The MB grew more rapidly than ever before (Beattie 2000, 202-203). This process of religious awakening brought about increases in the number of places of worship, widespread printing and distribution of religious literature and religious video/audio recordings by charismatic Islamic preachers. This in turn gave rise to religiously inspired associations, educational camps and other related activities (Ayubi 1980, 491-194; 1991; Ibrahim 2002, 70-73; Wickham 2002, 36-62; Al-Awadi 2004, 131; Ayoob 2004).
46 The salafi-movement has been the MB’s prime contender and rival for sympathetic activists since the mid-1970s. In the 1980s intensive support for the Islamic Societies (including The Islamic Society organization –Gamaa Al Islamiyyah, the largest group among several other) on a grassroots level developed the confidence of these groups as they confronted the Mubarak regime through a violent set of strategies. In the 1990s, popular support and membership diminished due to several reasons, in particular the brutal state repression. Throughout the 2000s, salafi mobilization has taken another shape focusing on nonviolent strategies; nevertheless, continuing to promote a puritanical form of Islamic practices attracting a substantial number of activists.
90 At the same time, this seemingly ‘relaxed repression’, after Nasser’s nearly totalitarian hold on power, produced different kinds of socio-political tensions. Sadat’s insistence on signing a peace treaty with Israel provoked widespread popular opposition, even among those friendly to the regime. Sadat, sensing opposition from within his own ranks, in an unprecedented political act in the post-colonial period, dissolved the parliament, and dismissed two hundred of his party’s MPs several months before signing the treaty in March 1979 (see Auda 1991). After the peace treaty, there was an increase in Islamist displays of grievance in the form of protests and publications against the regime which produced severe repression tactics. The authorities regularly intimidated voters during the already restricted political elections, for instance they banned suspected Islamists from voting. The arrests of Islamist activists came to be identified as a primary regime tactic in limiting their activities. The regime supposedly even assassinated several leading Islamist activists and a few members of other opposition groups (Hinnebusch 1985). These and other regime tactics in turn incited to violence an already numerous cohort of salafis (e.g.
the Islamic Group and Islamic Jihad) creating an emotional synergy of ‘regime rage’
amongst the religiously inspired opposition fuelled by what was perceived as illegitimate regime actions. The synergy of these effects is often referred to as the “Autumn of Fury”
(see Haykal 1983).
Another significant factor that led to increased popular hostility against the Sadat regime was manifested in what is known as “the bread riots” of 1977. This was a widespread revolt across the country as a result of the state’s low economic performance and the decision to reduce state subsidies directly causing popular protests with mass-destruction of state property in cities across Egypt (Richards and Baker 1992, 28; Adly 2011, 303).
During the same period, the economic liberalization as envisioned by Sadat produced rapid economic growth, 8 percent overall between 1974 and 1981 (Ikram 2006, 25).
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that poverty and economic grievances are more complex than what is found in statistics on the economic performance of markets.
Amartya Sen argues that “the standard of living is really a matter of functionings and capabilities, and not a matter directly of opulence, commodities or utilities” (1987, 16). The contentment of social actors with their lives is ultimately connected to their capabilities to live them as they desire.
91 Even though Sadat’s policy did advance the overall economic performance of the country, at least in the long-term, it did effectively enable the emergence of an economic elite, sometimes referred to as munfatihun (lit. openers, here profiteers from the infitah) (see Ryan 2001). Such economic actors did cooperate with the regime and were incorporated into a state support structure meaning they ultimately benefited from its policies. Doctors and Lawyers syndicates have thrived in particular under the relative freedom from repressive policies of the regime allowing them to internalize organizational structures and pool resources, which would otherwise be viewed by the regime as a direct political threat (see Al-Awadi 2004, 127-130). Today there are more than four million members of Egyptian trade unions and they include just above 26 percent of the total work force (ETUF 2010).
The policy of infitah continued under the reign of Mubarak. The policy of infitah was, in retrospect, deemed as only moderately successful in advancing Egypt’s economy, mainly because it failed to produce sustainable growth and economic distribution mechanisms.
On the contrary, perpetuation of budget deficits followed by increased (youth) unemployment put increasing strain of the regime’s ability to deliver public services (Wickham 2002, 37-39). Moreover, the overpopulation of urban centers, internal urban/rural disruption together with poor urban planning and the insufficient production of basic food stuffs were often mentioned as primary indicators of Egypt’s economic underdevelopment. In the first half of the 1990s, both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) put pressure on the Egyptian regime to adopt expanded neo-liberal financial policies including the further privatization of state assets and deregulation as a means to achieve a true market economy.
At the same time, the expansion of the state bureaucracy continued throughout the 1990s where state wages “sustained its expansion from 23.98 per cent of total expenditure in 1990/91 to 30.57 per cent in 1997/98 and maintained that level until 2006 (28 per cent).
The average share of wages in total expenditure stood at an average of 23.57 per cent in the period 1990–2007 and at almost 30 per cent of total current expenditure of the same period” (Adly 2011, 303). Such development shows that at the same time that the state was expanding, the economic system was being increasingly deregulated. This indicates the paradoxical domestic policies of the Mubarak regime.
92 During the same period, the regime purged many of the financial magnates close to the previous Sadat regime. They were disempowered through a string of judicial proceedings as a way of securing a hold on political control (see Merriam 1983). Moreover, during the later period of the 1980s Egypt was increasingly dependent on foreign imports (e.g.
foodstuffs, industrial material) and worsening domestic production further adding to economic inequalities (Mitchell 2002, 215-220). Economic poverty, seen through the rates of (unequal) income distribution, had steadily increased in the 1980s and 1990s (Nel 2008, 79). By 1991, Egypt was categorized as one of the poorest countries in the world (Ibrahim 2002, 166). Added to this, Sadat, and later, Mubarak experienced a diminishing role as a provider of an overarching national ideology, much in contrast to Nasser (Kepel 2006, 65).
Such a loss of ideological advantage enabled the religious opposition to claim ideological and moral superiority.
For instance, the increased variety of imported goods has generally been inaccessible to the masses, mainly due to high prices. Islamists generally used the growing gap in spending power to indicate the regime’s “immoral” consumerism and the increased Westernization of Egyptian public life (see Halliday 2005). Islamist SMOs generally spoke of social inequalities caused by the regime’s neo-liberal economic policies and at the same time, what has been perceived as socio-cultural decadence fueled by foreign influences (see Abdo 2000). Here Islamist activists tapped into growing frustrations among a substantial part of the young Egyptian population, especially unemployed university graduates, formulating an alternative to the authoritarian Mubarak regime (Ibrahim 2002, 129-130).
Although the Egyptian economy had been dependent on income from the tourist industry, which is extremely sensitive to global economic changes, a massive amount of the regime’s income is generated by gas and oil exports (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008). This in turn suggests that “[t]he continuing existence of significant income of this kind enables incumbent regimes to maintain patronage-based neo-patrimonial political systems” (Sclumberger 2006, 50). The patron, as indicated before, refers to an incumbent politically appointed (or elected) administrator who through his/her position of power develops and utilizes personal networks in order to remain in that same position or move to an even higher position of power (see Therkildsen 2005, 36-38).
93 It is important here to have in mind that whatever political grievances were present in Egypt, they had been further magnified by economic deprivation and poverty. Youth unemployment in Egypt has been about 20%, considerably higher than the unemployment rates of similar states. When asked, almost 70% of unemployed youth (15-24 yrs) answered that they are willing to emigrate for employment opportunities (Global Employment Trends for Youth 2010, 22).
These claims are further supported by the World Bank’s (WB) assessment of Egypt’s economic performance in the first half of the 2000s which shows that poverty levels have remained stable. The 2005 WB report showed that in the year 2000 more than 45 percent of the Egyptian population lived on 2 US dollars or less a day47 (the World Bank Report 2005; Zuhur 2007). The data shows that ever-increasing levels of poverty have been on the rise since the early 1990s, the initial period of renewed economic reforms (el-Naggar 2005) although this stagnated in the 2000s. Nevertheless, the risk of widespread popular unrest due to the decreased purchasing power of the Egyptian masses and the deteriorating socio-political situation were already extremely high in 2008 (Economist 2008b).
The Islamists of the MB were however better prepared to cope with economic hardships than most of the Egyptian population. Already in the late 1990s, many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s well-educated and unemployed professional youth activists sought employment in the Gulf States where the booming oil-economies demanded skilled labor.
“It is estimated that about 2.1 million households benefited from the remittances of one or more migrant workers during the 1980s —a total of roughly 12.6 million Egyptians, or about 23 percent of the population” (Abdo 2000, 81).
Gathering strength by appealing to the disempowered student graduates and offering an, at least theoretical, alternative to the grim socio-economic realities, the MB made significant gains in recruiting new activists at the end of 1990s and beginning of 2000s.
The organization improved its financial structure (e.g. investment and banking) due to the massive inflow of capital from its members working in the Gulf states. Immediately, the organization’s social programs were expanded by building new educational facilities,
47 The WB’s official poverty line.
94 welfare distribution centers, medical facilities etc. (Abdo 2000, 79-80; Ibrahim 2002, 58-60;
Ikram 2005; IRIN 2006).
Other Islamist SMOs connected to the Islamic Societies (as discussed earlier) sought to increase their influence in some of the most impoverished suburbs of Cairo as well as several towns and cities in Upper Egypt. They succeeded in establishing a rather functional system of social welfare distribution in the poorest areas. This eventually drew the attention of the state security services due to the regime’s fear of independent activism, no matter how apolitical it seemed (see Abdo 2000, 121-125; Wickham 2002, 36-62). SMOs such as Gamaa Al-Islamiyyah and Islamic Jihad even developed their own security services, which ensured that the distribution of resources was effective. The security personnel also made sure that Islamic rules were not transgressed, such as, the prohibition of drug and alcohol consumption, upholding a dress-code etc. Increased pressure from the state security authorities to control regions where the salafi SMOs were most active provoked a violent response from the SMOs own “security” forces (Ajami 1995).
The Mubarak regime’s readiness to use force was demonstrated during several occasions when it clashed with the salafi SMOs (see Urdal 2006). Robert Springborg puts this development in a larger context: “the lack of organizational and ideological cohesiveness within the elite, increasing lassitude within state structures, the emergence of counter-elites and ideologies within the increasingly active legal and underground political oppositions, and the growing independence of associational groups and even governmental bodies, such as the judiciary” (in Alterman 2000, 2).
The spiral of Islamist grievances and regime responses had additionally been fueled by a general sense of perceived injustice of nepotism (see Richards and Baker 1992;
Heydemann 2004; Adly 2009). Moreover a restricted political culture, despite economic
“openness” did in fact encourage market monopolies, business cartels and increased economic control of large scale businesses (see Zaki 1995; Schlumberger 2006).
Even though the upwardly mobile middle class is rising, there are (unintended) consequences, which create strains manifested in popular demands for change. These demands have been observed across the ideological board, and most clearly so in the MB
95 (Clark 2004; Benin and el-Hamalawy 2007). It seems that the MB’s organizational framework and its network based mobilization capabilities extend well beyond any other SMO which also suggests that the MB will have an advantage in elections in post-revolutionary Egypt. One such organizational advantage is the MB’s dominance in several important professional syndicates which are highly relevant in the organization of election campaigns.