In this section I argue that the secularist ideology promoted by post-colonial Indonesian leaders with Dutch education, and expressed in the ideas of the nation-state and nationalism, led to the consolidation of Islamism among Islamic leaders, in particular among the revivalists. The idea of the nation-state insisted on the separation of Islam from the state (e.g. the rejection of making Islam the foundation of the state, Islam as the state law, and the requirement for a state leader/President to be a Muslim) and Indonesian leaders thus refused the formalisation of shari’ah as state law. Soekarno (1901–1970)54 and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980)55 were the most prominent secularist leaders of this time, becoming the first President and Vice President of Indonesia respectively in 1945. They asserted that the nation-state should be based on a national identity that accommodates all ethnic and religious values.
Soekarno and Hatta were the leaders of the nationalist-secular party – the Indonesian National Party (PNI) – which was established in 1927. The main visions of this party were the establishment of a nation-state and nationalism. Soekarno had modern political ideas, believing that the ‘backwardness’ of Indonesia was the result of Dutch colonialism, which had led to poverty and a low-level of education amongst the Indonesian people. Soekarno emphasised that his party’s objective was to secure complete independence for Indonesian people, including for non-Muslims.
According to Soekarno, it was not necessary for the party to have an Islamic basis
54 After graduating from the Europeesche Lagere School (the Dutch-Medium Junior Secondary School), Soekarno studied in the Hogere Burger School (the Dutch-Medium Secondary School) and the Technische Hoge School (the Technical Institute Bandung). During 1916–1926, he was actively involved in student organisations (Latif, 2008; Ismail, 1995).
55 Hatta studied administrative laws in Rotterdam University in the Netherlands (Latif, 2008; Ismail, 1995).
(Ismail, 1995), as its two main aims were to oppose imperialism and capitalism and to create an independent nation-state with unity among Indonesian people per se.
Soekarno, with other Western-educated intellectuals such as Mohammad Hatta and Sjahrir (1909–1966),56 formed a circle of secularist-nationalist intellectuals.57 From the 1930s onwards, Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir promoted nationalism as a key tool for establishing independence (Mrazek, 1994).
Ideological debates between nationalist and Islamic revivalist leaders were thus unavoidable. The debates initially focused on the nature of nationalism, with the Islamic revivalists believing that it should be based on Islamic teachings, while the nationalist group thought that the diversity and heterogeneity of national values should be accommodated. Nationalism, for Soekarno, involved the people’s consciousness of being united in one group and one nation, while leaders of Islamic organizations such as the leader of the more pan-Islamic oriented Sarekat Islam or
“Islamic Union” Agus Salim (1884–1954) and the founder of the Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) or “Islamic Association” Ahmad Hasan (1883–1956) believed that nationalism should be placed in the framework of Muslims’ service to Allah.
Mohamad Natsir (1908–1993), the leader of the largest Islamic political party in the 1940s and 1950s called the Masyumi stressed Salim and Hasan’s opinion that nationalism should be perceived as a medium for gaining the transcendental consent (ridha) of Allah (Noer, 1978:276). Effendy (2003:20) points out that these two different groups emerged within a certain political context in which Islamic leaders
56 Sjahrir studied law in the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands (see Mrazek, 1994; Sjahrir, 1990; Latif, 2008; Ismail, 1995).
57 By ‘these secularist-nationalists’ I mean intellectuals who frequently published their opinions on social, political and economic issues. They were also concerned with long-term strategies for educating the Indonesian people using modern educational systems. Mrazek (1994)’s lengthy and detailed study of Sjahrir, however, offers a more subtle insight than the simple conclusion that he was a secularist. The same can be learned from his memoir “Renungan dan Perjuangan” (1990).
were not only united to fight against colonial rule and engaged in a struggle for nationalism and independence, but were also struggling in a debate with nationalist figures about what the constitution and foundation of the country should be.
In the early 1940s, the debate between these two groups shifted to the nature of the relationship between Islam and the state – a debate that represented the key disagreement and tension between Islamic and nationalist groups. In an article published in 1940, Soekarno argued for the separation of Islam from the state (1964:369–500), on the basis that the formal-legal relationship between Islam and the state (Effendy, 2003:23) is a likely factor in increasing discrimination, given Indonesia’s composition of many different religious groups. In contrast to Soekarno, Natsir – a founder and leader of the Masyumi – promoted the idea of unity between religion and the state (Kahin, 2012; Effendy, 2003). Since the beginning of the 1930s, Natsir had been very active in propagating the idea that the state and religion were indivisible (Effendy, 2003) – an idea that is typical of the general ideology of Islamists in other Islamic countries, such as the MB in Egypt, and Jama'ati Islami (JI) in India and Pakistan (See Chapter 1). Natsir’s Islamist ideas on the state and religion cannot be separated from his international network both in Pakistan through the Muslim World Congress (Mutamar al-‘Alam al Islami) and Saudi Arabia through the Muslim World League (Rabitah al-‘Alam al-Islam) (Kahin, 2012).
The momentum in the debate between these two groups increased in the run-up to Indonesian independence in 1945, as well as in the post-colonial period during 1956–1959. The first gain in momentum came at a time when Indonesians were formulating the state constitution in preparation for independence in 1945, while the second came in the formative years of the Republic of Indonesia, when they were
completing and revising the constitution after the first general election in 1955.
The first meeting of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI) was held on 29 May 1945, and at it Islamic and nationalist groups discussed the philosophical basis and ideology of the state (Ismail, 1995). During the meeting, the Islamic faction argued for the importance of inserting the clause ‘with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practice shari’ah (Islamic law)’ into the constitution, while the secularist group rejected this (Effendy, 2003, Latif, 2008).
This Islamic clause became referred to as ‘the seven words’ in the so called Piagam Jakarta or “Jakarta Charter”, referring to the original Indonesian translation: ‘dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya’.58
At this meeting, the Islamic representatives argued that Islam should be mentioned clearly in the constitution because Muslims contributed to the independence of Indonesia. Moreover, Natsir contended that the Muslim majority had taken the greatest role in the struggle for Indonesia’s independence, and that an integral part of this struggle involved the objective of implementing Islamic teachings and shari’ah in the country (Kahin, 2012; Mahendra, 1995). Moreover, the Islamic groups appealed to the fact that Muslims made up the majority of the Indonesian population, constituting 90% of it in 1945 (Ismail, 1995:51). In this period, the spirit to strengthen Islamic identity among Muslims was very high, and the Islamic leaders insisted that the constitution of the state should clearly mention the application of shari’ah to Muslims, believing that this would guarantee that the state would
58 This clause was a key part of the content of the Piagam Jakarta or the ‘Jakarta Charter’ (see Latif, 2008; Effendy, 2003; Ismail, 1995).
formalise it as official state law. This idea coloured the political thinking of the Islamic figures in both the Investigating Body’s (1945)59 and the Constitutional Assembly’s (1956)60 meetings (Ismail, 1995:42).
The nationalists, on the contrary, proposed that Indonesia should be a modern nation-state, “neutral” with respect to religious identity, but accommodating various religions, ethnicities and traditions. They argued that the constitution should not prioritise a particular religion, ethnicity or tradition and dropped the ‘seven words’
of the Islamic clause from the constitution’s preamble, arguing that Indonesia was different from Saudi Arabia and Egypt because it was unique in terms of its population, culture and traditions, as well as in historical and geographical aspects (Ismail, 1995). In addition, Soepomo – the leading representative of the secularist-nationalists – doubted whether shari’ah could meet the demands of a modern nation-state (Ismail, 1995). Instead, the secular-nationalists, led by Soekarno, promoted the idea of the Pancasila or ‘Five Principle Doctrines’, whose first doctrine referred to
‘the belief in one God’ (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa) (Ismail, 1995, Effendy, 2003).
Even though the Islamic faction was unable to achieve its goal of having the
‘shari’ah clause’ in the constitution, this polemic had strengthened the idea of
‘Islamism’ (the use of Islam as a political ideology to Islamise the state) among Muslim leaders – the unity between Islam, politics, and law – and the urgency for all Muslim factions, including traditionalism and the NU, to unite (Platzdasch, 2009).
59 This investigating body was established on 29 April 1945 for the preparation of Indonesian independence with the agenda of formulating the philosophy of the state. The outcome of the meeting was the Jakarta Charter, which includes an obligation for the state to implement shari’ah as state law for Muslims. However, in another meeting, the chapter was changed by removing the Islamic clause.
The committee then agreed to use this amendment of the chapter (see Nasution, 2001).
60 The Constitutional Assembly was a body elected in 1955 to make decisions regarding a permanent constitution for the republic of Indonesia. They held meetings on 10 November 1956 and 2 July 1959. After these, they decided on the constitution. Soekarno ended their duty on 5 July 1959 (see Herbert, 2007; Ricklefs, 1991).
The Islamic organisations such as the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam or PERSIS and the NU, established an oppositional Islamic political party in 1945 named the Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia – the ‘Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims’ (Masyumi) – whose objective was to unite as many Islamic organisations as possible and to aid the mobilization of Muslims against Western allies (Platzdasch, 2009; Saleh, 2001; Noer, 1987). These Islamic organisations joined the Masyumi to win the election from secular-nationalist parties in 1955 election (Effendy, 2003), and their struggle in this period thus shifted its focus from a fight against colonialism and a struggle for independence to the fight to become the strongest Islamic political party. Despite the strong legitimacy of its initial emergence and becoming a crucial participant in Indonesian politics during 1940s-1950s, Masyumi only survived until 1960 (Platzdasch, 2009; Saleh, 2001; Noer 1987). Masyumi was a breeding ground for the key Islamic politician, Mohammad Natsir, who later continued as a founding leader of DDII (Kahin, 2012).
Most Islamic organisations in Indonesia at this time were reformist Islamist, including the Muhammadiyah, which was powerful during this period.61 Therefore, the participation of the traditionalist NU in Islamism was odd. I argue that the NU’s identity as an ‘Islamist’ group only represented a kind of expression of its solidarity as an Islamic organisation. As seen by its development, the NU later separated itself from the ‘Islamists’ and established its own political party, called the NU party in 1952. Moreover, after 1959, the NU preferred to ally with the government's secularist party, the PNI, and left the ‘Islamist’ group. The traditionalists believed
61 I categorized Muhammadiyah as reformist Islamist because of the Muhammadiyah’s stance on the relationship between religion and politics and in particular on the role of Islam in the Indonesian state on one hand, and on the other hand, the Muhammadiyah’s focus on education, social work, and management of organisations (see Burhani, 2000; Mulkhan, 2000; Noer, 1978).
that the government had to be supported so long as Muslims were free to perform their worship. This view contradicted the more clearly ‘Islamist’ (Masyumi) position that insisted on the implementation of shari’ah within the arenas of politics, law, and the economy. As a result, the NU became closely allied with the government, entering into a coalition with them, and its leader occupied the position of Minister of Religious Affairs during the Old Order Soekarno regime (Kahin, 2012; Barton, 2002).
For Islamic leaders, winning in a general election and dominating the parliament and government represented another way to pursue a shari’ah-based state. Although the NU resigned from the Masyumi and created a new political party as noted above, Islamic leaders were united on a common issue: to introduce shari’ah into the constitution. In total, these Islamic parties gained 230 seats in parliament, while the secularists gained 280 seats (Effendy, 2003:33-34). From 1956 until 1959, the polemic on the relation between Islam and the state rose again, and the parliament was deadlocked. The polemic ended after the President disbanded parliament in 1959, arguing that the state had become endangered by the conflict of ideology within parliament (Latif, 2008).