La Voz Infantil
2.1.1 Adquisiciones preling¨ u´ısticas
The rapid development of Internet technology and an ever-growing large population of netizens (web users), as discussed in Chapter Two, becomes a vital driving force for China’s grassroots nationalism.
The expansion of Internet together with the recent speedy rise of blogging, instant messaging and social networking services in China have revolutionised the way in which news and information are spread, digested and interacted among the government, the media and the public. This has given the Chinese netizens an unprecedented capacity for communication. Xiao Qiang identifies that the Internet Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) play a “particular important role in Chinese Internet life”, and gradually become the “primary way that Chinese netizens access and transmit information online to a large number of people, almost as effectively as mass media” (2011: 204). 95 Increasingly, Chinese netizens use the social network services
such as BBS forum to disclose news and information, such as scandals, injustice, alleged corruptions, mistreatment by local authorities, most of which are too sensitive to be published in the official media.96 These cases are then picked up by fellow
netizens and quickly passed around the internet in weblogs, chat rooms and by instant messages. The cases can become extremely popular in online community within hours as this process is repeated. Almost instantaneously, cases are widely discussed and debated with opinions shared across Internet BBS forums, weblogs, and in chat rooms. Due to their rapid rising profile of these news and information, traditional media are forced to follow the cases in order to respond the needs of the market.
95 The latest CNNIC report shows that by the end of 2010, China had 295 million bloggers, with an
annual increase of 33%; more than half of all netizens use social networking sites; and 80% of China’s Internet sites had their own BBS forums, with popular forums such as Tianya Club and Mop.com attracting tens of millions registered users (CNNIC, 2011: 36-38).
It is worth noting that this form of netizen-reporting mainly limited to domestic issues. Due to China’s sophisticated online firewall systems, it is very difficult for ordinary citizens to directly access unrestricted foreign news, therefore much harder for Chinese netizens to expose news from overseas. Nevertheless, domestic cases may easily spark nationalistic sentiment if in any way involving a foreign country, especially Japan. For instance, questions were raised when a well-known Chinese actress was falsely revealed online to have held a Japanese nationality. It happened in summer 2009, when the actress, Xu Qing was set to portray Madam Sun Yat-sen in a showcasing film to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC on 1 October 1949.97 Netizens questioned casting a Japanese national to play such a
prominent Chinese political figure in a film with such high political importance. Others went further to label Xu as a traitor and asked how could a traitor to the country portray an important founding member of the PRC. What is interesting is that of the all-star cast in the film, several of them are real foreign nationals, but Xu was singled out perhaps because it was Japan. In order to clarify this accusation and respond to public criticism, Xu late had to disclose her Chinese identity card to the public, declaring that she did not, and would never adopt Japanese nationality.98
Thanks to the growing popularity of social media sites, through the use of the internet as a new media source, the general public are now able to report, spread and make comments on news in China.
97 Madam Sun Yat-sen was amongst China’s most significant political figure in the 20th Century, she
was the Vice Chairman of the PRC at its establishment. For Xu Qing’s “nationality gate”, please see
China News Network (2009).
98 Chinese law does not accept dual-nationality; one automatically gives up Chinese nationality upon
becoming a foreign national. So by showing she still holds a Chinese Citizen Identity Card, she can prove she has not join any other nationality.
On international affairs, although it is harder for Chinese netizens to play the reporting role, the Internet provides them with a rather effective tool to play the broadcasting and most importantly, the commentating role. This is particularly demonstrated with issues and events concerning countries, such as Japan, that have traditionally been targeted by Chinese nationalism. By reporting however minor issues concerning the so-called “controversial” countries, newspapers and the Internet web portals, the online community will react with passionate nationalistic sentiment on the BBS forums and in chat rooms across China. It should be mentioned that the State Council Information Office (SCIO), China’s news/information regulator, seems to be more open and tolerance towards international issues than domestic ones (Shirk, 2011b: 226). The reason for this is that, as discussed in Chapter Two, the government’s propaganda department has been the major promoter for patriotism; hence, it has to be very careful when choosing to suppress nationalistic sentiment online.
With commercial media finding nationalism a good selling point, the public’s lack of direct access to foreign news sites, and the state’s relative tolerance in nationalistic comments, Chinese people frequently use the Internet share their nationalistic opinions and vent their anger at Japan. Not only is the anti-Japan banner waved on general discussion forums whenever a relevant issue pops up, there are also several popular BBS forums that maintain a strong nationalistic tone, where anti-Japanese sentiment are continuously voiced. The Strong Nation Forum perhaps best represents this. Created in the wake of the 1999 US bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the forum is sponsored by the People’s Daily and is attributed as an important development in Chinese popular nationalism (Shen and Breslin, 2010). The forum
has a specific section for Sino-Japanese relations – no other bilateral relationship has its own section, browsing through the China-Japan section, it is not hard for one to discover a pattern of posting. While the section keeps a constant monitor on anything to do with Japan and with odd critical comments thrown in, it is whenever an issue breaks out, the forum soon explodes with hatred messages expressing strong anti- Japanese sentiments. If there is any discontent about the nationalistic opinions, the person(s) is quickly accused as betraying the Chinese nation and labelled a traitor. Peer pressure from fellow netizens can be a significant factor in opinions forming and sharing in an online community, as people naturally want to be a part of group with similar views and characteristics. Essentially, no one would like to be criticised or even insulted by faceless total strangers. Therefore, there may be too much psychological pressure that any different voice may be reluctant to come and express true opinions. For the same token, people may simply follow or concur with nationalistic sentiment in order to earn credit and popularity ratings on the BBS or social networking sites. The following two case studies will look into this more closely. Generally speaking, with a young active dominant group, immense peer pressure, plus tabloid media’s exploration of nationalism, the online community in China today does show a strong anti-Japanese public opinion.
The new online social media platform also presents critical challenges for the CCP to contain and control the spread of information. Due to the its decentralised, instantaneous, anonymous, and boundariless nature of the online technology, it potentially posts “grave threat to any governing measure that is highly centralised, bureaucratic, and parochial” (Wu, 2007: 137). Whilst, the CCP understands that it is nearly impossible to maintain total control over the cyberspace, nevertheless, the
internet offers the government an effective way to promptly and accurately gauge public opinions on any breaking events. This enables a swiftly evaluation to public reactions and appropriated responses taken by the government. Shirk here illustrates how tabloids and Internet are used to “test the water” for the public opinions:
Whenever a foreign policy official tells me that he or she feels under pressure from nationalist public opinion, I ask, “How do you know what public opinion actually is?” “That’s easy,” the official says. “I read Global Times99 and the Internet.” (Shirk, 2011b:
230).
Regarding to Chinese netizens’ behaviour and its impacts on policy makers in Beijing, Daniela Stockmann (2011) offers a detailed study on government’s response in terms of information management, to the public opinion crises, referring to “a situation in which public opinion and the position of the state on a particular issue are in disagreement, thus endangering social stability and economic growth” (Stockmann, 2011: 176). Rising popularity in the new web-based media source, Stockmann argues, has presented a platform on which information that differs from the position of the government may be distributed, thus “simulating distrust in government and encouraging people to protest against government actions” (2011: 176). Contrary to the usual evidence in social psychology and communications indicating that people tend to selectively seek information consistent with their beliefs and avoid information that contradicts their beliefs, Stockmann’s study on the interactions between the Chinese public and Beijing’s media management shows that under state-
99 Global Times《环球时报》 is considered as a prime example for sensational reporting and
nationalist headlines, on which its readership strives. It is the tabloid version of its founder, the CCP’s flagship mouthpiece, People’s Daily, with most of its readers being well-educated, upper-income young urbanites. See Shirk (2011b: 227-230) for a specific discussion on Global Time and its impact on mobilising public opinion on foreign policy. For a critical view on Global Time’s sensationalising international news and pandering to nationalism, see China Digital Times (2008).
initiated synchronisation on media reports, new media sources would be able to aid the government in “appeasing” public protest rather than “mobilising it” (Stockmann, 2011: 176 and 185). This is because, as Stockmann explains, “the commercial look of domestic media source [in China] creates the perception of a media outlet that represents the public as opposed to the state and thus aids the government in guiding public opinion to favour its politics” (2011: 198). Stockmann’s view will be further reflected in Chapter Four, when the thesis also studies the 2005 anti-Japanese protests. This case will argue that government’s careful management on information acts as an effective mechanism to control the release of popular nationalist anger.