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CAPÍTULO II : LA EDUCACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO 17

7. Agentes de la Educación para el Desarrollo 91

The prospects for agenda success of an idea are increased if it is seen to be connected to a problem that decision-makers consider worthy of addressing. The research undertaken

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165 for this study suggests that while SHRAs could be considered an appropriate means of addressing several key issues in the Pacific, not all of these issues are currently a priority for Pacific leaders. This suggests a constraint on the prospects for agenda success.

Analysis of the empirical materials revealed there is limited understanding and awareness of human rights throughout the Pacific, particularly in the small island states (Hay, 2009; Liddicoat, 2007, 2009; RRRT/SPC, 2008; Toki & Baird, 2009). Promotion and education work is not widespread throughout the sub-region, and human rights are often perceived to be both contentious and of little relevance (Liddicoat, 2009). This stance is associated with the debates around universalism and cultural relativism and the tension between human rights, culture and law in the Pacific (Madraiwiwi, 2006; New Zealand Law Commission, 2006; Peebles, 2005; Tuilaepa, 2006). The perception that human rights are a Western construct contributes to ambivalence within the Pacific to the concept of human rights (Australian Human Rights Centre, 2008; de Blaauw, 2008; Houng-Lee, 2006; Huffer, 2006; Human Rights Law Resource Centre, 2008; Madraiwiwi, 2006; McDougall, 2009; Thaman, 2000). The cultural diversity throughout the Pacific is perceived to be a significant constraint on the Pacific leaders’ commitment to human rights constructs, including SHRAs. Given the limited funding and support for civil society and national organisations working in the area of human rights, especially in the small island countries, it appears that addressing the issues of limited awareness and understanding of human rights is currently of low priority for many Pacific leaders. Even so, human rights policy and legislation are evident in all of the PIF member countries. The small island states and New Zealand have a bill of rights and all PIF countries have ratified at least some of the international human rights instruments (Human Rights Law Resource Centre, 2008; RRRT/SPC, 2008). The Pacific sub-region does, however, have the lowest worldwide level of ratification of the seven core international human rights instruments, and while the ratification of treaties does not guarantee that human rights will be protected, it does give a general indication of a government’s commitment to prioritising human rights standards (Angelo, 1992; Australian Human Rights Commission, 2008; Baird, 2008; Farran, 2009; Jalal, 2006; Liddicoat, 2007; Maclachlan, 2009; Peebles, 2005). Pacific leaders may, however, consider SHRAs as mechanisms that could further support their current efforts to meet their national, sub-regional, and international obligations and requirements. Certainly

166 with the introduction of the compulsory four-yearly UPR process, leaders may be more willing to support the establishment of sub-regional arrangements if they provide technical support and monitoring and reporting expertise.

There is some evidence to suggest that SHRAs may be supported for their potential to address ongoing civil and political crises in the sub-region, such as in Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. In particular, the Fiji coup in 2006 was perceived to be a situation in which SHRAs could have either assisted in preventing or helped with addressing alleged human rights violations. In addition, SHRAs could have potentially assisted with associated challenges including the lack of an independent NHRI in Fiji and the distance and cost of accessing international human rights fora. Although the Pacific leaders saw the coup as a significant event, they did not prioritise the idea of SHRAs as a solution to the Fiji crisis, but instead responded through direct sanctions at both national and sub-regional levels. SHRAs, therefore, were not at that time seen as immediately important for implementation. Future political or civil crises may also be able to be connected with SHRAs, although if the Fiji situation is indicative, Pacific leaders may be reluctant to employ a direct sub-regional response by means of an institutional arrangement.

The number of NHRIs in the Pacific is extremely low compared with other regions and sub-regions throughout the world (Liddicoat, 2007, 2009; Maclachlan, 2009; RRRT/SPC, 2008). This issue can also be connected with the idea of SHRAs as sub- regional mechanisms can act as alternative institutions in which to promote human rights standards or to seek redress for human rights violations (Durbach, 2009; Liddicoat, 2007, 2009; Sydney Centre for International Law, 2008). The small island countries in the Pacific have not established NHRIs for many reasons, including a suspicion about the relevance of human rights (especially to their cultural context), resource constraints, and difficulties with meeting the required standards, chiefly that of independence (APF, 2008; Enright & Zirnsak, 2009; Liddicoat, 2007, 2009; Maclachlan, 2009). Furthermore, few of these countries have indicated an interest in establishing NHRIs in the near future.70

70 Exceptions are Samoa, Papua New Guinea, and Nauru whose leaders have held discussions with the

Asia Pacific Forum on establishing NHRIs in their respective countries. Palau, Tonga, and Vanuatu have more recently expressed interest in establishing an NHRI (Lee, 2011).

This suggests that Pacific leaders do not see them as vital, and this, too, may inhibit the linking of this issue to the establishment of

167 SHRAs in the Pacific. However, Pacific leaders may be persuaded to support the establishment of a sub-regional arrangement as opposed to a national institution if they believe SHRAs will provide similar advantages but be more cost-effective and less resource intensive for individual Pacific states.

The Pacific faces significant geographical, economic and environmental challenges. Issues of isolation, distance to the main islands, and smallness of economy and population, are apparent (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2008; Fong Toy, 2006; Human Rights Law Resource Centre, 2008; Powles, 2006). Climate change and global warming are critical issues throughout the sub-region, impacting on the rights of people to food, housing, sustainable livelihoods, and education (Glazebrook, 2009). NHRIs or other national institutions may not be sufficient to address these widespread challenges that are common across the Pacific. Pacific leaders are currently actively engaged in sub-regional and international fora, especially in respect of climate change. However, to date SHRAs have not, as far as it is known, been formally raised as a potential solution for assisting with addressing these challenges.

Although at this point in time the Pacific leaders have not placed SHRAs on their decision agenda, there has been gradual movement towards increasing the promotion and protection of human rights in the sub-region. This is evident in the inclusion of human rights objectives in the Pacific Plan, the appointment of a senior human rights advisor in the PIF Secretariat, and the scoping exercise due for completion in 2011. Furthermore, several issues have been identified in this research that could be connected with SHRAs. Advocates of a sub-regional mechanism, and in particular a commission, have strategically emphasised that SHRAs could assist with meeting the obligations of the UPR and treaty processes, be part of the solution to civil and political unrest such as in Fiji, and assist with environmental rights issues such as the problem of climate change. Therefore, whilst Pacific leaders may be reluctant to address human rights issues per se, they may be more likely to establish SHRAs if they are convinced these arrangements can usefully address other critical problems in the PIF countries or the wider sub-region. If SHRAs then can be presented as available, feasible and cost- effective solutions to these issues then the prospects for agenda success will be increased.

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