Agentes Físicos

Building an institutional form of legitimacy was the most salient aspect of Mubarak’s overall legitimacy equation (Hinnebusch 1990b, p.196). The focus on the institutional source as a main theme of legitimacy had been inherited by Mubarak from Sadat, which had been sealed by the smooth transfer of power between them, reflecting the institutionalisation of “unchallenged legal legitimacy in the office [of the presidency]” (Hinnebusch 1990b, p.196). Indeed, the way by which Mubarak assumed power was a lucid demonstration of a stable intra-elite’s code of power transition. As happened with Sadat, there was no disputes among elites on the ‘right’ of the Vice President to be nominated to the vacant position of the President. The Egyptian regime, whether within the Nasser- Sadat’s transition, or the Sadat-Mubarak’s transition, appeared to be rested on a solid basis, as far as political succession is concerned. As this chapter and the chapters to follow will explain, the relations of intra-elite rivalry will change to the extent that the next succession in 2011 will be totally different from the two smooth transitions that preceded it.

As discussed in the preceding chapters of this research, the exhaustion of the Egyptian postcolonial state’s welfarism and ideological legitimacy, after the 1967 War, left little viable alternative for Mubarak other than institutional legitimacy, without which the regime would not claim that it has the ‘right to rule’. Mubarak, during the 1980s and 1990s, gained his institutional legitimacy through ‘upgrading authoritarianism’, as was explained by Heydemann (2007). Upgrading authoritarianism means reconfiguring authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic, and social conditions. In Egypt, it has led to a ‘semi-open’ society9_{. That arguably} included enlarging the margin of political pluralism and accommodation and the margin of press and media’s freedom, and emphasising the independence of the judiciary.

In consolidating his legitimacy, Mubarak was nevertheless eager to distinguish his rule from his predecessors, by claiming to be more democratic. Mubarak’s focus on a democratic opening was remarkable compared to Nasser and Sadat’s eras. Indeed, Egypt was not transformed to a democracy under Mubarak, and instead, comprising both democratic and authoritarian features, arguably constituted a ‘hybrid regime’ (Rutherford, 2008). Mubarak’s technique of mixing aspects of democracy and authoritarianism was, according to one scholar, ‘creative’ (Abdulbaki 2008, p.122). During times of relative political stability, Mubarak portrayed himself as a reformer and introduced state-led opening and liberalisation, while reversing such processes and resorting to coercion, once the controlled opening appeared to threaten the real balance of power (Abdulbaki 2008, p.122).

Mubarak in the 1980s and 1990s could be argued to be a classical case of successful authoritarian upgrading. Politically, he contained civil society and managed the political contestation in a way that kept an obvious level of stability10. Indeed, Mubarak had used his presidential powers in a less radically reformist way than Nasser and Sadat. While his predecessors sought to transform Egypt in different ways, Mubarak aimed for stabilisation of the country after three decades of radical swings to the left and right since 1952 (Hinnebusch 1990b, p.196). He began his presidency by releasing over one thousand political prisoners, arrested by Sadat in September 1981. They were comprised of activists and intellectuals from various social and political backgrounds, as well as religious leaders, journalists, students, professional syndicate members and trade unionists (Al-Awadi 2003, pp.82–83). During the 1980s and 1990s it was evident that Mubarak had allowed limited democratisation and liberalisation. This period represented declining patrimonialism, personalism, traditionalism and a pharaonic style of rule that characterised Sadat’s

9 _{The term ‘semi-open society’ was first used by the Egyptian columnist Gamal Abulhasan (Abulhasan 2014).}

10_{Heydemann (2007, p.5) lists five features of upgrading authoritarianism: Appropriating and containing civil societies; Managing} political contestation; Capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms; Controlling new communications technologies;

era (Hinnebusch 1990b, p.196). Mubarak generally favoured a less personal, more institutional style of rule. Representative of this as one example was, for the first time since independence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs become the province of career diplomats, less subject to Presidential nepotism, unlike under Sadat and Nasser (Hinnebusch, 1990, p.196). However, the authoritarian presidency ultimately remained the lynchpin of the state.

The Mubarak regime and the discourse it employed never claimed the system to be representative of a full democracy. The regime’s perspective was that it was impractical for Egypt to go, “from a non-democratic political system to a democracy overnight” (Cook 2012, p.168). The philosophical and political infrastructure must be carefully implemented first, so as not to threaten social cohesion, economic development and the political change itself, went the regime’s argument on democracy (Cook 2012, p.168). Regardless, the regime insisted, through Mubarak’s senior officials and ideologues that, “Egypt lives its best democratic eras ever” (El-Gallad 2007). That was meant to refer to the improvement of the democratisation’s status in relation to the eras of Nasser in particular and Sadat as well. Consequently, throughout most of the 1980s Mubarak achieved the objective of cooling Egypt’s political temperature down significantly. As Osman (2011) summarised it:

“A number of controversial laws that Sadat had introduced in his later years were quietly shelved; thousands of prisoners were freed; censorship of the press was relaxed…Civil associations proliferated. Professional syndicates were allowed to play an increasingly visible political role…The regime also reached out to different political forces in the country. For example, a number of parliamentary elections were conducted under a new ‘list system’, which allowed opposition parties to aggregate votes that otherwise would have been distributed in constituencies controlled by the NDP” (p. 181).

The opening started also to include the press and media. By enlarging the margin of press and media’s freedom, and allowing the diversification of TV satellite channels, Mubarak gained more legitimacy as his regime appeared heading towards more liberty, democratisation and pluralism. The 1990s witnessed the launching of the first Egyptian satellite TV channel, while in 1998, NILESAT, was the first Egyptian satellite to orbit Earth. Indeed, the increasing freedom of media and press was a remarkable characteristic of the Mubarak’s rule in comparison to his predecessors. The depth and consequences of this phenomenon will be discussed in the next two chapters, as it was the 2000s that witnessed a radical transformation in the status of media and press.

In addition to that, the most influential move by Mubarak was in politically reconciling with the MB, the strongest and most important political Islamist movement. Mubarak relied on the MB to balance the more radical Islamist movements. Throughout the first decade of his presidency (1981– 90), Mubarak allowed the MB to flourish. The movement reached what was probably the peak of its presence in society since the golden age of the 1930s and 1940s (Pioppi et al. 2011, p.48). The regime tolerated the existence of the MB’s organisations, allowing its Cairo headquarters to operate, as well as its charitable wing which had been suppressed in 1981 after Sadat’s assassination. The Mubarak regime also secured the return of leading MB members from exile, including the late

murshid (Supreme Guide) Mustafa Mashhur. The regime also complied with a court's ruling allowing pro-MB magazines to re-publish. Resultantly, the MB consolidated its presence within student organizations, participated in the parliamentary elections in 1984 and 1987, while winning elections in the main professional associations, such as doctors, scientists, engineers and lawyers. The MB also consolidated its social presence through the expansion of an efficient network of charities linked to private mosques (Pioppi et al. 2011, p.48). The peak of the relation with the MB was their unprecedented victory in the 2005 parliamentary elections and gaining 85 seats (20% of the voting power). This will be covered in the chapters to follow.

Simultaneously, the emphasis on the judiciary’s independence was another significant pillar of the state’s claim for institutional legitimacy under Mubarak. In the 1980s Mubarak launched a, “seriously organised” campaign against institutionalised corruption (Al-Awadi 2003, p.78), meant to underscore its claim to legal legitimacy. The campaign targeted high profile figures, such as Sadat's brother ‘Ismat El-Sadat, who was tried in 1983 for illicit dealings. The campaign against

fasad (corruption) was intended to show Egyptians that the Mubarak regime was industriously committed to tackling corruption, that nepotism no longer characterised the regime, as well as showing that all were equal before the law (Al-Awadi 2003, p.78).

Regardless of all the constitutional defects, the judiciary was able to exercise a promising degree of independence (Abdulbaki 2008, p.122). The state’s discourse consistently emphasised the regime’s unequivocal respect for equal rights, the judiciary’s independence and the sovereignty of law (Al-Awadi 2003, p.77). This was not simply a discursive strategy, but had a real impact in practice. Members of the prosecuting attorney and the State Court were guaranteed full immunity and protection under law. Furthermore, the Council of the Supreme Court was presided over by an independent judge, rather than the Minister of Justice.

Mubarak also declined to use his presidential powers, at least in a blunt manner, to pressurise the courts into issuing new rulings that would curtail social and political freedoms. On the contrary,

the courts adopted a series of limited but significant legal reforms in the social and political spheres (Al-Awadi 2003, pp.77–78). Additionally, through issuing several rulings condemning some human rights violations, rejecting a number of unconstitutional legislative procedures and several electoral laws, “the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court not only demonstrated an exceptional degree of autonomy compared to other Egyptian state-institutions, but also proved its ability to challenge the executive authority” (Abdulbaki 2008, p.125). Resultantly, the judiciary has increasingly won the confidence of opposition groups who sought to challenge the regime. It is noteworthy that by the late 1990s, the judiciary had supported the establishment of around half of the fourteen political parties, after having had their applications rejected by the PPAC. Almost all prospective party applications had been declined by the PPAC, amounting to fifty by the year 2000 (Abdulbaki 2008, p.125). This unprecedented and relative independence of the judiciary was justifiably perceived as a positive sign of a maturing or ongoing, “democratization based on the rule of law” (Abdulbaki 2008, p.122).

In sum, it could be argued that Mubarak institutionalised the postpopulist state in Egypt and gave it a source of legitimacy that was able to maintain this state without deep social unrest. However, the two other sources of legitimacy, eudaemonic and ideological were not totally abandoned. Indeed, Mubarak during at least the first two decades of his rule worked hard to guarantee that his regime is not seriously short of these two still-important sources.