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2.2 Hardware

2.2.2 Agrupaciones de micrófonos

Drawing a clear line in the sand that membership is not on offer for countries belonging to the Eastern Partnership (EaP), the Juncker Commission nevertheless recognised the need “to step up close cooperation, association and partnership to further strengthen our economic and political ties”. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in particular, have much in common with the pre- accession states of the Western Balkans: geographic proximity to the EU, domestic political priority to become members of the EU, and similar struggles to improve their political and economic governance in line with EU standards

and values (Emerson et al. 2018).The EU’s main differentiation between the two

groups is over the ‘membership perspective’, which has been offered to the Balkans but not to the East European neighbours. Beyond this formal political stance, however, the EU has de facto been extending virtually the same comprehensive array of economic and political instruments to both groups by signing (Stabilisation and) Association Agreements ((S)AAs), including Deep and Comprehensive FTAs with the three EaP states. Yet, when comparing the material substance of the SAAs and AAs (Blockmans, 2017) and the record of both groups in terms of the quality of their political and economic governance

(Emerson and Noutcheva, 2018), one finds that the two groups are comparable at both levels. Most striking is that on most of the indicators the EaP frontrunner,

Georgia, even ranks slightly ahead of the Balkan frontrunners. The actual

The EU should stand behind its core values and reset its relationship with Turkey on a more credible and strategic footing.

WHAT COMES AFTER THE LAST CHANCE COMMISSION?|39

policies of the EU towards the Balkans and DCFTA states have been evolving more than the outmoded rhetorical doctrines and now converge in content, but so far ‘under the radar’ of high politics. This convergence leads into a case for reconsidering the EU’s present political doctrines over its neighbourhood policies.

The next Commission has the opportunity to give more strategic content and profile to neighbourhood relations. One idea would be to de-territorialise the obsolete ENP and consolidate the many existing instruments into an extended, more standardised system with some access to the EU institutions (Blockmans, 2017; Emerson, 2019). A new neighbourhood concept could connect with the current renewal of interest in the longstanding debate about differentiated European integration. This debate could focus either on developing a more restricted top-tier group, or

on a wider outer-level group, or both. Today the focus is mostly on the top-tier questions, which are proving to be extremely difficult to implement, including in the sectors already subject to selective membership (in particular the euro and Schengen). The question of an

outer tier is growing in pertinence, not only for EaP countries, but also for Turkey, Brexit Britain, the EEA states and Switzerland. There will be predictable resistance to a common institutionalisation, as various neighbouring states give priority to their bilateral relationships with the EU and try to cut their own special deals. When it comes down to practical instruments of cooperation, however, these naturally become highly standardised. And the EU institutions are wary about making special deals with one state that will be used as a precedent in negotiations with others. So, for reasons of both administrative and legal simplicity, and also of political negotiation, there is a case for rationalisation and some kind of soft institutionalisation, with degrees of flexibility. The clinching argument is the current strategic context, with the EU and wider space of European values being under serious threat from within and outside. The EU thus needs to get its act together more decisively in its neighbourhood (Emerson, 2019).

This finding not only applies to states on the European continent, but also ENP countries in the MENA region (Moran, 2018; Van der Loo, 2016). Parts of the region are going through an extended period of war and upheaval marked by state failure, sectarian strife, transnational terrorism, great power interventions, the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (including chemical), massive loss of life and large-scale physical destruction. These developments are not just a threat to the entire region, but also to the rest of the world and to Europe in particular. The EU is strategically absent from

The next Commission has the opportunity to

give more strategic content and profile to neighbourhood relations.

40|NEIGHBOURHOOD,SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICIES

much of the MENA region. It is further proof of the obsolescence of the ENP. The EU’s naval force ‘Operation Sophia’ off the coast of Libya and actions vis-à- vis Egypt (i.e. co-opting authoritarian regimes in preventing people from making the perilous journey across the Mediterranean in search of a better life) exemplify the ‘pragmatic’ rather than ‘principled’ approach in protecting the Union’s own interests in relations with the neighbours, and their neighbours. Shedding almost every pretence at conducting Moralpolitik, the EU effectively tries to engage in Realpolitik, with the ENP being nothing more than CFSP in disguise.

Pushed by the prospect of Brexit and stress-tested by a US President intent on putting America first and retreating from multilateral arrangements, this raises the question whether the hybrid Union of member states and EU institutions has what it takes to defend its ‘strategic autonomy’ in a volatile neighbourhood. Above and beyond the member states, the EU has so far really only mobilised one offensive asset: money, which it can use as leverage to create the conditions for post-war reconstruction, or squeeze off with targeted sanctions. In the diplomatic arena it was able to take some credit for mediating the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) but the US has since robbed the EU of that success.

History has shown that rogue leaders only understand a language of diplomacy backed by force.14 If Europe wants a voice in addressing instability

and the political problems that blight its neighbourhood, it urgently needs to grant itself the means to be a strategic player.