Ahora bien, la Sala advierte que la vulneración ha causado principalmente a un impacto cultural –como modalidad de daño

So far we have demonstrated that the Howard Government had a stated policy of strengthening the US alliance from the beginning of its first term, and that this policy was intensified dramatically following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. This section will examine Australia's relations with Iran

33 Ann Capling, A ll the Way with the USA. 75.

34 Brendon O'Connor, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2003."

35 Australia-US relations are described as reaching a 'new zenith' under the Howard Government in Rod Lyon and William T. Tow, The Future o f the AustraHan-U.S. Security Relationship (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 2004). p. 1.

between 1996 and 2001, before the move towards the US became a dominating factor in Australian foreign policy. The period was characterised by policies of trade expansion and political engagement with Iran, due primarily to the efforts of the coalition Government's first Minister for Trade, Tim Fischer. Fischer's promotion of Iran as a market for Australian agricultural exports reflected both his preference for bilateral trade promotion over multilateral trade regimes and his strong interest in the Middle East more generally. His bilateralist approach sat comfortably with his talents as a trade 'salesman,' and his three years in the Trade portfolio were marked by an energetic schedule of trade promotion tours to a large number of countries and the establishment, in 1996, of the Market Development Task Force within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to coordinate and focus bilateral trade activity.36

Fischer's interest in the Middle East flowed not only from the value of that region to the agricultural commodity exporters that formed part of the core electoral constituency of the National Party of Australia, of which he had been leader since 1990, but also from a personal interest in the political conflicts and inequalities of the region. As leader of the National Party in opposition Fischer called for a 'truly even- handed' approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict and for greater understanding in Israel of the plight of the Palestinians and Lebanese. Between 1993 and 1994 he caused consternation amongst the Australian Jewish community by criticising Israel's policies in Lebanon, suggesting that the West had 'rose-tinted glasses' with respect to Israeli actions, and asserting that Israel's belligerence was an obstacle to peace in the region.37 Despite rebuke from the Coalition leader at the time, John Hewson, Fischer refused to retract his comments. Fischer's position on Israel was in stark contrast to that adopted by the Howard Government in 2004 with respect to the construction of the separation barrier within the West Bank. His departure from the Trade Ministry upon his resignation from Parliament in 1999 removed from Cabinet a strong voice in support of Australian trade interests in the Middle East, and as a consequence the balance of interests within Cabinet strongly favoured Howard's policy of drawing Australia closer to the US strategically. While Fischer was an enthusiastic promoter of a

36 On Fischer's bilateralist preferences see Richard Leaver, "The New Trade Agenda." 107-109; Peter Rees, The Boy from Boree Creek: The Tim Fischer Story (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001). 253-254; Ann Capling, Australia and the Global Trade System: From Havana to

Seattle (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 172-173. On Fischer as a trade

'salesman' see Peter Rees, The Boy from Boree Creek. 258. 37 Peter Rees, The Boy from Boree Creek, p. 224.

free trade agreement with Washington, his assessment of US strategic policy in the Middle East was contrary to that held by Howard and would have provided a counterweight to the swing towards Washington after September 2001.

The Howard Government was forced to address the issue of US sanctions against Iran within six months of taking office when ILSA was signed into public law by President Clinton on 8 August 1996. Tim Fischer had already made his opposition to the extra-territorial provisions of the sanctions well known to the Australian Parliament in June. In response to a question w ithout notice he remarked:

Extraterritorial measures are inconsistent with basic principles of international law. They seek to impose punitive measures on third-country investors and impinge on the sovereignty of other countries. Australia argues that the most effective way for the US to achieve foreign policy objectives is to work closely and cooperatively w ith its partners.38

Both Fischer and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer expressed to senior representatives of the US Administration and Congress Australia's opposition to the Helms/Burton and ILSA sanctions.39 Fischer publicly criticised the sanctions during the launch of a report into Australia-US trade and investment relations, describing it as "inconsistent with basic principles of international law and sovereignty—and dubious in terms of a practical effe ct."40 He added that " it is an area where there is sharp disagreement between Australia and the USA—I make no apology for stating that in clear term s."41 On 8 August he defended Australia's trade with Iran, asserting that "Australia will continue to lodge its protest over the principle which sees the United States bring in yet another non-tariff barrier, restricting exports to the United States if they are not happy with what an overseas country is doing in a third country."42

A more serious challenge to Australia's trade interests in Iran arose in 1997, though not from further US sanctions but rather from international reactions to a German court's finding that senior Iranian ministers had been directly involved in the political assassination of Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant in 1992. In response to the court's finding most Western governments, including Australia, withdrew their Ambassadors from Tehran in protest, prompting angry reactions from Iran and threats of economic retaliation. The Australian Government moved swiftly to neutralise the

38 Hansard, (HoR), 26 June 1996, p. 2792. 39 Ibid.

40 SMH, 10 August 1996, "Fischer Follows Up Hawke's Attack On US." 41 Ibid.

impact of the crisis on Australia-Iran trade relations, demonstrating both the continuing importance of the Iranian market to Australian agricultural commodity exporters and the determination in Canberra to protect the bilateral trade relationship.

The German High Court brought down its ruling on 10 April 1997 after a three-year hearing into the 1992 murder of four Iranian Kurds at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin. Four of the five accused, three Lebanese and one Iranian, were found guilty of the murder and senior Iranian Government figures were implicated through the activities of the Committee for Special Operations. The court found that the Iranian intelligence minister at the time of the assassinations, Ali Fallahian, had given the order to proceed and an international warrant was issued for his arrest. The court's findings with regard to the Committee also implicated President Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Khamene'i. The judgement had an immediate and dramatic impact upon relations between Iran and Germany, with each recalling its ambassador from the other's capital on 11 April.43 On the same day the European Union urged its member states to recall their ambassadors from Tehran, and suspended officially the policy of 'critical dialogue' it had pursued with Iran since the beginning of the 1990s. 44 All EU member states, with the exception of Greece, agreed to both the withdrawal of ambassadors and the suspension of the 'critical dialogue'.

President Rafsanjani protested during Friday prayers at the University of Tehran that the court's decision was politically motivated and a disgrace to the German judiciary.45 Hojjatoleslam Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and Speaker of the Iranian Majles (Parliament), called for a revision of diplomatic and economic ties with Germany, while the Finance and Economy Commission of the Majles called for a "full rupture" of economic ties.46 The anger of the Iranian Government and Majles was echoed in popular demonstrations that called for an official apology from the German Government.47

43 AFR, 12 April 1997, "Envoys Recalled As Iran Is Accused." 44 GDN, 11 April 1997, "EU Seeks To Isolate Iran."

45 Kayhan International, 12 April 1997, "Mykonos Trial Scandal Disgrace for German Judiciary." pp. 2,7.

46 Kayhan International, 14 April 1997, "Majlis Calls for Revision of Iran-Germany Ties." p. 1.

Iran News, 16 April 1997, "MPs Demand Full Rupture of Economic Ties with Germany." p. 1. 47 Kayhan International, 14 April 1997, "Massive Anti-German Rallies Held Nationwide." pp.

Washington seized on the judgement to increase pressure on the Europeans, and Germany in particular, to constrain trade with, and investment in, Iran. 48 In late April

the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff, travelled to Europe in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Europeans to join the US embargo against Iran. As the EU member states were meeting in Luxembourg at the end of April to discuss the restoration of ambassadorial representations to Tehran, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote to EU governments urging each to extend its suspension of trade with Iran. Again, the US pressure failed to produce a result favourable to Washington. 49 All EU ambassadors were returned, although the 'critical

dialogue' remained suspended, together with arms sales to Iran, and an official statement was released calling on Iran to "respect international law and nuclear non­ proliferation agreements and refrain from terrorism" . 50 Trade with Iran, however,

would continue unaffected. Three European States—France, Italy and G reece- remained opposed to some of the measures imposed upon Iran, such as the suspension of ministerial visits to and from Tehran.

The Australian reaction, in contrast to that of both the EU and US, was more cautious and low key. The Australian Ambassador to Iran, Stuart Hume, who had presented his credentials to the Iranian President only the week before, 51 was recalled

to brief Canberra on the diplomatic dispute, but returned to Tehran after only nine days. Iran had responded to the withdrawal of Ambassador Hume by threatening retaliatory action against Australian trade interests, as it had done to the EU, and cancelled a planned visit of an Australian economic delegation. 52 The threat caused

considerable concern amongst Australian grain growers, who "notified the Government that they did not want to see crucial contracts endangered through retaliation by Iran over "politicking" and trade sanctions. " 53 The president of the Queensland

48 GDN, 11 April 1997, "EU Seeks To Isolate Iran." Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p. 291.

49 GDN, 30 April 1997, "EU Returns Its Envoys To Iran, With A Warning." AFR, 30 April 1997, "Keep Iran Out Of Trade Loop, US Urges EU."

50 GDN, 30 April 1997, "EU Returns Its Envoys To Iran, With A Warning." GDN, 1 May 1997, "Iran Defiant As Row With EU Deepens."

51 Iran News, 6 April 1997, "New Thai, Australian Ambassadors Meet President, Foreign Minister." pp. 2,13. Kayhan International, 6 April 1997, "President Receives New Thai, Australian Ambassadors." pp. 1,7.

52 SMH, 14 April 1997, "Iran Row May Cost Us $650m In Exports - Farmers."

53 SMH, 14 April 1997, "Iran Row May Cost Us $650m In Exports - Farmers." Iran News, 14 April 1997, "Iran Cancels Visit by Australian Delegation." The Iran News story stated that

Graingrowers' Association warned that the Iranian wheat market was worth $A500 million a year, and that such a valuable market should not be jeopardised for the sake of politics, adding that "what we need to do is basically judge Iran as it is now, and not dwell too much on the past."54 The president of the Wool Council of Australia, Rod Thirkell-Johnston, stated that "there is very little that Australian farmers can do about the internal workings of the politics of Iran. But this trade [with Iran] is vital to the well-being of Australian agriculture - particularly meat and wheat."55

The industry's concerns prompted the Trade Minister, Tim Fischer, to reassure farmers that any further Australian actions against Iran arising from the ruling would not have an impact upon already agreed sales. On 17 April he told the press that the Government had no intention of interfering in trade between Australia and Iran, while Foreign Minister Alexander Downer announced that the Government would examine the German court's ruling in detail and consult with Europe, Canada and New Zealand before taking any action against Iran.56 The protestations of Australia's peak agricultural bodies seem to have had the intended effect, for there were no official condemnations of Iran issued by the Government, let alone any sanctions, and Australia's recall of its Ambassador was shorter than that of any European nation. Hume returned to Iran on 20 April, as did the New Zealand Ambassador.57 The rapidity with which Australia and New Zealand re-established ambassadorial representation was appreciated in Tehran. A spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Mahmoud Muhammadi, announced that Iran would "take into account the steps taken by these two countries in determining their future relations with the Islamic Republic" and "increase [its] ties with those countries which follow the principles of mutual respect and trust in their relations with Iran."58 Ambassador Hume made it known upon his

"Iran decided to yesterday to cancel a visit here by an Australian economic delegation in retaliation for the Pacific country's decision to recall its ambassador here in solidarity with Germany."

54 Ib id

55 SMH, 15 April 1997, "Farmers’ Plea On Trade Row."

56 AFR, 17 April 1997, "Australia Holds Fire On Iran." Fischer's comments were well received in Tehran. See Kayhan International, 17 April 1997, "Australia Says No Threat to Trade Ties With Iran." pp. 1, 3.

57 Interview with Stuart Hume, former Australian Ambassador to Iran, 1997-2001. Goulburn: Australia. 2 November 2005.

58 Kayhan International, 20 April 1997, "Foreign Ministry Welcomes Return of Australian, NZ Envoys." p. 1, 2. The article is repeated in Iran News on the same date.

return to Tehran that Canberra was interested in maintaining good relations with Iran and in "exploring fresh trade links".59

Canberra's sensitivity to Iranian threats of retaliation following the Mykonos ruling must be understood in the context of an increase in exports to Iran during the 1996-97 Australian financial year. The increase was based primarily on massive wheat sales, which were in turn occasioned by the persistence of drought conditions in Iran's wheat growing regions. 3,350,000 tonnes of wheat were shipped to Iran during the 1996-97 season, representing an increase of almost 75 per cent over the previous season.60 The performance of the Iranian wheat market was a key contributing factor to the favourable Trade Outcomes and Objectives presented to Parliament by Tim Fischer in March 1998. In his commendation of the report to the House, Fischer observed:

we are continuing to expand our market development and market access efforts across the globe. It is interesting to note that Australian exporters are picking up on these opportunities. Exporters are seeing the benefits in diversifying their efforts and are not relying on traditional markets as much as in the past. This is reflected in the decrease in the proportion of Australia's exports going to Japan ... as business capitalised on the range of opportunities in Asia and throughout the world. For example, in 1996-97, our fastest growing markets included: Iran, with a 71 per cent increase in exports; Egypt, with a 51 per cent increase; South Africa, with a 31 per cent increase; and Mexico, with a 24 per cent increase.61

While the export performance to Iran and Egypt for the period was particularly strong, it was not characterised by diversification. Growth in both those markets rested on a dramatic increase in wheat sales which did not hold up into the next season. Sales to Iran dropped to just over 500,000 tonnes across the 1997-98 season, as the Iranian crop recovered under more favourable climatic conditions. Sales to Egypt halved, from 1,665,000 tonnes in 1996-97 to 730,000 in 1997-98. Nonetheless, Middle East markets, and Iran in particular, remained very important to the Australian wheat industry. The loss of wheat exports to Russia, and to a lesser degree China, as a result of the US Export Enhancement Program (EEP) subsidies had increased Australian dependence on Middle East wheat sales, and focused Australian attentions on the

59 Kayhan International, 23 April 1997, "Australia Seeks Improved Trade Ties With Iran." p. 1, 7.

60 AWB, Annual Report 1998.

criticality of holding market share in the region.62 The alarm shown by Australian wheat growers at the possibility of losing Iranian sales over the Mykonos dispute testified to the importance of that market to the industry. The development of Middle East markets in general was identified as a priority by Tim Fischer.63 As a result of these concerns and interests, the Australian-Iranian bilateral relationship enjoyed a modest revival during Fischer's three years as Trade Minister.

Tim Fischer's efforts to promote the bilateral trade relationship culminated in his decision to lead a trade mission to Tehran during the first week of March 1999 to revitalise the Iran-Australia Joint Ministerial Commission. His visit to Tehran was the first by an Australian Minister since that of Gareth Evans in 1992,64 and the first meeting of the Australia-Iran Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC) since August 1994, when delegations led by the Australian Trade Minister, Bob McMullan, and the Iranian Minister for Agiculture, Issa Kalantari, met in Sydney.65 In announcing the mission to the press, Fischer observed:

This is quite a significant policy development, the first (visit) in five years. The Prime Minister [John Howard], the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Alexander Downer] and myself have carefully weighed this matter and consulted with the Iran Government. It also reflects the need to update the situation in Iran with the new president and to do so ahead of some of our competitors. ... All the ramifications had to be raised; at the moment the US Congress has a ban by varying degres on certain types of trade with Iran.66

From the perspective of the present study the most interesting aspect of Fischer's press statements before and during the trade mission to Iran was his attitude regarding Australia's trade relations with Iran in the context of the US sanctions. It is interesting that he raised the issue of US sanctions on Iran as part of the consideration

62 The impact of the EEP on Australian trade in agricultural commodities is discussed in detail in the previous chapter. The Federal Member for Colio, Gavan O'Connor, observed in Parliament, during the reading of the Wheat Marketing Amendment Bill, that "Australia, of course, is a major exporter of wheat to the rest of the world. We are the fourth largest exporter of wheat, behind the United States, Canada and the Europeans, and we account for some 10 or 11 per cent of world exports. So we are a significant player. Our exports are