Aislamiento y clonación del fragmento de 348 pb correspondiente al ORF5

Singapore takes a highly structured if time-intensive approach to countering JI’s ideology. This program, which is encouraged but not sponsored or funded by the government, relies on three elements to de-radicalize detained JI operatives and head off radical proliferation in the community. The RRG, a group of approximately 30 volunteer

asatizah (group of ustaz, or scholars/teachers of Islam) which also includes four female ustazah, administers the first two elements: the counseling of JI detainees and counseling and supporting their families with the hope of moderating their extreme views. These two elements attempt to directly change the ideology of radicalized individuals. The third element of the program is a community engagement program, where members from both the RRG and Inter Racial Religious Community Circles (IRRCC) hold conferences in public forums and give lectures at venues like schools about the correct, peaceful interpretation of Islamic scripture and the dangers of extremism. Pamphlets and guidebooks with titles such as Don’t be extreme in your religion (Bin Ali & Hassan, 2008) and Questions & answers on jihad (Bin Ali & Hassan, 2007) are also distributed within segments of the Singaporean Muslim community deemed to be especially at risk of radicalization. This community engagement project, while important in the overall Singaporean counter-ideology strategy, will not be examined here as it is beyond the scope of this thesis’ focus on individual-centered efforts. Instead, this study takes up the issues associated with the first two elements as administered by the RRG.

The RRG was founded after the government’s initial roundup of 33 JI operatives in Singapore that began in late 2002. Two ustaz who assessed the detainees in conjunction with the government’s Internal Security Department (ISD), Mohamed bin Ali, a member of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), and Mohamed Hasbi bin Hassan, the president of the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (PERDAUS), noted that the detainees possessed a dangerous misunderstanding of some basic Islamic concepts. In order to counter what the two scholars deemed a threat to the community as embodied in the JI ideology, they established the RRG with the concurrence of the government as an attempt to correct these misunderstandings through counseling. Volunteers from the Singaporean asatizah (community of religious scholars/teachers) were solicited to administer the counseling with the goal of correcting “their misinterpretations of Islam” (Montlake, 2007).

Eventually, counseling of family members (using the female ustazah to counsel the wives of the detainees) was also offered to break down the religious misunderstanding and ideological support in the detainees’ households. This voluntary family counseling was

also tied to tangible support in the form of skills training for the wives and school fees and spending money for the children provided by the Interagency After Care Committee, a grouping of Muslim organization and mosques.

RRG Counselors have conducted more than 800 counseling sessions – each detainee is seen once a week for two hours, with one dedicated ustaz per detainee or family – since the group’s founding in early 2003. The group notes that detainees have a distorted view of Islam that plays upon their inability to cope with a pluralistic and secular society. They use the manipulated version of religion supplied by radical teachers as an outlet for social frustrations. Many detainees, when given the choice to engage with the counselors from the asatizah, ask specific questions about the morality of using violence in the name of religion (“A glimpse of RRG: reality and experience,” 2006).

By securing the support of the community to reform militants, starting with discussions with the asatizah and gradually involving reintroduction into mainstream society, the RRG claims some success in curbing extremism. To date, approximately 44 terrorist detainees (the total includes a small number of MILF members) have been graduated from their Detention Order (DO) (imprisoned) status and released into the community on Restriction Order (RO) status. RO status subjects the former detainees to close monitoring and regulates their actions, and those released on RO status serve an average of only 3 years in jail. A few have even reformed to the extent that they have the RO status lifted.

Of course, judging the successes of such a program is bound to be subjective as it is not entirely able to be quantified. Solely considering the numbers of released terrorists does not guarantee that the program is, in fact de-radicalizing individuals, although they must also convince representatives from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the ISD of their reform before release. Greg Fealy, a researcher at the Australian National University, notes that while rehabilitation efforts are worth trying, experience with other programs shows that only a small number of the detainees are likely to fully reform. Any numbers of success higher than just a few are possibly due to the unique position of Singapore to “monitor and control radical activities” (as reported in Hussain, 2007b, p.

184). Those close to the program and involved in its administration acknowledge that a

sort of “black swan” effect is present; the lack of violence in recent years may lead one to believe that the program is working, but until an established and verified long-term trend is observed there can always be doubt (J. Jerard & M. Salleh, personal interview, September 23, 2008). Indeed, at least one released prisoner, Mohamed Selani, has been rearrested and placed in DO status for supporting and funding the MILF.