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Capítulo 2. Información básica del análisis forense

2.3. Realización del análisis forense en móviles

2.3.1. Preservación / Conservación

2.3.1.3. Aislamiento

 

Christopher  W.  Gowans    

 

It  is  widely  recognized  that  the  problem  of  free  will  and  determinism,  a  standard  topic  in   contemporary  Western  philosophy,  was  not  addressed  in  traditional  Buddhist  thought.  In   this  chapter,  I  propose  some  reasons  for  this  lacuna  in  the  teaching  of  the  Buddha  as   represented  in  the  four  primary  Nikāyas  (baskets  or  collections)  of  the  Pāli  Canon.  The   heart  of  the  reason  is  the  Buddha’s  practical  orientation:  he  said  he  would  only  discuss   topics  that  directly  pertain  to  overcoming  suffering,  and  little  in  his  teaching  about  this   directly  brought  the  problem  into  focus.    

   

The  Practical  Nature  of  the  Buddha’s  Teaching    

The  place  to  begin  is  “The  Shorter  Discourse  to  Mālunkyāputta”  (Cūḷamālunka  Sutta)   (Majjhima  Nikāya  (“MN”)  I  426-­‐32;  references  to  MN  are  to  Ñāṇamoli  &  Bodhi  (1995)).  In   this  well-­‐known  text,  Mālunkyāputta  observes  with  disapproval  that  the  Buddha  has  not   taken  a  position  on  ten  ‘speculative  views’.  These  pertain  to  whether  the  world  is  eternal  or   infinite,  the  relationship  of  body  and  soul,  and  the  postmortem  existence  of  the  Buddha.  

Mālunkyāputta  says  that  he  will  continue  as  a  disciple  of  the  Buddha  if,  and  only  if,  the  

Buddha  takes  a  position  on  these  views  or  at  least  declares  that  he  does  not  know  what  to   say.  

 

In  response,  the  Buddha  says  that  he  never  claimed  he  would  take  a  position  on  these   views.  By  way  of  explanation,  he  offers  a  famous  simile.  Suppose  a  man  wounded  by  an   arrow  covered  with  poison  was  brought  to  a  doctor.  The  man  then  said  he  would  not  allow   the  doctor  to  treat  the  wound  until  he  knew  various  facts  about  the  attack,  such  as  the   name  of  the  person  who  wounded  him,  his  height,  where  he  lived,  the  kind  of  bow  and  shaft   he  used,  etc.  It  was  observed  that  the  man  might  well  die  before  coming  to  know  all  these   facts.    

 

The  immediate  point  of  the  simile  is  evident:  Mālunkyāputta’s  requirement  that  he  will   follow  the  Buddha  only  if  he  first  takes  a  position  on  the  ten  speculative  views  is  similar  to   the  wounded  man’s  requirement  that  he  will  allow  the  doctor  to  treat  him  only  if  he  first   knows  the  facts  about  the  attack.  In  both  cases,  the  requirement  is  unreasonable  because   the  knowledge  demanded  is  not  needed  to  address  the  practical  issue  at  hand.  In  order  to   survive  the  attack,  the  wounded  man  needs  proper  medical  care,  and  knowledge  of  the   name  of  the  person  who  attacked  him  and  many  other  pieces  of  information  about  the   attack  are  not  relevant  to  this.  Likewise,  the  Buddha  says,  in  order  to  overcome  suffering   Mālunkyāputta  needs  to  know  the  Four  Noble  Truths,  and  understanding  the  speculative   views  is  not  relevant  to  this.  Specifically,  the  Buddha  says  that  he  has  declared  the  nature  of   suffering,  its  origin,  its  cessation,  and  the  way  leading  to  its  cessation,  since  understanding  

     

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these  leads  to  enlightenment  and  Nibbāna  (Pāli;  Sanskrit:  nirvāṇa).  And  he  has  not  declared   a  position  on  the  speculative  views  because  understanding  these  does  not  have  this  benefit.  

 

There  are  several  texts  in  which  the  Buddha  declines  to  answer  questions  that  are  put  to   him.  The  point  of  these  texts  varies.  Often  the  point  is  that  the  questions  have  a  false   presupposition,  and  sometimes  it  is  that  any  answer  would  be  misunderstood  by  the   questioner.  There  are  other  texts  in  which  the  ten  speculative  views,  among  others,  are   discussed.  Once  again,  the  point  of  these  texts  varies.  In  one  prominent  case  it  is  to  warn   against  the  dangers  of  contact  and  craving  (see  Dīgha  Nikāya  (“DN”)  I  41-­‐45;  references  to   DN  are  to  Walshe  (1987)).  These  diverse  purposes  often  complement  one  another  and   need  not  be  seen  as  signs  of  conflict.    

 

The  Mālunkyāputta  discourse  has  been  interpreted  in  different  ways.  But  the  most   straightforward  reading  is  that  the  Buddha’s  sole  concern  is  to  enable  us  to  overcome   suffering  and  so  he  will  only  discuss  matters  that  pertain  to  this  preeminently  important   practical  concern.  This  does  not  mean  he  will  never  discuss  any  ‘speculative  views’.  It   means  that  he  would  do  so  only  if  this  would  help  us  to  overcome  suffering.  After  all,  a   dominant  theme  in  the  Nikāyas  is  the  importance  of  having  ‘right’  rather  than  ‘wrong’  

views  (views  that  reduce  or  promote  suffering,  respectively).  Nonetheless,  one  message  of   this  text  is  clear:  don’t  be  distracted  by  matters  irrelevant  to  the  urgent  practical  task  at   hand.    

 

Another  important  feature  of  the  Mālunkyāputta  discourse  is  that  the  Buddha’s  teaching  is   compared  to  the  medical  practice  of  a  doctor  (see  Gowans  2010).  Just  as  a  doctor  heals   physical  ills  of  the  body,  so,  too,  the  Buddha  heals  the  broader  ills  encompassed  by  the  term  

‘suffering’  (dukkha).  This  medical  analogy  is  reinforced  by  other  texts  in  which  Nibbāna  is   compared  to  a  state  of  health  and  the  Buddha  is  compared  to  a  doctor  (MN  I  510-­‐12,  II   260).  Texts  such  as  these  are  in  the  background  of  Buddhaghosa’s  (1999)  use  of  a  medical   simile  to  interpret  the  Four  Noble  Truths:    

 

“the  truth  of  suffering  is  like  a  disease;  the  truth  of  the  origin  is  like  the  cause  of  the   disease,  the  truth  of  cessation  is  like  the  cure  of  the  disease,  and  the  truth  of  the  path   is  like  the  medicine”  (Visuddhimagga  XVI  87).  

 

The  implication  of  the  medical  analogy  is  that  the  Buddha’s  teaching,  the  Dhamma  (Pāli;  

Sanskrit:  Dharma),  should  be  regarded  as  a  kind  of  practical  or  craft  knowledge  similar  to   medicine.  From  this  perspective,  his  teaching  has  two  important  features:  it  has  a  specific   practical  goal  (overcoming  suffering),  and  it  is  based  on  purported  knowledge  that  enables   us  to  achieve  this  goal.  The  teaching  is  first  and  foremost  knowledge  of  how  to  do  

something:  it  is  a  program  of  spiritual  exercises  directed  to  the  attainment  of  

enlightenment.  But  the  program  is  based  on  an  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  world,   especially  human  nature.  The  Mālunkyāputta  text  tells  us  that  the  Buddha  was  only   interested  in  discussing  issues  that  were  pertinent  to  his  teaching  so  understood.  

 

     

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My  suggestion  is  that  these  considerations  provide  a  helpful  framework  for  thinking  about   the  Buddha’s  teaching  in  relationship  to  the  contemporary  problem  of  freedom  and  

determinism.  In  Western  philosophy,  this  problem  usually  arises  because  it  is  thought  that   there  is  at  least  prima  facie  reason  to  believe  that  human  beings  have  free  will,  that  

everything  that  happens  is  causally  determined,  and  that  these  contentions  conflict  with   one  another.  Beliefs  about  free  will  are  usually  supported  by  intuitions  people  have  about   making  choices  and  assumptions  they  make  about  the  presuppositions  of  moral  

responsibility.  Beliefs  about  determinism  are  usually  maintained  by  reference  to  the   scientific  understanding  of  the  world  (at  least  above  the  quantum  level)  and  sometimes  by   appeal  to  theological  beliefs  about  the  power  of  God.  Determinism  is  thought  to  imply  that   whatever  happens  must  happen  in  the  way  it  does  because  it  is  causally  determined  by   scientific  laws  or  God.  The  concern  about  conflict  stems  from  the  thought  that  an  exercise   of  free  will,  a  free  choice,  is  at  least  in  some  respect  not  causally  determined  in  this  sense.  

 

Is  there  any  reason  to  think  that  the  Buddha  would  or  should  have  shared  these  or  similar   concerns?  It  is  worth  reminding  ourselves  that  the  Buddha’s  enlightenment  was  not  based   primarily  on  the  development  of  a  philosophical  theory.  In  a  canonical  account  of  his   enlightenment,  the  Buddha  first  attains  the  four  jhānas  (states  of  deep  meditative  

attainment),  thereby  passing  through  but  stilling  “sustained  thought”,  and  then  reaching  

“neither-­‐pain-­‐nor-­‐pleasure  and  purity  of  mindfulness  due  to  equanimity”  (MN  I  21-­‐24;  cf.  

MN  I  247-­‐49).  In  this  purified  state,  he  achieves  three  forms  of  “true  knowledge”:  that  of  his   past  lives,  the  operation  of  karma  and  rebirth,  and  the  Four  Noble  Truths.  It  was  through  a   form  of  meditation,  then,  that  the  Buddha  saw  the  way  to  overcome  suffering.  His  

enlightenment  was  based  more  on  a  kind  of  observation  than  on  rational  analysis.  And  he   said  that  his  teaching  was  “unattainable  by  mere  reasoning”  (MN  I  167).  

 

Philosophy  enters,  to  the  extent  that  it  does,  in  the  Buddha’s  articulation  of  what  he   observed  and  especially  his  willingness  to  discuss  challenges  to  the  coherence  of  his   teaching  and  its  consistency  with  commonly  held  beliefs  or  prominent  philosophical  views   of  other  traditions.  This  willingness  is  constrained  by  the  pragmatic  orientation  of  the   Mālunkyāputta  text,  but  the  import  of  the  discussions  in  the  Nikāyas  is  a  substantial   account  of  human  beings,  our  susceptibility  to  suffering  and  our  ability  to  overcome  it   through  enlightenment.    

   

Dependent  Origination    

The  heart  of  this  account  is  a  causal  understanding  of  human  life.  The  doctrines  of  karma   and  rebirth  as  well  as  the  Four  Noble  Truths  are  crucially  based  on  observations  of  causal   regularities.  The  Buddha  called  these  phenomena  ‘dependent  origination’  (paṭicca  

samuppāda:  Pāli;  Sanskrit:  pratītyasamutpāda).  In  a  widely  quoted  brief  formulation  of   dependent  origination,  he  says:    

 

“When  this  exists,  that  comes  to  be;  with  the  arising  of  this,  that  arises.  When  this   does  not  exist,  that  does  not  come  to  be;  with  the  cessation  of  this,  that  ceases.”  (MN  

 

This  idea  is  the  beginning,  and  in  many  ways  the  end,  of  the  Buddha’s  teaching:  “one  who   sees  dependent  origination  sees  the  Dhamma;  one  who  sees  the  Dhamma  sees  dependent   origination”  (MN  I  190-­‐91).  

 

Dependent  origination  is  sometimes  interpreted  as  a  form  of  causal  determinism.  If  this   were  correct,  the  Buddha  would  have  been  committed  to  one  important  part  of  what  gives   rise  to  the  contemporary  problem  of  free  will  and  determinism.  However,  this  

interpretation  attributes  far  more  to  the  Buddha  than  we  are  encouraged  to  suppose  in  the   Nikāyas.  The  brief  formulation  is  a  summary  of  a  longer  statement  that  elaborates  eleven   factors  that  explain  the  arising  and  cessation  of  suffering.  The  arising  part  of  the  statement   says:    

 

“That  is,  with  ignorance  as  condition,  formations  [come  to  be];  with  formations  as   condition,  consciousness;  with  consciousness  as  condition,  mentality-­‐materiality;  

with  mentality-­‐materiality  as  condition,  the  sixfold  base;  with  the  sixfold  base  as   condition,  contact;  with  contact  as  condition,  feeling;  with  feeling  as  condition,   craving;  with  craving  as  condition,  clinging;  with  clinging  as  condition,  being;  with   being  as  condition,  birth;  with  birth  as  condition,  ageing  and  death,  sorrow,  

lamentation,  pain,  grief,  and  despair  come  to  be.  Such  is  the  origin  of  this  whole   mass  of  suffering.”  (MN  III  63-­‐4)  

 

This  statement  is  immediately  followed  by  the  cessation  part.  This  begins  by  stating,  “but   with  the  remainderless  fading  away  and  cessation  of  ignorance  comes  the  cessation  of   formations”,  and  it  concludes  by  saying  “such  is  the  cessation  of  this  whole  mass  of   suffering”  (MN  III  64).  Since  the  Second  Noble  Truth  says  that  craving  is  the  source  of   suffering,  and  the  Third  Noble  Truth  refers  to  the  cessation  of  suffering,  it  is  evident  that   these  longer  formulations  of  dependent  origination  are  expansions  of  the  basic  ideas  in   standard  formulations  of  the  Second  and  Third  Noble  Truths  (see  Aṅguttara  Nikāya  (“AN”)   I  176-­‐7  for  this  connection;  references  to  AN  are  to  Bodhi  (2012)).    

 

The  longer  formulation  has  been  a  source  of  perplexity  both  because  of  what  is  and  is  not   included  on  the  list  and  because  of  its  apparently  rigid  linear  sequence.  A  traditional  

interpretation  based  on  a  literal  reading  understands  it  as  referring  to  a  succession  of  three   lives.  However,  though  the  longer  formulation  appears  frequently  in  the  texts  (see  

especially  “The  Book  of  Causation”  in  SN),  perhaps  we  should  not  be  so  preoccupied  with  a   literal  reading  of  it.  There  are  variations  of  the  longer  formula  that  refer  to  other  factors   (for  example,  see  SN  II  29-­‐32),  and  in  general  in  the  Buddha’s  teaching  many  items  beyond   the  eleven  factors  in  the  longer  formulation  are  referred  to  as  pertaining  to  the  arising  and   cessation  of  suffering.  

 

In  any  case,  these  interpretive  questions  should  not  obscure  the  fact  that  the  brief  

formulation  is  a  summary  device  for  referring  to  the  Buddha’s  rather  extensive  analysis  of   why  suffering  arises  and  how  we  can  overcome  it.  It  is  important  to  recognize  that  the  

     

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Buddha’s  teaching  concerning  dependent  origination  has  two  parts.  The  first  part  says:  

these  are  the  causal  conditions  of  suffering.  Many  of  these  conditions  involve  deeply   ingrained  habits  that  govern  the  lives  of  most  ordinary  adult  human  beings  (ignorance,   formations,  craving,  clinging,  etc.).  But  the  second  part  says  in  effect:  you  can  use  

knowledge  of  these  conditions  as  part  of  a  training  program  to  change  your  habits  so  as  to   reduce  and  eventually  eliminate  suffering.  This  is  the  heart  of  the  Buddha’s  practical   teaching:  knowledge  of  human  nature  that  is  put  to  practical  use.    

 

The  doctrine  of  karma,  the  other  side  of  the  Buddha’s  enlightenment  experience,  also   conforms  to  this  model.  In  the  cycle  of  rebirth,  morally  good  actions  bring  about  greater   well  being  and  morally  bad  actions  bring  about  lesser  well  being.  But  we  can  make  use  of   these  causal  conditions  to  improve  our  lives:  by  living  better  morally  we  can  increase  our   well  being  in  the  future.  Dependent  origination  is  central  to  both  saṁsāra  (the  delusional   reincarnational  cycle)  and  liberation  from  saṁsāra.  

 

In  order  to  understand  the  Buddha’s  teaching  in  its  proper  context,  as  a  form  of  practical   knowledge,  it  will  be  helpful  to  consider  a  comparison  from  agriculture  (a  frequent  source   of  similes  in  the  Buddha’s  thought,  e.g.  SN  I  227).  Suppose  a  group  of  farmers  often  

complained  that  their  crops  were  doing  quite  badly.  In  response,  a  wise  farmer  made  a   series  of  careful  observations  about  the  circumstances  in  which  crops  did  and  did  not  do   well.  He  then  reported  back  by  saying  that  poor  crops  are  the  result  of  planting  seeds  at  the   wrong  time,  inadequate  nutrition  in  the  soil,  improper  water,  heat  and  light,  damage  from   animals,  insects  and  disease,  and  harvesting  at  the  wrong  time.  Conversely,  good  crops  will  

result  from  reversing  these  conditions:  planting  at  the  right  time,  providing  adequate   nutrition  in  the  soil,  etc.  The  wise  farmer  claims  to  provide  some  valuable  practical   knowledge,  and  the  main  test  of  whether  or  not  he  has  done  so  is  basically  practical—

whether  or  not  reversing  the  conditions  brings  about  good  crops.    

   

Someone  might  say  that  the  wise  farmer’s  claims  presuppose  the  philosophical  theory  of   causal  determinism,  noting  that  he  had  summed  up  his  account  with  the  brief  formulation   of  dependent  origination,  and  then  demand  that  he  defend  this  philosophical  theory.  In   response,  the  farmer  might  well  say,  I  am  showing  you  how  to  have  good  crops,  and  I  don’t   need  to  defend  that  theory  in  order  for  you  to  grow  better  crops.  Just  focus  on  improving   your  soil,  planting  at  the  right  time,  etc.  If  this  improves  your  crops,  that  is  all  that  matters.  

For  the  purpose  of  improving  our  crops,  we  don’t  need  to  resolve  philosophical  questions   about  causality,  for  example,  about  whether  Hume  or  Kant  or  someone  else  had  it  right.  

Surely  this  would  be  a  proper  response.  

 

My  suggestion  is  that  we  regard  the  Buddha’s  teaching  about  dependent  origination  in  a   similar  way.  He  had  observed  some  causal  regularities,  both  about  the  relationship  

between  the  moral  quality  of  our  actions  and  our  future  well  being  (karma),  and  about  the   steps  needed  to  achieve  enlightenment  and  overcome  suffering  (the  Four  Noble  Truths,   especially  the  Eightfold  Path).  It  is  important  that  he  understood  the  regularities  correctly,   and  the  Buddha  was  quite  prepared  to  discuss  this.  But  all  that  really  mattered  is  that  the   teaching  was  effective:  that  we  could  improve  our  well  being  by  being  more  virtuous,  and  

     

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that  we  could  overcome  suffering  by  following  the  Eightfold  Path  (and  related  practical   advice).    

 

If  some  Mālunkyāputta  figure  demanded  that  the  Buddha  take  a  position  on  whether  or  not   dependent  origination  was  a  form  of  causal  determinism,  he  might  well  have  said  that  we   do  not  need  to  resolve  this  question  in  order  to  follow  and  benefit  from  his  teaching.  Just  as   the  wise  farmer’s  advice  could  be  put  to  good  use  without  resolving  these  philosophical   perplexities,  so  too  the  Buddha’s  teaching  could  have  valuable  results  without  engaging   these  philosophical  concerns.  This  does  not  mean  that  dependent  origination,  as  the   Buddha  understood  it,  does  not  raise  philosophical  questions.  It  and  the  wise  farmer’s   teaching  might  well  do  so.  However,  understood  as  forms  of  practical  or  craft  knowledge,   pursuing  such  philosophical  questions  is  a  distraction  from  the  main  point:  it  will  not  help,   but  will  simply  delay,  overcoming  suffering  and  improving  our  crops.    

 

It  might  seem  that  the  brief  formula  of  dependent  origination  and  other  texts  cannot  be   read  otherwise  than  as  implying  strict  causal  determinism.  But  they  have  been  read  in   other  ways.  Moreover,  if  we  think  about  the  observations  that  are  likely  to  have  been   behind  these  texts  we  can  see  that  this  reading  is  not  required.  In  contemporary   psychology,  experimental  work  establishes  statistical  correlations  between  observed   factors  that  are  expressed  in  terms  of  a  correlation  coefficient  (a  number  between  -­‐1  and  1,   indicating  negative  and  positive  correlations).  Additional  evidence  is  often  thought  to   support  judgments  about  direction  of  causality.  It  is  reasonable  to  think  that  the  texts  about   what  contributes  to  suffering  and  overcoming  suffering  were  based  on  observations  by  the  

Buddha  of  what  he  took  to  be  significant  correlations  indicating  causality  similar  to  those  in   contemporary  psychology.  For  example,  the  Buddha  saw  that  craving  increases  suffering,   and  that  reducing  craving  decreases  suffering.  

 

In  fact,  judging  from  the  texts  we  have,  with  their  multiple  and  partially  overlapping  lists,   he  discovered  a  complex  array  of  relevant  phenomena.  For  example,  he  said  that  there  are   five  hindrances  to  enlightenment  (sensual  desire,  ill  will,  sloth  and  torpor,  restlessness  and   remorse,  and  doubt)  and  seven  factors  of  enlightenment  (mindfulness,  investigation-­‐of-­‐

states,  energy,  rapture,  tranquility,  concentration  and  equanimity)  (MN  I  60-­‐62,  III  85-­‐8).  

Such  phenomena  are  often  presented  in  a  standard  order  in  the  texts,  and  it  is  sometimes   suggested  that  there  is  a  linear  causal  sequence,  with  one  factor  causing  another,  which   then  causes  another,  etc.  (as  in  the  longer  formulation  of  dependent  origination).  But  such   ordering  is  more  likely  to  reflect  rhetorical  strategies  of  presentation  of  relevant  factors  in   an  oral  teaching  than  literal  reports  of  observations  of  strict  causal  sequences.    

 

None  of  this  shows  that  the  Buddha  rejected  the  philosophical  theory  of  determinism.  

Complex  statistical  correlations  by  themselves  neither  undermine  nor  support   philosophical  positions  about  determinism.  But  recognizing  that  observation  of  such   correlations  must  have  played  an  important  role  in  the  development  of  the  Buddha’s   teaching  helps  us  to  see  why  the  brief  formulation  of  dependent  origination  need  not  be   read  as  an  endorsement  of  determinism.  It  is  a  quick  summary  device  reminding  us  that   there  are  causes  of  suffering  and  corresponding  ways  of  intervening  to  overcome  suffering   (the  arising  and  cessation  parts  of  the  formula),  as  the  Buddha  has  explained  in  detail  in  

     

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various  places.  The  Buddha’s  teaching  was  primarily  a  practical  instruction,  based  on   observation,  about  the  origin  of  suffering  and  how  to  overcome  it.  “Take  these  steps,”  the   Buddha  was  saying,  “and  they  will  enable  you  to  attain  enlightenment  and  end  suffering”.  

various  places.  The  Buddha’s  teaching  was  primarily  a  practical  instruction,  based  on   observation,  about  the  origin  of  suffering  and  how  to  overcome  it.  “Take  these  steps,”  the   Buddha  was  saying,  “and  they  will  enable  you  to  attain  enlightenment  and  end  suffering”.