Capítulo 2. Información básica del análisis forense
2.3. Realización del análisis forense en móviles
2.3.1. Preservación / Conservación
2.3.1.3. Aislamiento
Christopher W. Gowans
It is widely recognized that the problem of free will and determinism, a standard topic in contemporary Western philosophy, was not addressed in traditional Buddhist thought. In this chapter, I propose some reasons for this lacuna in the teaching of the Buddha as represented in the four primary Nikāyas (baskets or collections) of the Pāli Canon. The heart of the reason is the Buddha’s practical orientation: he said he would only discuss topics that directly pertain to overcoming suffering, and little in his teaching about this directly brought the problem into focus.
The Practical Nature of the Buddha’s Teaching
The place to begin is “The Shorter Discourse to Mālunkyāputta” (Cūḷamālunka Sutta) (Majjhima Nikāya (“MN”) I 426-‐32; references to MN are to Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995)). In this well-‐known text, Mālunkyāputta observes with disapproval that the Buddha has not taken a position on ten ‘speculative views’. These pertain to whether the world is eternal or infinite, the relationship of body and soul, and the postmortem existence of the Buddha.
Mālunkyāputta says that he will continue as a disciple of the Buddha if, and only if, the
Buddha takes a position on these views or at least declares that he does not know what to say.
In response, the Buddha says that he never claimed he would take a position on these views. By way of explanation, he offers a famous simile. Suppose a man wounded by an arrow covered with poison was brought to a doctor. The man then said he would not allow the doctor to treat the wound until he knew various facts about the attack, such as the name of the person who wounded him, his height, where he lived, the kind of bow and shaft he used, etc. It was observed that the man might well die before coming to know all these facts.
The immediate point of the simile is evident: Mālunkyāputta’s requirement that he will follow the Buddha only if he first takes a position on the ten speculative views is similar to the wounded man’s requirement that he will allow the doctor to treat him only if he first knows the facts about the attack. In both cases, the requirement is unreasonable because the knowledge demanded is not needed to address the practical issue at hand. In order to survive the attack, the wounded man needs proper medical care, and knowledge of the name of the person who attacked him and many other pieces of information about the attack are not relevant to this. Likewise, the Buddha says, in order to overcome suffering Mālunkyāputta needs to know the Four Noble Truths, and understanding the speculative views is not relevant to this. Specifically, the Buddha says that he has declared the nature of suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, since understanding
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these leads to enlightenment and Nibbāna (Pāli; Sanskrit: nirvāṇa). And he has not declared a position on the speculative views because understanding these does not have this benefit.
There are several texts in which the Buddha declines to answer questions that are put to him. The point of these texts varies. Often the point is that the questions have a false presupposition, and sometimes it is that any answer would be misunderstood by the questioner. There are other texts in which the ten speculative views, among others, are discussed. Once again, the point of these texts varies. In one prominent case it is to warn against the dangers of contact and craving (see Dīgha Nikāya (“DN”) I 41-‐45; references to DN are to Walshe (1987)). These diverse purposes often complement one another and need not be seen as signs of conflict.
The Mālunkyāputta discourse has been interpreted in different ways. But the most straightforward reading is that the Buddha’s sole concern is to enable us to overcome suffering and so he will only discuss matters that pertain to this preeminently important practical concern. This does not mean he will never discuss any ‘speculative views’. It means that he would do so only if this would help us to overcome suffering. After all, a dominant theme in the Nikāyas is the importance of having ‘right’ rather than ‘wrong’
views (views that reduce or promote suffering, respectively). Nonetheless, one message of this text is clear: don’t be distracted by matters irrelevant to the urgent practical task at hand.
Another important feature of the Mālunkyāputta discourse is that the Buddha’s teaching is compared to the medical practice of a doctor (see Gowans 2010). Just as a doctor heals physical ills of the body, so, too, the Buddha heals the broader ills encompassed by the term
‘suffering’ (dukkha). This medical analogy is reinforced by other texts in which Nibbāna is compared to a state of health and the Buddha is compared to a doctor (MN I 510-‐12, II 260). Texts such as these are in the background of Buddhaghosa’s (1999) use of a medical simile to interpret the Four Noble Truths:
“the truth of suffering is like a disease; the truth of the origin is like the cause of the disease, the truth of cessation is like the cure of the disease, and the truth of the path is like the medicine” (Visuddhimagga XVI 87).
The implication of the medical analogy is that the Buddha’s teaching, the Dhamma (Pāli;
Sanskrit: Dharma), should be regarded as a kind of practical or craft knowledge similar to medicine. From this perspective, his teaching has two important features: it has a specific practical goal (overcoming suffering), and it is based on purported knowledge that enables us to achieve this goal. The teaching is first and foremost knowledge of how to do
something: it is a program of spiritual exercises directed to the attainment of
enlightenment. But the program is based on an understanding of the nature of the world, especially human nature. The Mālunkyāputta text tells us that the Buddha was only interested in discussing issues that were pertinent to his teaching so understood.
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My suggestion is that these considerations provide a helpful framework for thinking about the Buddha’s teaching in relationship to the contemporary problem of freedom and
determinism. In Western philosophy, this problem usually arises because it is thought that there is at least prima facie reason to believe that human beings have free will, that
everything that happens is causally determined, and that these contentions conflict with one another. Beliefs about free will are usually supported by intuitions people have about making choices and assumptions they make about the presuppositions of moral
responsibility. Beliefs about determinism are usually maintained by reference to the scientific understanding of the world (at least above the quantum level) and sometimes by appeal to theological beliefs about the power of God. Determinism is thought to imply that whatever happens must happen in the way it does because it is causally determined by scientific laws or God. The concern about conflict stems from the thought that an exercise of free will, a free choice, is at least in some respect not causally determined in this sense.
Is there any reason to think that the Buddha would or should have shared these or similar concerns? It is worth reminding ourselves that the Buddha’s enlightenment was not based primarily on the development of a philosophical theory. In a canonical account of his enlightenment, the Buddha first attains the four jhānas (states of deep meditative
attainment), thereby passing through but stilling “sustained thought”, and then reaching
“neither-‐pain-‐nor-‐pleasure and purity of mindfulness due to equanimity” (MN I 21-‐24; cf.
MN I 247-‐49). In this purified state, he achieves three forms of “true knowledge”: that of his past lives, the operation of karma and rebirth, and the Four Noble Truths. It was through a form of meditation, then, that the Buddha saw the way to overcome suffering. His
enlightenment was based more on a kind of observation than on rational analysis. And he said that his teaching was “unattainable by mere reasoning” (MN I 167).
Philosophy enters, to the extent that it does, in the Buddha’s articulation of what he observed and especially his willingness to discuss challenges to the coherence of his teaching and its consistency with commonly held beliefs or prominent philosophical views of other traditions. This willingness is constrained by the pragmatic orientation of the Mālunkyāputta text, but the import of the discussions in the Nikāyas is a substantial account of human beings, our susceptibility to suffering and our ability to overcome it through enlightenment.
Dependent Origination
The heart of this account is a causal understanding of human life. The doctrines of karma and rebirth as well as the Four Noble Truths are crucially based on observations of causal regularities. The Buddha called these phenomena ‘dependent origination’ (paṭicca
samuppāda: Pāli; Sanskrit: pratītyasamutpāda). In a widely quoted brief formulation of dependent origination, he says:
“When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases.” (MN
This idea is the beginning, and in many ways the end, of the Buddha’s teaching: “one who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma; one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination” (MN I 190-‐91).
Dependent origination is sometimes interpreted as a form of causal determinism. If this were correct, the Buddha would have been committed to one important part of what gives rise to the contemporary problem of free will and determinism. However, this
interpretation attributes far more to the Buddha than we are encouraged to suppose in the Nikāyas. The brief formulation is a summary of a longer statement that elaborates eleven factors that explain the arising and cessation of suffering. The arising part of the statement says:
“That is, with ignorance as condition, formations [come to be]; with formations as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, mentality-‐materiality;
with mentality-‐materiality as condition, the sixfold base; with the sixfold base as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, being; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, ageing and death, sorrow,
lamentation, pain, grief, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.” (MN III 63-‐4)
This statement is immediately followed by the cessation part. This begins by stating, “but with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes the cessation of formations”, and it concludes by saying “such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering” (MN III 64). Since the Second Noble Truth says that craving is the source of suffering, and the Third Noble Truth refers to the cessation of suffering, it is evident that these longer formulations of dependent origination are expansions of the basic ideas in standard formulations of the Second and Third Noble Truths (see Aṅguttara Nikāya (“AN”) I 176-‐7 for this connection; references to AN are to Bodhi (2012)).
The longer formulation has been a source of perplexity both because of what is and is not included on the list and because of its apparently rigid linear sequence. A traditional
interpretation based on a literal reading understands it as referring to a succession of three lives. However, though the longer formulation appears frequently in the texts (see
especially “The Book of Causation” in SN), perhaps we should not be so preoccupied with a literal reading of it. There are variations of the longer formula that refer to other factors (for example, see SN II 29-‐32), and in general in the Buddha’s teaching many items beyond the eleven factors in the longer formulation are referred to as pertaining to the arising and cessation of suffering.
In any case, these interpretive questions should not obscure the fact that the brief
formulation is a summary device for referring to the Buddha’s rather extensive analysis of why suffering arises and how we can overcome it. It is important to recognize that the
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Buddha’s teaching concerning dependent origination has two parts. The first part says:
these are the causal conditions of suffering. Many of these conditions involve deeply ingrained habits that govern the lives of most ordinary adult human beings (ignorance, formations, craving, clinging, etc.). But the second part says in effect: you can use
knowledge of these conditions as part of a training program to change your habits so as to reduce and eventually eliminate suffering. This is the heart of the Buddha’s practical teaching: knowledge of human nature that is put to practical use.
The doctrine of karma, the other side of the Buddha’s enlightenment experience, also conforms to this model. In the cycle of rebirth, morally good actions bring about greater well being and morally bad actions bring about lesser well being. But we can make use of these causal conditions to improve our lives: by living better morally we can increase our well being in the future. Dependent origination is central to both saṁsāra (the delusional reincarnational cycle) and liberation from saṁsāra.
In order to understand the Buddha’s teaching in its proper context, as a form of practical knowledge, it will be helpful to consider a comparison from agriculture (a frequent source of similes in the Buddha’s thought, e.g. SN I 227). Suppose a group of farmers often
complained that their crops were doing quite badly. In response, a wise farmer made a series of careful observations about the circumstances in which crops did and did not do well. He then reported back by saying that poor crops are the result of planting seeds at the wrong time, inadequate nutrition in the soil, improper water, heat and light, damage from animals, insects and disease, and harvesting at the wrong time. Conversely, good crops will
result from reversing these conditions: planting at the right time, providing adequate nutrition in the soil, etc. The wise farmer claims to provide some valuable practical knowledge, and the main test of whether or not he has done so is basically practical—
whether or not reversing the conditions brings about good crops.
Someone might say that the wise farmer’s claims presuppose the philosophical theory of causal determinism, noting that he had summed up his account with the brief formulation of dependent origination, and then demand that he defend this philosophical theory. In response, the farmer might well say, I am showing you how to have good crops, and I don’t need to defend that theory in order for you to grow better crops. Just focus on improving your soil, planting at the right time, etc. If this improves your crops, that is all that matters.
For the purpose of improving our crops, we don’t need to resolve philosophical questions about causality, for example, about whether Hume or Kant or someone else had it right.
Surely this would be a proper response.
My suggestion is that we regard the Buddha’s teaching about dependent origination in a similar way. He had observed some causal regularities, both about the relationship
between the moral quality of our actions and our future well being (karma), and about the steps needed to achieve enlightenment and overcome suffering (the Four Noble Truths, especially the Eightfold Path). It is important that he understood the regularities correctly, and the Buddha was quite prepared to discuss this. But all that really mattered is that the teaching was effective: that we could improve our well being by being more virtuous, and
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that we could overcome suffering by following the Eightfold Path (and related practical advice).
If some Mālunkyāputta figure demanded that the Buddha take a position on whether or not dependent origination was a form of causal determinism, he might well have said that we do not need to resolve this question in order to follow and benefit from his teaching. Just as the wise farmer’s advice could be put to good use without resolving these philosophical perplexities, so too the Buddha’s teaching could have valuable results without engaging these philosophical concerns. This does not mean that dependent origination, as the Buddha understood it, does not raise philosophical questions. It and the wise farmer’s teaching might well do so. However, understood as forms of practical or craft knowledge, pursuing such philosophical questions is a distraction from the main point: it will not help, but will simply delay, overcoming suffering and improving our crops.
It might seem that the brief formula of dependent origination and other texts cannot be read otherwise than as implying strict causal determinism. But they have been read in other ways. Moreover, if we think about the observations that are likely to have been behind these texts we can see that this reading is not required. In contemporary psychology, experimental work establishes statistical correlations between observed factors that are expressed in terms of a correlation coefficient (a number between -‐1 and 1, indicating negative and positive correlations). Additional evidence is often thought to support judgments about direction of causality. It is reasonable to think that the texts about what contributes to suffering and overcoming suffering were based on observations by the
Buddha of what he took to be significant correlations indicating causality similar to those in contemporary psychology. For example, the Buddha saw that craving increases suffering, and that reducing craving decreases suffering.
In fact, judging from the texts we have, with their multiple and partially overlapping lists, he discovered a complex array of relevant phenomena. For example, he said that there are five hindrances to enlightenment (sensual desire, ill will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and remorse, and doubt) and seven factors of enlightenment (mindfulness, investigation-‐of-‐
states, energy, rapture, tranquility, concentration and equanimity) (MN I 60-‐62, III 85-‐8).
Such phenomena are often presented in a standard order in the texts, and it is sometimes suggested that there is a linear causal sequence, with one factor causing another, which then causes another, etc. (as in the longer formulation of dependent origination). But such ordering is more likely to reflect rhetorical strategies of presentation of relevant factors in an oral teaching than literal reports of observations of strict causal sequences.
None of this shows that the Buddha rejected the philosophical theory of determinism.
Complex statistical correlations by themselves neither undermine nor support philosophical positions about determinism. But recognizing that observation of such correlations must have played an important role in the development of the Buddha’s teaching helps us to see why the brief formulation of dependent origination need not be read as an endorsement of determinism. It is a quick summary device reminding us that there are causes of suffering and corresponding ways of intervening to overcome suffering (the arising and cessation parts of the formula), as the Buddha has explained in detail in
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various places. The Buddha’s teaching was primarily a practical instruction, based on observation, about the origin of suffering and how to overcome it. “Take these steps,” the Buddha was saying, “and they will enable you to attain enlightenment and end suffering”.
various places. The Buddha’s teaching was primarily a practical instruction, based on observation, about the origin of suffering and how to overcome it. “Take these steps,” the Buddha was saying, “and they will enable you to attain enlightenment and end suffering”.