Algoritmos de emparejamiento

Naturally, China’s family planning policy is thought to be a major factor in the nation’s fertility decline, as it has supplied the nation with, and occasionally forced the population to utilise, a broad spectre of free or inexpensive birth control methods. 170 Penny Kane argues that the mere availability of contraception led to much of the reduction in fertility, as Chinese had been practising birth control for more than 2000 years, and are largely accepting the fertility limitations.171 John C. Caldwell and Zhao Zhongwei argue that there are several reasons for broad family planning policy acceptance. Firstly, there is long tradition for strong authoritarian influence in China. Secondly, reproduction has historically not been viewed as

165 _{(Zeng et al. 1993)} 166 _{(Peng 2011b, 160-161)} 167

(Zhao and Chen 2011, 828)

168 _{(Zhao and Chen 2011, 830)} 169 _{(Lee and Wang 1999, 8)}

170 _{(Neurath 1994, 166; Fong 2011, 126)} 171

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an individual choice. Thirdly, at the time of policy introduction, and still today, there exists a popular demand for family planning methods and birth control.172 Nadia Diamond-Smith and Malcolm Potts agree that contraception is the main component of fertility reduction, and should be further diffused to limit population size and environmental strain.173 Wei Chen argues that China’s abortion rate actually is quite moderate by international standards, and has had a lower impact on fertility reductions than in South Korea and Japan,174 thus emphasising the role of preventive birth control.

Gu Baochang argues that there is broad acceptance for family planning and birth limitation across China, and shows how most provinces have an observed fertility rate which is below the level of fertility allowed by the local family planning policy.175 Low fertility is thought to be a sign of modernisation, related to the diffusion of individualism through the rise of capitalism. Some have even argued that market economy is necessary for individualistic demographic decision making.176 Greenhalgh however, argues that the rise of self-optimising and self-governing individuals amongst its population is a deliberate outcome of China’s population policy.177 Thus, the policy aim is no longer mere population control, but rather human development.178 Although more and more young men and women are choosing education, careers and self-fulfilment over traditionally valued marriage and family life, this does not necessarily reflect an increasing influence of individualisation among young Chinese.179 It might be a consequence of the government’s focus on population quality (renkou suzhi 人口素质), where high education and successful careers provide just as much

renkou suzhi, or perhaps even more, than traditional family roles.

Lee and Wang claim that “Chinese individuals constantly adjusted their demographic behaviour according to collective circumstances to maximise collective utility.”180 Tony Saich questions this conclusion and points to a clear lack of collectivism in fertility decisions, as he argues that although most Chinese agree with the necessity of the policy, “many also have specific reasons about why it should not apply to them.”181 Nonetheless, having children has traditionally been regarded as a process engaging the entire family, where young couples have

172 _{(Caldwell and Zhao 2007)} 173

(Diamond-Smith and Potts 2010)

174

(Chen 2007, 101-106)

175 _{(Gu 2009, 79)}

176 _{(Lee and Wang 1999, 18)} 177

(Greenhalgh 2010, xiii)

178 _{(Greenhalgh 2010, 26-28)} 179 _{(Chu and Yu 2010, 269)} 180 _{(Lee and Wang 1999, 9)} 181

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been heavily influenced by their parents and grandparents, both in regards to number, gender and rearing of children.182 As this thesis shows however, few of the interviewees seemed to be especially concerned about their parents’ wishes on how many children they should have and when. Several of the participants actually viewed their parents’ attitudes as old-fashioned and non-modern, stating that their parents did not understand the amount of resources needed to raise children today. Li Ying, one of the interview participants in my study, rather jokingly said that even her boyfriend did not have any say in the timing and number of any children they might have.

Mette Halskov Hansen and Pang Cuiming argue that the participants in their study of young rural Chinese views on family, showed a combination of highly individualistic opinions and collective awareness.183 This is also true for many of the participants in my study. On the one hand they largely accept state family planning policy and state ideology on

suzhi, at the same time their reasons for preferring a certain number of children are based

almost exclusively on their own individual opinions about ideal family size. However, since the actual family size decisions are still in the future for my respondents, it is too soon to tell if they will end up following the path of collectivism or individualism when starting a family. Lee and Wang argue that demographic decisions never have been an individual decision in China, hence resistance to the family planning policy and forced compliance is rather limited, as the individual is used to yielding to the collective good.184 Hill Gates and Fong however argue that resistance have mainly been seen in rural areas, as family planning policy limitations largely coincided with individual socioeconomic restraints in urban areas.185 Of the participants in my study, none were familiar with any use of force (qiangzhi强 制) by authorities towards their family in order to assure policy compliance. However, as both Milwertz and Greenhalgh note, the concepts of force (qiangzhi 强制) and voluntary (ziyuan自 愿 ) may have other connotations in Chinese, where force implies physical force, and

voluntary can be understood as not physically forced.186

Nonetheless, according to the participants in my study, their parents were heavily influenced by the family planning policy when they decided on how many children they would have. The participants themselves however, seem largely ambivalent towards the

182

(Milwertz 1997, 77-79)

183 _{(Hansen and Pang 2010, 49)} 184 _{(Lee and Wang 1999, 10)} 185 _{(Gates 1993; Fong 2004)} 186

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policy’s effect on their plans for having children, as suggested by Fong.187 Their concerns are rather based on personal and financial conditions. This ambivalence towards policy impact may be due to the fact that many of the participants view having children as something which is still far into their future. Possibly, it might also imply that they feel the policy do not affect them much, as they are mostly single children (who sometimes are allowed to have two children) and/or transnational students (who often are exempt from the policy).188 Many also expect the policy to be gradually relaxed, thus their own low fertility desires are likely to be in accordance with any future variations of the policy. While most demographers agree that China's family policy needs adjustments, most Chinese policymakers and administrators advocate retaining the current policy for two reasons: the overall population of China is still too large, and today's low fertility rate will not continue if the policy is relaxed.189

In Yilin Nie and Robert J. Wyman’s study of family planning policy in Shanghai, there is a distinct difference between the answers from the older and the younger participants on the topic of policy compliance. The older respondents, who were at reproductive age when the policy was first introduced, say there were many different reasons for just wanting one child in that period, among them fear of overpopulation and possible mass starvation as seen during the Great Leap Forward. The younger people Nie and Wyman interviewed also expressed acceptance of the family planning policy, but their reasons for policy compliance were somewhat different. They were all largely content with having no siblings, as well as only being able to have one child themselves. Nie and Wyman thus sum up their interview objects' expressed opinions in the following way: the older generations say they approved of the family planning policy primarily based on a focus on the national good, while the younger generations say they approved of the policy based on personal interests.190

The reasons for reducing individual fertility levels have thus changed during the family planning policy period. In the 1990s, Milwertz wrote that several studies show how the main reason for having only one child in China is the policy restrictions imposed by the government, and not personal preferences.191 This statement is supported by the participants in my study, many of whom say that their parents limited their fertility mainly to comply with state policy, while they themselves base their fertility decisions more on their own socioeconomic situation. Many of the interviewees in my study were rather clear on the fact

187

(Fong 2011, 159)

188 _{(Landinfo 2012; Scharping 2003, 158)} 189 _{(Zeng 2007, 216-217)}

190 _{(Nie and Wyman 2005, 318-326)} 191

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that the reason they have no siblings is because their parents chose to, or had to, adhere to the one-child limitation. When explaining their own desires and plans for preferred number of children, very few stated that their choices were based on the recommendations of current family planning policy. Nevertheless, some of the participants rather jokingly expressed that a suitable partner would have to be a single child, in that way they could choose to have more than one child when they decided to start a family. Although, several of the interviewees seemed to be unsure of how the current regulations would affect them, as the exceptions to the one-child rule are both numerous and complicated. Most did however explain their ideal number of children on the basis of limited personal and national resources. They did not think they would be able to earn enough money to support more than one child, nor afford an apartment which could house more than one child.

In Milwertz’ study, 62.9 per cent of the women stated that they would choose to have only one child whether or not there existed a one-child rule, and none said they would choose to have more than two.192 This implies that there already existed other powerful factors, besides family planning policy, which limited their fertility. According to Gu’s more recent survey, among those who were allowed to have two children, less than 40 per cent expressed a desire to do so, and the main obstacle was reported to be economic conditions.193