Legal sanctions are a central component of deterrence-based polices for reducing the level of alcohol impaired driving. It is generally regarded that legal sanctions can reduce the incidence of drink driving behaviour through both general and specific deterrence mechanisms. General deterrence can result from the knowledge of drink driving sanctions and be due to the resulting fear of receiving such punishment and belief that it would be personally unpleasant (Homel, 1988). Specific deterrence can result from convicted drink drivers modifying their behaviour due to the experience of receiving sanctions and the accompanying financial and social consequences.
Legal sanctions for drink driving behaviour can take one of several forms, including: fines, licence actions such as suspension and revocation, jail sentences and community services. The type of sanction applied to the drink driver and the way in which they are administered are two variables considered to be important in the development of effective drink driving countermeasures. Deterrence theory posits that drink driving sanctions will be effective in modifying road user behaviour to the extent that they are perceived as being certain, swiftly applied and severe (Ross, 1982).
In recent years the use of severe sanctions, as a means of reducing drink driving behaviour, has been questioned. In a review of deterrence based policy, Ross (1990) concluded that if the probability of detection and punishment was perceived by drink drivers as being low then the effect of penalty severity would be negligible. This proposition is supported by Homel (1986) who found that only when the perceived chances of arrest are high, does perceived penalty severity have a deterrent impact additional to that of arrest certainty. The fact that this was particularly the case among those road users who had already suffered legal punishment for drink driving, highlights the combined impact of arrest certainty and penalty severity on specific deterrence.
Homel (1988) concluded that the main predictor of deterrence was perceived risk of apprehension and recommended that drink driving strategies be based upon activities which increased the risk of detection and not legislation which increases the severity of penalties. This proposition is supported by Scandinavian research (Aberg, 1986; Assum,
1986) which found that enforcement strategies which emphasise the perceived probability of detection rather than the severity of punishment had a much greater impact on road user behaviour.
Nichols and Ross (1990) stated that the criminal justice system may hinder the effectiveness of penalty severity as a deterrence. The more severe the penalty administered the more legal representations usually required and this may, in turn, lead to a delay in receiving punishment and even uncertainty about receiving any punishment at all. This punishment delay may, in turn, compromise all other aspects of the deterrence threat (National Institute of Justice, 1984). Rothengatter (1990) also stated that the judicial response to traffic law enforcement was a largely ineffectual deterrent because, in the majority of cases, the penalties issued are paltry in comparison to the types of traffic offences committed.
Fines
There are only a few studies relating to the use of fines as drink driving sanctions but the available evidence does suggest that substantial fines can be an effective deterrent for alcohol impaired driving (Nichols & Ross, 1990). Fines also have the added benefit that they can provide necessary income for drink driving countermeasure, although strategies based solely on revenue raising can have negative social and political implications.
Current levels of fines for drink driving are, in real dollar terms, less than they were several decades ago (Nichols & Ross, 1990) and this probably reflects the increasing use of other types of sanctions. It is generally regarded that fines should correspond to the perceived severity of the crime committed. This has implications for increasing the severity of drink driving fines if such behaviour is to be portrayed as a serious and socially unacceptable activity (Ross, 1985). However, Ross (1988) stated that unless road users perceive the risk of apprehension and punishment for drink driving as being sufficiently high then there may be only minimal deterrence benefits to be gained by introducing more severe penalties. It has also been recommended that some consideration be given to imposing fines which are proportional to the income of the offender so that all offenders are equally affected financially, by the imposition of a fine (Klette, 1983). A penalty system based upon this approach has been introduced in several Scandinavian countries where it has been found to be both effective and generally well accepted by the community (Votey & Shapiro, 1985).
Imprisonment
Imprisonment, often regarded as the most severe of drink driving sanctions, is an integral component of many deterrence based strategies targeted at the potential and convicted drink driver. The use of such sanctions is best typified by the experience in the United States of America where, in some States, first offenders can receive a mandatory two day jail sentence. It has been suggested that such sanctions provide the ultimate weapon for deterring repeat offender drink drivers, and may also provide needed 'shock value' for first time offenders. Howland (1988) has also suggested that imprisonment sanctions produce a gradual long-term effect, whereby the public comes to learn that drink driving is a serious and undesirable behaviour because of the severe penalties associated with it.
Some support for punishment severity, as it relates to the deterrent effect of jail sentences for more serious traffic offences, has been documented by Zador et al (1988 ). However, the effectiveness of imprisonment as a drink driving deterrent has been questioned by a
number of researchers (Homel, 1986; Voas, 1986; Nichol & Ross, 1990; Ross et al., 1990). Homel (1988) and Ross et al (1990) in similar methodological studies to that of Zador et al (1988) found no evidence that jail sentences had an impact on subsequent levels of recidivism.
In a review of the literature relating to legal sanctions for drink driving, Nichols and Ross (1990) indicated that there was little evidence to support the deterrent effectiveness of imprisonment and even referred to some evidence (Homel, 1988) which indicated that long periods of imprisonment increase, rather than decrease, the probability of reconviction for a drink driving offence. They concluded that policies based on increasing the certainty and swiftness of punishment have a greater deterrent impact than policies based upon severe punishments and highlighted research relating to the potential benefits and effectiveness of using licensing sanctions such as suspension and revocation.
Licence suspension
Licence suspension is often regarded as the 'teeth' of the driver-improvement system. Historically it has been, in effect, the ultimate sanction and often administered as the last resort in attempts to deal with high-risk or problem drivers (Simpson, 1990). In recent years it has become one of the principle sanctions for dealing with drink drivers and has been shown to be an effective countermeasure with a high deterrent effect (Ross, 1991). Licence suspension is administered for two primary reasons: punishment and safety. As a punitive measure, licence suspension is assumed to work as both a specific and general deterrent (Simpson, 1990). As a specific deterrent, it is assumed to punish the drink driver (by removing a cherished privilege - driving) thereby, reducing the likelihood of subsequent drink driving behaviour, when the privilege is reinstated. As a general deterrent, the threat of licence suspension is believed to decrease the likelihood of drink driving because drivers are not prepared to risk the chance of losing the privilege of driving.
As a safety measure, the use of licence suspensions removes the high risk drink driver from the driving population, to prevent them from being a danger to themselves and to other road users. In addition, once the period of licence suspension is over, there is strong evidence of a reduction in traffic violations and accidents among convicted drivers (Mann et al., 1991).
Ross (1990) has explained this effect in terms of specific deterrence, stating that the experience of licence suspension leads to a modification in drink driving behaviour because convicted drivers avoid driving actions which may lead to further licence sanctions.
Ross (1991), in a review of legal sanctions indicated that only measure supported in the research literature as being truly effective in reforming the drink driver is licence deprivation. He further indicated that licence sanctions have a greater deterrence potential because when they are administratively applied they are more certain and swift than traditional sanctions which depend to a large degree on the criminal justice system for their application.
The evidence of the effectiveness of licensing sanctions has been well documented. Mann et al. (1991) undertook an examination of three years of post court appearance data for a group of drink driving offenders who had received some form of licence suspension. When
compared to a control group, the results for the licence suspension group showed a significant reduction in the total number of road accidents, for first and multiple offenders as well as a reduction in the number of repeat drink driving charges for first offenders. Similar evidence of the effectiveness of licence suspension procedures has been documented by Blomberg et al. (1987) in a study of the experience with such sanctions in the American State of Wisconsin. They reported that between 1982 and 1985, when 100% of convicted drink drivers had their licences suspended for 90 days or more, there were significant reductions ill both the number of alcohol-related accidents and repeat offences of driving whilst impaired, among those drink drivers who had been convicted.
Licence suspension does not necessarily ensure compliance and it has been well established (Ross & Gonzales, 1988) that a large proportion of suspended drivers continue to drive during the suspension period. This problem is commonly identified by critics of licensing sanctions who argue that the inability of authorities to enforce such sanctions results in them being ineffective. Mann et al. (1991) argue against this proposition, highlighting compelling evidence that shows that although many individuals drive whilst under suspension, their rates of violation and accident involvement are substantially decreased either because they drive less, or more cautiously, or under conditions of lower risk.
This problem, in some jurisdictions, has led to the introduction of harsh sanctions aimed at reducing the percentage of suspended drink drivers who continue to drive. Such sanctions allow an offender's vehicle to be confiscated and, in the case of repeat offenders, even sold at public auction (Bailey, 1991). However, it is generally regarded that these sanctions are too severe and may actually result in negative social consequences (Mann et al., 1991) due to the effect on the offender’s family, financial hardship and possible unemployment. It has also been argued that licence suspensions can place an excessive burden on drink driving offenders. However, Wells-Parker and Crosby (1988) found little evidence that excessive economic hardship is caused by such sanctions. Ross (1991) reported that suspended drivers did not, as a rule, find themselves rejected by family and friends, and were able to continue driving for work related purposes under special licence provisions allowed by the court. In addition, relatively few suspended drivers (11 %) claimed that the licence suspension had resulted in loss of employment.
Waller (1985) has argued that licence suspensions should be waived in favour of more constructive alternatives such as rehabilitation. However, Mann et al. (1991) have argued that whilst, under appropriate conditions, education and rehabilitation countermeasures may have road safety benefits (Mann et al., 1988; Wells-Parker et al., 1988), reduction or elimination of licence suspension as an incentive to enter such programs cannot be supported on road safety grounds due to the compelling evidence regarding the deterrence potential of licensing sanctions.
Roadside licence suspensions
The use of roadside licence suspensions, which allow police to immediately suspend the driving privileges of an alcohol impaired driver, has also been shown to have a number of benefits (Simpson, 1992). Firstly, the most important feature of this legislation is swiftness of punishment and by satisfying the principles of immediacy and certainty of punishment it has a strong deterrent potential. Secondly, it is extremely efficient, because it allows legal
sanctions to be administered by the police thus reducing the reliance on the criminal justice system for their application.
Vingilis et al. (1993) reported on the use of a 12-hour licence law introduced in the Canadian province of Ontario. This new law provided police with the authority to immediately suspend a driver's licence for 12 hours if the driver registered a 'warn' (0.05 to 0.08g/100ml) on an approved screening device or a reading above 0.05g/100ml on an evidentiary breath testing device. They stated that the primary purpose of the 12-hour licence suspension was to introduce some form of immediate punishment for drink driving behaviour without the time-consuming tasks associated with arrest procedures, nor the high costs associated with adjudication.
Few evaluations of the impact of roadside suspensions have been conducted. One carefully designed study, undertaken by Vingilis et al. (1988), was able to detect a small short-term reduction in alcohol related fatalities associated with the introduction of such a law.
However, low levels of enforcement and associated publicity may have reduced the deterrent impact. They concluded that roadside suspensions can significantly increase the immediacy and certainty of punishment and therefore have a high deterrence potential. However, they cautioned, that this may only be possible only when roadside suspensions are accompanied by high levels of enforcement and publicity.