E. Condiciones de reclusión
3. Alimentación y agua potable
Perceptions of corruption and the causes of corruption highlighted in the UNODC BiH Business Corruption Report (2013) show that large percentages of business owners and representatives see corruption as a problem when conducting business, especially when dealing with officials and politicians. The report states:
When asked whether certain issues represent an obstacle to doing business in their country, business owners and representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina rank corruption as the sixth most important issue. In fact, corruption is considered a major obstacle by more than a third (36.5 per cent) of business representatives, after high taxes (64.3 per cent), complicated tax laws (50.1 per cent), political instability (42.5 per cent), labour regulations (40 per cent) and limited access to
financing (37.2 per cent). However, an additional 37.2 per cent of respondents consider corruption a moderate obstacle to doing business, while 26.3 per cent consider it no obstacle…The data show that almost half (47.8 per cent) of business representatives consider lack of transparency a common cause of corruption. In addition, between 40 and 45 per cent of business representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina consider great powers of public officials, absence of evaluation
mechanisms, lack of integrity of officials, lack of integrity within businesses, inappropriate influence of politicians and influence of powerful individuals to be a common cause of corruption (41-44). Very generally, this quote demonstrates the prevailing view amongst people in Bosnia and Herzegovina – local business owners and internationals alike – that corruption is deeply entrenched in politics as well as in the economy. Suggestions of corruption surround most political and economic issues, including the redevelopment of the city of Sarajevo. While the UNODC report focuses extensively on bribery among petty officials as the most obvious form of corruption, the perceptions of the causes of corruption by business owners also point at larger forces taking place in the country and are quite telling. It refers to the ‘great powers of public officials’ and the ‘inappropriate influence of politicians and influence of powerful individuals’ as common causes of corruption, as observed by 40-45 per cent of business representatives. That is a staggering statistic
that points at an understanding by BiH individuals that those in the country who have wealth and power are complicit in corruption.
Sentiments about the general level of corruption in the country were reflected in an interview I conducted with a female student at the architecture faculty. While
discussing urban development in Sarajevo, she said:
So I guess that this is something like the entrance to Europe. You know, it’s always been like that. We’re the crossroad of everything! You know, people come from the East and the West and they meet here, the drug trafficking meets here as well and prostitution rings I guess. It’s just I think… there’s a diagram I found online a while back which basically said that all the paths crossed in Bosnia. It’s actually worrying because you don’t get in touch with that because you can’t really tell, but when you think about the crime rate, it actually makes perfect sense, and also by the way… we also have the biggest corruption level in entire Europe, the fact that our borders are not guarded by anything literally, err, also you can get a Bosnia passport like that [sound of fingers snapping]. While she focuses on symptoms of corruption, such as drug trafficking and prostitution, she also alludes to an interesting dynamic involving influences originating in the ‘East’. She states that BiH is ‘something like the entrance to Europe’ and that people come from both ‘East’ and ‘West’ at this ‘crossroads’. However, as BiH is part of Europe, the underlying suggestion is that the influences from the ‘East’ cause the high levels of corruption. By explaining that, ‘when you think about the crime rate, it actually makes perfect sense’ she is alluding to the fact that BiH has Eastern influences, which cause it to ‘have the biggest corruption level in entire Europe’. The borders are not guarded, allowing for all manner of elements from the ‘East’ into this ‘Entrance to Europe’.
While the quote above shows general attitudes about corruption in BiH, the issue of corruption surrounds foreign investment more specifically as well. When discussing foreign investments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one male interview
respondent working for an international organisation (to be kept anonymous) explained: They [Arab investors] have a lot of money, you know… So in Bosnia, lots of money during the war was came and gone [sic], and we never saw it. We don’t have solid proof, but lots of these foreign investments, it’s money that is being laundered. Like you find some Arab, you pay
This quote constructs corruption, such as money laundering, as something that is connected to foreign investments, specifically in this case Arab investments. He depicts the process of laundering money as incredibly easy; it only takes finding ‘some Arab’ and paying him a salary in order to cover money laundering. Of course he does not explain the logical details of how this might work, but the suggestion is that Arabs can be easily bribed or used in corrupt schemes, and that they are, perhaps, more corrupt than other investors in BiH. There is a hidden suspicion of investments originating in the Arab world, especially with those who have ‘a lot of money’.
In my interviews with people working in the architectural and urban
development sectors and with people working with government institutions, a recurring theme of corruption in investment and as an obstacle to investment arose. In fact, for large projects, more than one interviewee stated that it is necessary to have strong political connections to build, and that without some political protection, large-scale commercial investments are extremely difficult if not impossible. For example, one female respondent working for a governmental institution stressed that it is nearly impossible to build without good connections and that there are no public consultations in urban development, ‘everything is 100% top-down – no public consultation.’ She also explained that of today’s tycoons in BiH, ‘maybe 70% are war profiteers’. She does not state who these ‘tycoons’ are. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small country and there are few rich and powerful people. Another woman I interviewed, who works in investment in Sarajevo, stated that, ‘big projects require shelter from one of the three main political parties. Everything can be done with the right connections.’ In other words, who you know is more important than how much you own.
Many of my interviewees explained that it is the corruption already existing in BiH that hinders investments from areas of the world that are not considered part of the
‘East’. One interviewee, a man working in urban development, described the situation in the following way:
The biggest impediment to investment in Bosnia is corruption. Most western investors avoid Sarajevo for this reason. It creates confusion, no clarity. The math cannot be applied. It creates unease, and a huge return on investment is needed. Nobody comes here; those that do take a big risk.
Thus, because there is so much corruption in Sarajevo, investors from the ‘West’ believe the risks are too large. That investors from Arab countries would not be deterred by the levels of corruption in investment assumes that for these investors, such a thing is normal or expected. However, another interview respondent who works at the architecture faculty described it in the following way, ‘the eastern world is more tolerant of the administration and bureaucracy in the Bosnian investment process. Americans, for example, would not tolerate it.’ This account is more diplomatic, and does not paint investors from GCC countries as necessarily corrupt or accepting of corruption.
The discourse that foreign investment from GCC countries is tied to corruption also points to who exactly is believed to be the perpetrator of this corruption. It is assumed in Sarajevo that the political elite are deeply involved in economic issues for their own personal advancement, and many people in the city (as will be examined below) implicate the SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije or Party of Democratic Action, a main Bošnjak political party in BiH) and the personage of Bakir Izetbegović, the Bošnjak member of the tripartite presidency who happens to be the son of Alija
Izetbegović (the famous war-time politician). Bakir Izetbegović is a member of the SDA, and on his website, he claims he was the ‘coordinator of the building of BBI Centar in Sarajevo’ and that he ‘organised or significantly helped build mosques in Sarajevo’, including many foreign funded mosques (‘Biografija’,
http://bakirizetbegovic.ba/stranica/biografija).13 For coordinating the building of BBI, Izetbegović received 2,500 BAM (993 GBP) monthly between 2005 and 2006 (Imovina
Političara, http://imovinapoliticara.cin.ba/). Although he clearly has had a hand in
bringing investment from the Middle East, many – including press sources, as will be discussed below – have speculated on his own personal gain from these investments.
To demonstrate the perception of Bakir Izetbegović in Sarajevo, one man working for a governmental organisation in the city explained Izetbegović’s influence in the following way:
You talk about Bakir Izetbegović, and he’s got a fortune around him. The other one is Radončić, the head of the political party SPB. They’re punching each other all the time, mentally, through newspapers through press releases... Every opportunity they get. You hear stories that there are people who have information that will put them both away for a long time. But those people, through fear or because they’ve been paid off, won’t come forward. You have to think that only twenty years ago these characters were the political mouthpieces of murder gangs. The
henchmen of those gangs are still alive. Some of them are in prison, some have been killed by other gang members, but the majority are still alive. Would you go up against somebody like that if you had to live here?
I will discuss the rivalry between Izetbegović and Radončić further on in this chapter. This quote clearly describes the aura of fear and intimidation that surrounds people of great wealth and power in Sarajevo, specifically Bakir Izetbegović. He indicates that Izetbegović is involved in corrupt activities and that ‘there are people who have information that will put them both away for a long time’. However, by using the words ‘murder gangs’ and ‘henchmen’ and by explaining how some of the ‘gang members’ have killed other members, he underscores the prevailing discourse around this personage: Izetbegović is dangerous and would not be afraid of killing those who speak out against him.
Bakir Izetbegović had a stake in the construction of both BBI and SCC, and there have been many rumours and accusations of corruption levied at him for both
13 ‘Bio je koordinator izgradnje BBI centra u Sarajevu…Gospodin Izetbegović je organizovao ili značajno pomogao izgradnju
investments. One of my interviewees, a man working for an international organisation, explained that:
There are rumours that Bakir Izetbegović is behind it [SCC], that he might have a stake in the ownership somehow… We have done a check into Al Shiddi, it is not as dodgy as in the Dnevni Avaz [more on this will be discussed below]. It’s not as shady as it appears. The arrangements – the permits and permission and privatisation – was all completely non- transparent. Izetbegović was definitely involved in this. There is
something dodgy there. Many things are done under the table, no transparency.
Izetbegović and his business practices are associated with ideas such as ‘non-
transparent’, ‘shady’ and ‘dodgy’, and while the construction of SCC is ‘not as dodgy as in the Dnevni Avaz’, Bakir Izetbegović is still characterised as somewhat crooked and unscrupulous.
Many of my field interviews also pointed to Bakir Izetbegović and the SDA as hidden political forces behind foreign investments such as SCC and BBI. For example one man, a waiter working in the Alipašino Polje area of the city stated, ‘there are hidden political motivations, big political motivations.’14 When I asked him who he thought might have hidden political motivations behind the investments, he replied, ‘SDA, the thieving party [lopovska stranka]’. In another of my field interviews, a female shopkeeper in BBI stated:
Yes, yes. There are hidden political motivations, here everything is politically bound, and I think that everything is in the interest… and these large centres, I think everything is beautiful and well-visited, for us it is lovely for the people to use something so beautiful, but behind
everything stands politics and the biggest profit goes in the pockets of the politicians.15
When I pressed her to state which politicians or political parties had hidden
motivations, she answered without any hesitation, ‘Bakir Izetbegović, SDA, we all know
14 ‘Krije, krije… i to veliki politički motiv’
15 ‘Da, da. Krije se politički motiv, ovdje je sve politički uvezano i mislim da je sve u interesu… I ovi neki veliki centri, mislim
that, but not everyone will say it.’16 There is a great deal of fear connected with corruption in Sarajevo and with personages such as Bakir Izetbegović, as this field interview respondent suggests. People are reluctant to talk about who or which forces might be behind foreign investment in Sarajevo. One woman even refused to continue further with our interview after being asked about political connections. Indeed, many seem to fear some sort of retribution from political leader, even when speaking anonymously with me.
Many of my field interviews reflect this fear. One male, Muslim shopkeeper explained:
There are [hidden political motivations]. That means, to you it is a public secret. Everybody alive knows about it being so, but nobody says so because people are afraid of something, I don’t know what.17
Another woman, a young economist, couched her answer in such a way as to not outwardly name any parties specifically. She said:
Of course, of course, everything is political… well, I think it is those who are in power. I would have a lot to say, believe me, but… well, I think about those who are ruling now, about the presidents let’s say, about one head president who has taken the wheel of this state, unfortunately, after his father [Alija Izetbegović] he continued and so on. I hope not much longer [that he will be in power].18
She does not explicitly state that she thinks Bakir Izetbegović is behind foreign investments in the country, but she greatly alludes to it by mentioning ‘those who are ruling now… one head president who has taken the wheel of this state...after his father’. However, she is reluctant to say any more, explaining that ‘I would have a lot to say, believe me’, but she does not, presumably out of fear. Likewise, another female shopkeeper responded that:
16 ‘Bakir Izetbegović, SDA, svi to znamo, a neće svako da kaže.’ 17 ‘To se krije...znači, to vam je javna tajna. Svako živ zna o tome da je to tako, ali niko ne govori zato što se ljudi boje nečega, ne znam čega.’ 18 ‘Naravno, naravno, sve je politički… Pa mislim o ovim što su na vlasti. Imala bih ja puno toga da kažem, vjerujte mi, ali ovaj...pa mislim o ovim što vladaju sada, predsjednicima recimo, jednom glavnom predsjednika koji vodi kolo u ovoj državi, nažalost, poslije svog oca on je nastavio i tako dalje. Nadam se da neće još dugo.’
Political motivations are hidden in everything here. I think that there doesn’t exist anything that doesn’t hide [them]. That is a rarity really… who do I think [is behind the investments]? Uh, I don’t want to respond. I’m sorry, I don’t want to. I think that maybe that is clear to everyone who it is.19
The perception in the city that certain politicians are behind the investments and that they are potentially dangerous, even to non-elites, is quite pervasive.
On the other hand, however, two of my interviewees described this perception as part of the problem when courting investment into Bosnia and Herzegovina. In my interview with Enes Kazazić, the director of South European Investment Company (SEIC), he explained that:
The major problem is our mentality. Here in Bosnia... when we speak about GCC, among Bošnjiaks… that always there might be some bad scenario. Who’s coming? Is it some politically motivated something? You know, I think this terrorism word is always a kind of umbrella. Who is checking whom, you know?
Interestingly, as someone engaged in courting investment from GCC countries, he downplayed any and all talk about politics and corruption. His response indicates that the mentality of the people connects investment from the Gulf region with terrorism, and this is the real reason that people are afraid. Samid Sinanović, the director of Shad Invest, a member of the Al Shiddi group, had a similar response. He said:
Bosnia has always been part of the East and West. They all want to be part of the EU. They would like investors from the West – from
Germany. In their minds, if they are not from the West it is degrading them as part of the West, part of the EU. There are mainly eastern investors. We cannot afford to tell them no.
According to Sinanović, it is the people’s prejudices that are a major obstacle. They want to be seen as a part of the West, which is why the discourses surrounding BBI and SCC have been constructed in such a way as to position Sarajevan identity along the East/West binary.
As many of the quotes above indicate, the perception exists in Sarajevo that corruption has been tied to movements of people, capital and ideas from the ‘East’ or from Islamic countries. People in the city see Bakir Izetbegović as someone who is perhaps outside the law and also the individual who is instrumental in courting investments from GCC countries and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Thus the two things have become entwined in the popular construction of this narrative: corruption and investment from the Arab world. People in the city use the connection to corruption to position Sarajevan identity towards the ‘West’ and towards Europe and the EU. Little discussion of corruption from countries such as the United States of America or
Germany is mentioned, although this undoubtedly exists. By focusing on corruption with respect to BBI and SCC and Bakir Izetbegović, the spaces become contested, especially in terms of the city’s identity.