The influence of the Manchu question on China’s economic development was beyond the financial realm. The fact that the tiny minority was in control of state power delayed and diverted the course of the society at large as Manchu leaders had a vested interest in giving priority to looking after the Manchus. The prominent Chinese officials during the Self-Strengthening Movement were excluded from the center of power. They handled practical issues in their jurisdiction, but had no overarching power that would allow them to make policies to determine the general direction the country was headed in. The ultimate power lay in the court dominated by the imperial lineage members, who happened to be Manchus. Their goal was to perpetuate Manchu rule and protect Manchu privileges.
This was particularly obvious in the case of Yihuan. Between 1861 and 1884 the central governemtn was dominated by Yixin (prince Gong, the Xianfeng emperor’s bother). In April 1884 Cixi reshuffled the Grand Council (junjichu) headed by Yixin. All the members were removed from their posts, and Yihuan
(prince Chun, the brother of Yixin) was replaced as the de facto leader of the new Grand Council. After he assumed leadership in the central government, Yihuan sought to look after the interests of the Manchus. His overall political doctrines were reflected in his saying, to have “weak branches, a strong truck, and firm roots.” In his view the roots included three components: the capital, the Northeast, and Eight Banners. The capital was the center of Manchu rule. When he was in command of the Capital Field Force
(shenjiying), a new banner unit added to the capital banners during the Self-Strengthening Movement,
Yihuan insisted on first arming the capital eight banners with Western style weapons.
In addition Yihuan made an effort to raise banner soldiers’ pay to benefit Manchus in general. When he joined the discussion on coastal defense, Yihuan advocated fortifying the Northeast as it was the place where the ancestors of Manchus originated (Yang 1992). Existing literature suggests that Manchu rulers’ excessive concerns about Manchu interests in the late-nineteenth century were harmful to the entire empire, especially to its economic transition.
The 10 years between 1885 and 1895 provided the best opportunity for China’s industrialization as internally civil wars subdued and externally foreign invasion was in an interim. Subsequently Qing financial status became better. Had the Qing government seized the opportunity to modernize the country, the outcome of the Sino-Japanese war would presumably have been different. However, existing studies indicate that government strategy was wrong and money was spent in the wrong place because of Manchu rule and the government’s policy to preserve Manchu supremacy. Manchu rulers’ attitude toward the Manchu question during the period of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1865-1895) was an important issue. Further examination of the question will help us understand better why China’s industrialization was slow in this critical period.
CONCLUSION
The Manchu question adversely affected China’s industrialization between 1865 and 1895. The aforementioned three decades were the golden period for China’s economic transformation. China’s industrialization began in 1865, yet 30 years later China was behind Japan in all of the important areas of modern development. China’s tardy industrialization was due to the lack of strong and efficient state leadership. The Manchu question weakened the power of the state, drained the state of its financial resources, and prevented strong and efficient state involvement in economic development.
Broadly speaking, effective state intervention took two forms as demonstrated by the Meiji
government: direct governmental investment and policy assistance. The former refers to money invested in modern industries directly by the government. The latter consisted of general industrialization-oriented policies and concrete actions and measures to assist selected industries and enterprises. In general the Japanese government outperformed the Chinese government in all areas. First, the Meiji government’s investments in modern projects amounted to three times the Chinese government’s. In addition, compared with the Chinese government, the Meiji government’s policies at the macro-level covered a wider range of economic, financial, and social issues. Finally the Meiji government took some effective measures to assist Japanese companies, which the Chinese government failed to perform at a comparable level.
Ethnic rebellions in China between the 1850s and 1870s in general, and the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) in specific, severely undermined the power of the state in economic, military, and political terms. Consequently the weakened government was unable to lead China’s industrialization efficiently. Ethnic rebellions, however, resulted from ethnic inequalities created and reinforced by the state. Ultimately, therefore, the state was responsible for ethnic conflicts.
Moreover, the Manchu stipend drained the state of its already-tight finances after the Taiping Rebellion, resulting in insufficient governmental investment in modern industries. The Manchu stipend alone constituted approximately 20% of Qing expenditures between 1865 and 1895. The total sum of money the government spent on the Manchu stipend was seven times governmental investment in modern
projects. Hence it is safe to say that the government gave precedence to the welfare of the Manchu ethnic group over the economic development of China.
The fact that Manchu welfare took priority over China’s industrialization was firmly rooted in the Manchu question. Broadly speaking the Manchu question had two basic dimensions: politically Manchu rule of Qing China and Manchu supremacy in sociopolitical terms. Manchu rule and Manchu supremacy reinforced each other. Manchu rule created and reinforced Manchu supremacy, and Manchu supremacy motivated Manchus to support Manchu rule. The mutually supporting relations between the two resulted from the fact that the Qing empire was based on Manchu minority rule. To perpetuate Manchu rule of the empire, Manchu rulers needed to enlist wholehearted support from the Manchus. To preserve the ethnic identity of the Manchus immersed in the vast Chinese population, Manchu rulers needed to separate the Manchus from the Chinese physically and socially. Manchu rulers established the ethnic hierarchy in the empire, and placed the Manchus at the top.
The Manchus enjoyed sociopolitical privileges given to them by the state. Therefore the Manchus collectively had a vested interest in seeing the perpetuation of the empire. Presumably they offered support to the state wholeheartedly. Throughout the duration of the Qing dynasty, no Manchus rebelled against the state, while rebellions by other ethnic groups were common in the empire38.
Given the symbiotic relationship between the state and the Manchus, it is not surprising that the state not only allocated much more funds for Manchu livelihoods than for China’s industrialization, but sought to continue and reinforce Manchu dominance in sociopolitical domains. The Qing government’s failure to act on the Manchu question prior to 1895 in the way the Japanese government abolished the samurai was due to the fundamental difference between the two social groups: whereas the samurai were a class, the Manchus were an ethnic group which the Qing state most favored. And the Qing state’s failure to reform the Manchu question had a harmful consequence for China’s modernization.
The political developments after 1895, however, rendered the Manchu question obsolete. Pro- dynastic intellectuals and officials suggested reforming it, while revolutionaries advocated subverting the
state. Under increasing social pressure even the government had to face the Manchu question in the 1900s. The move came too late, however, as discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII: THE DECLINE OF STATE POWER AND THE CHINESE SHOWDOWN ON THE MANCHU QUESTION: 1895-1911
This chapter deals with the process through which the Manchu question came to an end in the last decade or so of the Qing dynasty. The end of the Manchu question had much to do with the decline of state power. After China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, state power declined significantly. With the decline of state power, Chinese disaffection with the Manchu question grew increasingly. The Manchu question soon surfaced. The state reformed certain aspects of the Manchu question in the 1900s, namely Manchu-Chinese inequalities in the political and legal spheres. Yet the basic elements of the Manchu question remained unchanged. Under such a circumstance the revolutionaries launched anti-Manchu propaganda through newspapers and magazines published in Japan and Shanghai. Furthermore, revolutionaries organized armed revolts against the government, which culminated in the 1911 Revolution. The revolution brought the Manchu question to an end.