Alteraciones en los niveles de MBNL1 y CUG-BP1 modifican los fenotipos de

How important is O¨ calan to the PKK? By all accounts, the PKK is very much O¨ calan’s creation. Although based in Damascus and the Bekaa, O¨ ca- lan has succeeded in imposing himself on the Kurdish psyche by sheer force, ruthlessness, and single-minded determination. There is no question that he has a genuine following among rank-and-file Kurds, even those who do not belong to the PKK. Indeed, by all descriptions O¨ calan is secre- tive, withdrawn, suspicious, and lacking in self-confidence. He does not like group discussion; his close associates reportedly seem uncomfortable around him. He does not treat others as equals and he often demeans his subordinates in front of others, demands self-confessions from his lieuten- ants, and keeps his distance from nearly everyone.41 _{He has elevated the}

art of self-criticism to new heights. Arguing that the movement started with self-criticism, developed with self-criticism, and that victory will re- sult from continued self-criticism,42_{he has used this notion effectively to}

maintain his hold on the organization and its membership. The lack of pluralism within the PKK ought not come as a surprise given its Marxist- Leninist roots. ‘‘Kurdish ‘Marxism’ in Turkey, like Turkish Marxism itself . . . offered little opportunity for political pluralism.’’43_{Not unlike other}

organizations of its kind, the PKK has been subjected to numerous purges by its leader. This type of structure is not appropriate for the overt political phase of PKK activity. He has very limited direct personal contact with European statesmen of the sort that Yasir Arafat consistently sought to encourage.44_{Constrained by the Syrians, he is limited in the contracts he}

can develop from his Damascus base.

Some Kurdish observers believe that O¨ calan has begun to show consid- erably more maturity, realism, and balance since 1993. This version shows him moving away from ideology toward greater pragmatism, as evidenced in changing PKK positions on key issues ranging from separatism to Marxism-Leninism. He first demonstrated this pragmatism in 1993 when he declared a unilateral cease-fire that was well received by the Turkish public and media.45_{The positive Turkish response was encouraged by}

then-president O¨ zal, who even asked the HEP parliamentarians to attend the announcement of the cease-fire’s renewal. The death of O¨ zal and the subsequent collapse of the cease-fire dashed any hopes of a cessation of hostilities. O¨ calan has again tried, but this time without success, to seize

the initiative by declaring a unilateral cease-fire to coincide with the De- cember 24, 1995, Turkish parliamentary elections.

O¨ calan’s grip on the organization remains an important question. After all, the collapse of the 1993 cease-fire was the result of insubordination: In a deliberate attempt at undermining the cease-fire, a local PKK com- mander in Bingo¨l intercepted a bus carrying military conscripts and killed thirty-three of them.46_{Despite the potential for many more such would-}

be disloyal commanders and the natural handicaps arising from running an insurrection from a foreign capital, O¨ calan has maintained a semblance of coherence and unity. In part, he has managed to do this by instilling a sense of blind dedication among his followers. He has used his aloofness and harshness to create a charismatic image for himself. Should he pass from the scene, the PKK will undoubtedly experience a period of interne- cine fighting until another leader emerges or the movement evolves into a new and unexpected—perhaps less, or even more, violent—form. Here again the future role of the KPE may have a major impact on the form a future PKK takes.

There has been speculation for some time about the absence of any PKK-related violence in the main cities of the country, where hundreds of thousands if not millions of Kurds reside, some of whom are fairly recent arrivals escaping the conflict. Among the reasons offered are the efficiency of the security services; the vulnerability of the daily lives of these Kurds, afraid to get involved in the violence from which they have yearned to escape; the lack of professional PKK cadres in the cities; and finally the control exercised by O¨ calan, who correctly calculates that a major escala- tion of this sort would doom, at least in the medium term, any hope of Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation.47_{In fact, it might trigger the kind of inter-}

ethnic fighting that has not yet materialized in this conflict. That is not to say that soft targets in the cities have not been attacked directly by the PKK. Some attacks, such as the bombing of a railroad station that killed a number of military cadets, created a furor. Other attacks against tourists in Antalya, which shook the tourist industry in 1993, have not been resumed despite periodic threats by O¨ calan. If the government’s military campaign against the PKK genuinely succeeds in the southeast, this option in the cities may then appeal to O¨ calan. More radical members of the PKK may not share this view, but, for the time being, the PKK is not about to disappear from the southeast.

political and diplomatic arm of the PKK into the KPE will in fact impose change on the political leadership of the PKK—if not in removing O¨ calan himself, at least in diluting his influence and pushing the organization in more moderate and open directions by those most prominent and active outside of the Bekaa valley and Damascus. The expansion of legal political activity in Turkey would similarly force O¨ calan to respond to changes he cannot totally control or manipulate.

An important constraining factor in the life of O¨ calan is his host, the Syrian government. As much as this situation shelters him from the Turk- ish military, it nevertheless makes him a client of the Assad regime. While it is impossible to discern the degree of control Syrian officials have over O¨ calan, it is safe to argue that Syrian help does not come without strings attached. The situation makes him vulnerable in the unlikely event that Ankara and Damascus can cut a deal satisfactory to both sides. Although it is hard to see O¨ calan’s being delivered to Turkey by Assad, there was increasing speculation in Ankara that the government formed by Necmet- tin Erbakan would at least request from Damascus that O¨ calan be sent somewhere not adjacent to Turkey’s borders. Erbakan, it was thought, with his Islamic anti-Israeli credentials, stood a better chance of convincing Assad than a traditional Turkish government. Still, not only did his tenure in office not suffice to initiate discussions with Damascus, but as his deal- ings with the Iranians who clandestinely support the PKK demonstrated, it is unlikely that these countries would willingly give up a political cord.

The Syrian connection notwithstanding, the fact remains that for the time being O¨ calan is the uncontested leader of the PKK. Irrespective of the terrorist label that has stuck to him, he has achieved, at least among a significant segment of Turkey’s Kurdish population, a stature that no other Turkish Kurdish personality has reached, certainly not since Shaykh Said.