Broad-scale evaluation of research in HE in the UK dates back to the 1970s. Participation in the research projects and workshops of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/CERI) programme on institutional management in HE performance evaluation, at the time is said to have attracted minimal attention from the HEIs (Sizer, 1988). Future plans would nevertheless be based on these activities. In 1979, the government
introduced the following two ‘requirements and expectations’ that affected the future existence and the direction to be followed by HEIs in the UK (Sizer, 1988; Johnes, 1996):
- Government reduction of public spending, coupled with a move towards a market economy, which influenced institutions to adopt a market-related focus in an effort to seek alternative funding. Government primarily hoped to reduce reliance on government funding and on a secondary note intended to ‘increase institutional autonomy’.
- HEIs were expected to be accountable for the services they provided in relation to resources allocated to them. Sizer (1988) lists some of the variables that would demonstrate accountability. These include; efficiency in the use of resources, effectiveness in the achievement of objectives, strategies and action plans, and responsiveness and relevance to societal needs. In research in particular,
selectivity in the allocation of resources would be an important consideration. Of importance also is the need to improve the quality and excellence of teaching and research.
It should be noted that at this initial stage of planning the UK system planned a parallel establishment of evaluation for teaching and research.
Campbell (Shapira and Kuhlmann, 2003) confirms that the UK is one of the countries in Europe that has been reducing general university funding (GUF)/block grants and attempting to reduce dependency on government funding. This prompted the introduction and increase in the diversity of income to universities. The reduction in government funding together with a process to seek alternative funding may have been intended to guide institutions into
providing teaching and research services that are in line with and relevant to the demands of those who provide resources. Fulfillment of such demands by resource providers would in a way affect institutional mission and the direction of science. Therefore, institutions were required to revise their missions and visions, supposedly in line with the new developments. With such a level of compromise, it is obvious that ‘selective’ funding became an important determining factor in the research assessment exercise (RAE) exercise.
Expectations of the system are that ”institutions of higher education would increasingly have to compete for resources – not only among themselves within the sectors, but also with other institutions within the higher education sector – and must respond to demands for increased efficiency and value for money” (Johnes, 1996:18). Allocations of the research GUF followed the selectivity pattern and after the 1996 RAE, 98% of government research grants were allocated according to the recommendations of the research evaluation exercise (Barker, 2007).
According to Sizer (1988), the culture would change from professional lifelong tenure based on collegial means to an entrepreneurial model. One of the important government
recommended implementation strategies was to calculate and publish performance. This was intended to increase efficiency and to assist government to determine the true level of
demand (Johnes, 1994).
Prior to this new idea, the university sector in the UK was predominantly state-funded (Johnes, 1994) with an academic self-regulation process. The new system was regarded by Bauer and Kogan (1997) as being imposed on the universities. The requirements triggered actions from different funding agencies, especially those responsible for state funding. In the early 1980s, a programme named the SRHE / Leverhulme Programme conducted a study on the future of HE in the country. This, according to Sizer (1988), put performance firmly on the agenda. Bodies such as the Treasury and the Committee for Vice-Chancellors were compelled to plan activities in tandem with performance evaluation. This extended to different academic levels (faculties) in the institutions. This resembles a typical example of what Rip and van der Meulen (1996) describe as government’s extreme steering powers. The move was towards a somewhat prescribed, statutory state system that allowed universities to only control academia.
In the early 1980s, the University Grants Committee (UGC) introduced the reduction of funds to universities (the grant letter of July 1981). This was emulated by the Department of
Education and Science (DES), which reduced research funding to public sector institutions, including universities. This compelled institutions to shift reliance to non-governmental funding, which would increase their research funding substantially. According to Sizer (1988) most organizations that responded to institutional financial demands laid down their rules of accountability in exchange to the assistance they provided.
The 1985 Jarrat Committee Report on ‘Efficiency in Universities’ (Sizer, 1988), the 1985 DES Green Paper on ‘The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s’ and other documents all contributed towards the ‘value for money’ philosophy. Of interest to this study, is the introduction of the UGC’s Research Selectivity assessment in 1986 (the first in the cycle of events) and the publication of its results by the Secretary of State, which
according to Sizer (1988) culminated in the DES White Paper on ‘Higher Education, Meeting the Challenges’ in 1987. The White Paper marked the start of a new era that “pledged” and affirmed the commitment of government to a system of institutional autonomy linked to accountability. This would be maintained through the alignment of institutional missions
with the production of teaching and research outputs, against which performance would be measured.
The following section focuses on the systems that led to the processes of evaluation.
5.3 The evolutionary process
The system of HE funding evolved with changes in government systems. Johnes (1996) attributed the changes to government’s intention to increase the efficiency of the HE sector. This section provides a brief account of historical changes in the system of evaluation and its funding bodies. Initial discussions focus on activities from 1980 onwards, with the
University Grants Committee (UGC) as the main funding body for universities in the early eighties. This body was later replaced by the University Funding Council (UFC).
With the restructuring of HE, which culminated in the abolition of the binary system in 1992 (combining polytechnics, colleges and universities), another funding structure emerged to replace the bodies responsible for the three levels of the UK HE system. Three Higher Education Funding Councils (HEFCs) were separately introduced for England, Scotland and Wales. The HEFCs became important bodies in HE representing Treasury and the
Department of Education. The latter replaced the Department of Education and Science in 1993.
Since the introduction of the research assessment exercise (RAE) in 1986 the UK HE system has been involved in a systemic and comprehensive research evaluation. A second and third exercise followed in 1989 and 1992 respectively. The 1992 cycle was followed by one in 1996.A new cycle in 2001 cycle was followed by a review period and then the cycle in 2008 (Barker, 2007).
Lucas (2004) observed that improvements and modifications occurred from cycle to cycle. The availability of information and the quality of evaluation improved as the evaluation activities evolved. This is an important lesson for South Africa.
Similar to the Dutch model, Campbell (Shapira and Kuhlmann, 2003:98) classifies the UK exercise as Type A model, in which a comprehensive “ex-post” research evaluation covers and addresses all disciplines at national level. Lucas (2004) and Barker (2007) explain the
continuous reshaping and modification of the exercise through continued debate and discussion among universities and policy makers during and between cycles.
Research funding mechanisms are said to have remained unchanged throughout all the RAEs (Elton, 2000). Ironically the funding for teaching and research were treated differently despite the initial plan for similar treatment and the notion that the two core areas should support each other. Elton (2000) and Lucas (2004) conclude that the preference given to research compromised the quality of teaching.