Ambiente de desarrollo del Módulo de Clasificación

As stated in previous chapters, the overall aim of this thesis is to build a discursive structure to explain EU-Russia energy relations. To this purpose, this chapter presented an historical overview of the narratives existing respectively in Russia in relation to the West and Europe, and the narratives existing in Western Europe/West in relation to Russia. In methodological terms, this discussion contributed to establish the historical representations available to the Self to describe the Other (e.g; threat, intrusive, learner, norm-maker/norm-taker/ developed/underdeveloped, equal partner). This constructs the kinds of ‘otherness’ that can occur in a continuum that goes from a radical confrontation to cooperation (e.g. ‘degree of Otherness’). The detection of the mutual and historical narratives used by actors (Self / Other) in their mutual relations serves as a basis to analyse, in the following chapters, how elements of these narratives emerge in the energy policy paradigms in the EU and Russia (layer two).

Starting from the 19th century debate, Russian thinkers have intensely debated the dilemma on where to locate the concept of the ‘West’ in Russia’s identity. As a result, the discursive representations of Russia’s identity came to pertain to the three broad narrative fields of exceptionalism, westernism and pragmatic statism, which alternated throughout history and, as demonstrated, expand in other sub-narratives. As a result, Western Europe is constructed as an intrusive and threatening entity, the ‘equal partner’ or the ‘model’.

Similarly, the second section illustrated the narratives through which Western Europeans have represented Western Europe in relation to Russia. Western Europe/EU relies on the following basic narratives for its self-representation: ‘Europeanization’, ‘Civilian Empire’ and ‘Concert of Europe’. As a result, Russia is constructed as a ‘learner’, ‘threat’, ’equal partner’ or as the ‘land or the future.’

For each of these narratives there is a corresponding view of ‘Europe’ that can be ascribable to the binary distinction between true/false Europe recurrent on both sides.

Importantly, broader narratives and sub-narratives should not be seen as separated. A number of common themes – superiority, sense of mission, cooperation – are reflected in both. As such, although claiming different paths of development, the narratives detected are intertwined and present common themes. First of all, in putting forward their arguments, these narratives have constantly reinforced claims to superiority. As such, in developing their conceptual apparatus, exceptionalist narratives have assigned – from time to time – superiority to the Russian, Slav and Eurasian civilization. Similarly, by indicating the Western path as the model to follow for modernization and by denying Russia’s unique character, Westernisers in Russia implicitly claimed the superiority of Western civilization.

On the Western side, by describing Russia as a ‘learner’ and in a continued transition towards modernization, the West was automatically conceiving itself as a superior civilization. Secondly, stemming from the feeling of being a superior civilization, the exceptionalist narratives – such as Slavophilism and Panslavism – supported the idea of embracing and absorbing other ethnic groups (e.g. Slavs) under a single umbrella. This seems to recall the constitutive element of Westernization / Europeanization ideology, which aims to interfere in and assimilate other civilizations and states by introducing Western standards.

In addition, the key concept of cooperation is another recurring theme that can be found not only in Russian Westernism but also in the neo-Eurasian doctrine and in the West. In particular, although being an exceptionalist narrative, neo-Eurasianism comes to accept cooperation with those countries located in Western Europe on condition that they hold an anti-Western orientation. Similarly, in specific phases of history, the West has recognized Russia as an equal partner belonging to international society and with whom cooperation is possible.

Furthermore, as debate evolved, the messianic principle proved to be a further common feature. Starting from Slavophilism, exceptionalist narratives came to believe that Russia had been assigned a holy mission to rescue the world from the collapse triggered by Western civilization. The aim was to replace the Western principles in what was depicted as an evangelic mission to transfer Russian culture to the declining West and globally. This objective recalls the sense of mission that Peter the Great and the early Westernisers had to westernize Russia through the introduction of Western principles. Likewise, the belief in the universal goodness of its standards and the need to spread

them has been often implemented as a leading narrative of the Western civilization (e.g. Westernisation). As embodiment of the Western values, the EU’s foreign policy (especially with its neighbourhood in the context of the ENP) has also claimed to pursue a mission to spread its own standards throughout the world.

Drawing from this last point, Westernisation/Europeanisation on one side and exceptionalism on the other side have one thing in common: they are two different reactions to two competing strategies of dealing with globalisation. On one side, through the ‘bureaucratic imperialism’ grounded in traditional readings of ‘Westernness’ as synonym of goodness, the EU aims to project its internal order. On the other side, through the promotion of the ‘sovereign democracy’ and a strategy of bureaucratic centralization, Russia aims to protect internal order.422 Recent examples pertaining to EU-Russia relations can elucidate this idea. Faced with the EU’s intention to interfere in its affairs, Putin’s Russia restricted Western dialogue with civil society in Russia, as seen in the NGO law as well as in the restriction for Western companies to access key oil and gas reserves such as Shtokman and Sakhalin-2. On the contrary, through Europeanisation, the EU wants to minimise the ambiguity of its external environment (e.g. Ukraine, Russia, energy security) by extending its own acquis. This kind of ‘bureaucratic imperialism’ is manifest in policies such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA), the Common Strategy on Russia, the Energy Charter, the Road Map for the EU-Russian Common Spaces and the ENP (which Russia did not sign).423

The next chapter will narrow down the focus to EU-Russia energy relations. In particular, the aim will be to map the energy paradigms of the EU and Russia and on this basis, to demonstrate how elements and themes of the narratives detected in this chapter (layer one) are reflected in the EU’s and Russian energy paradigms.

422 _{S., Medvedev, The Stalemate in EU-Russia Relations: Between ‘Sovereignty’ and ‘Europeanization’,}

in Hopf, Russia's European choice, pp. 225-226. See also T., Hopf, Introduction, in Hopf, Russia's European choice, pp. 9-10

423 _{Medvedev, in Hopf, Russia's European choice, pp. 220-221}

This idea of exporting internal law standards to other countries, especially neighbours, recalls the theory of ‘analogia domestica’.

Chapter 4 - Building Layer Two: Framing EU’s and Russian Energy