communications through the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean could be attacked. The region had valuable oil resources and had bases from which an air offensive could be launched by the allies against important Russian industrial areas and communications which would otherwise be out of range. Boase concluded that the Middle East was extremely important to the allied war effort as a whole and of particular interest to Australia. He therefore found it a serious omission that although the Australian chiefs of staff recommended an Australian contribution to the allied defence of the Middle East or Far East, the council of defence made no such recommendation.
Retention of the Middle East area, therefore, may be more urgent and vitally important to the security of Australia - at least in the early stages of a war, than South East Asia: consequently, an Australian contribution to the former area may best help to safeguard the Australian continent.40
The Australian defence committee reviewed the defence discussions of the London prime ministers’ conference on 11 November 1948. The committee summarized the British arguments about the existing international situation. These were that the establishment of collective security through the United Nations had broken down. Soviet policy and aims were a threat to all free nations, who were in danger of being subjugated one by one. Soviet policy, if pursued, would inevitably lead to a clash. And Soviet forces could engage in a land war at any time. The probability of the Soviet Union engaging in a major war before 1956 might be conditioned by economic factors, and, for a time, by its relative air power. If it wished to go to war and felt confident of attaining its primary objectives rapidly, economic considerations would not in themselves prevent it from doing so. The defence committee argued that the ultimate security of Australia in war depended upon cooperation with other members of the British Commonwealth and the United States:
Accordingly, decisions as to the relative strengths of the three Australian services, their composition, the nature and proportion of their armaments, and the material resources which Australia should be able to produce in war should be based on the overall general defence policy and strategy which is likely to be adopted in war, and Australia’s part in it.
40 ‘Australian joint services liaison staff - British Commonwealth defence cooperation’, by A.J. Boase, n.d., CRS A5954 Box 1790, AA.
The committee concluded that in conjunction with the United Kingdom and New Zealand joint service liaison staffs, it should commence an examination of the basic objectives of British Commonwealth defence policy and general strategy, and a suitable basis for the distribution of strategic responsibility and the Australian war effort.41
Chifley made it clear, however, that the discussions between British and Australian defence staffs should not be regarded as committing the government, unless specific authority for a plan had been sought and obtained. And more particularly, he declared that before his government would consider, let alone approve, the plans which the defence committee had been authorized to work on, it was essential to have something more than a mere assurance from the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff that ‘the threat in the Pacific can be adequately matched by American naval and air strength’. 42
Evatt’s department was also continuing its strong resistance to the view that Australia should abandon its internationalist foreign policy and regional defence policy in favour of participating in a global anti-Soviet alliance and more particularly to the view that Australia should make a military commitment to the Middle East. As we have seen, the strategic appreciation of the Australian chiefs of staff was a veiled criticism of the Chifley government’s foreign policy. Essentially the paper had argued that the Soviet Union was the only power with which the British Commonwealth was likely to be at war, and that the Australian war effort should most usefully be deployed by the United Kingdom against a Soviet attack in either the Far East or the Middle East. A department of external affairs political appreciation strongly opposed this line.
41 Defence committee minute 252/1948, Report by defence committee on United Kingdom paper P.M.M. (48)1 ‘The World Situation in its Defence Aspects’, 11 November 1948, CRS A5954/1 Box
1790 AA.
42 Attlee to Chifley, 29 December 1948 and attached memorandum ‘Comments by the British Chiefs of Staff on the major military aspects of Mr Chifley’s letter’, CRS A5954 Box 1627 AA.
The political appreciation dealt with the position of Australia, as a South East Asian country, in the event of a conflict between one or more of the western powers and one or more of the eastern European countries. External affairs argued that one of the most crucial factors for Australia in the event of such a conflict would be the attitude of China. Whichever government prevailed in China as a whole, Chinese long standing ambitions in South East Asia, which were temporarily thwarted by similar Japanese ambitions, would be pursued. In the event of a European war in which China played some part, the involvement of South East Asia was certain, regardless of the character of the Chinese government, and regardless also on which side China aligned itself. Australia, whether directly involved in the main conflict or not, would be no less concerned than during Japanese aggression in South East Asia and the Pacific.
External affairs disputed the argument in defence’s strategic appreciation that China offered no threat to Australia because it was impoverished by many years of war. China always was and always would be impoverished because of the poverty of its natural resources. Its poverty supplied a pressing reason for interest in the vastly rich areas of South East Asia. External affairs pointed out that .in Malaya there was a majority of Chinese and in almost all other countries in South East Asia there was a Chinese minority which was extremely influential. The department argued that whichever government prevailed in China would endeavour to gain control of the resources of South East Asia through these overseas Chinese populations:
Any open conflict between north and south China, or any involvement in a broader global conflict, will lead to increased interest in South East Asia. A communist dominated China, which could result from the present confused political situation in China, and which could follow quickly on the commencement of an east-west conflict, would certainly aim at acquiring the use of the resources of South East Asia, not by military action, as was the case with Japan, but by internal action, using Chinese populations and the already organised political groupings of secret societies. Presumably, too, assistance in arms and munitions, at present lacking, would reach the peoples of South East Asia.
External affairs concluded that the Soviet Union was not the only major power with which the British Commonwealth was likely to be at war because this implied no
direct threat from the Chinese or from the overseas Chinese in South East Asia. Furthermore the department felt that defence’s opinion that the only likely areas of Australian participation would be the Far East or Middle East, ignored the facts of South East Asia. It considered, however, that national developments in India and other South East Asian countries would counterbalance the military threat from China to the security of South East Asia and Australia. A combination of communist influence, working through Chinese nationals in South East Asia and taking advantage of Chinese policy, could threaten the security of the whole area. But the methods used in the initial stages would not be such as could be combatted by ordinary military manoeuvres.
External affairs proposed a long term policy designed to forestall Chinese or communist domination of South East Asia — which it saw as the a more significant threat to Australia’s security than Soviet aggression in Europe. The programme included a deliberate financial and industrial policy to meet the developmental needs of South East Asia; a policy of making available technical, educational, and administrative assistance to the region; consultation with the United States to enliven interest in South East Asia; and the extension of Australian consular posts in South East Asia. 43
The prime minister forwarded the political appreciation to his defence minister in October. The department of defence was extremely hostile to a political appreciation which challenged its own orthodoxies. Defence did not want to consider any other scenario but that of a global war against the Soviet Union in alliance with the British Commonwealth. The strategy must be to ‘beat Russia first’ in the critical theatres of Europe and the Middle East. It did not think that the Soviet Union could advance far into South East Asia while threatened by the naval and air strength of the United States in the Pacific. And China, in defence’s view, was a ‘negligible’ threat to South East Asia. 44
43 ‘Political Appreciation’, 30 September 1948, CRS A1068/T4 DL 47/5/1 AA.
The Chifley government’s concern that there was too much concentration on problems in Europe and not enough on the problems of South East Asia, did not mean that it was anxious to commit Australian troops to Asia in order to fight communism there. In June 1948, the British colonial authorities declared a state of emergency in Malaya, and the United Kingdom government approached the Australian government for assistance. The preservation of order and stability in Malaya was essential to the United Kingdom, because Malaya was the sterling area’s largest dollar earner. As Peter Edwards has shown, the British and Australian governments viewed the Malayan problem differently. The British attempted to portray the Malayan emergency as a communist revolt directed from Moscow. The Chifley government, in contrast, emphasised the link between communism and nationalism in South East Asia, and argued that the spread of communism there was due to a mixture of European colonialism, the denial of legitimate national claims, and poor economic conditions. Consequently it placed more emphasis on non-military methods of dealing with communism in Asia. To scotch a possible British request for military assistance, Chifley declared bluntly on 17 July 1948: ‘there is no question of Australia sending any troops to Malaya’. The government did, however, under press and opposition criticism, agree to supply small arms to Malaya. But later on 28 September when the United Kingdom high commissioner made an informal approach to Chifley on the question of military assistance, Chifley firmly denied the request.45
The distance between government and opposition in matters of foreign policy is well illustrated by the debate on international affairs in February 1949. Evatt reaffirmed that support for the United Nations was the cardinal principle of the government’s foreign policy. The United Nations existed to prevent war, to adjust and settle disputes ‘not arbitrarily but in accordance with the principles of justice’, and to solve international problems of economic and social significance. He rejected the
45 Peter Edwards, ‘The Australian Commitment to the Malayan Emergency, 1948 - 1950’, Historical Studies, 2 2 ,1 9 8 7 , pp.604-16.
notion that there might be a conflict of interest between support for the United Nations and support for the British Commonwealth, since the Commonwealth itself was bound by the principles of the United Nations charter. He argued that wars could be prevented by removing their underlying causes, and that international disputes could be settled by reference to a standard of what was ‘just and right’ rather than to what was merely ‘expedient’. And he dismissed the idea that the North Atlantic Pact was an alternative to the United Nations, arguing that it was merely an adjunct to the UN. He hoped that the proliferation of defence pacts would not lead to a situation in which two great power blocs were ‘struggling for mastery, and without a forum at which they can meet and discuss their differences with a view to preserving peace’.46
Menzies replied on 15 February. He described Evatt’s approach to international affairs as ‘completely theoretical’ and ‘completely legalistic’. He censured Evatt for contrasting ‘justice and expediency, as if justice were some ideal quantity existing at large, and criticizing force and expediency as something to be rejected because they were expedient.’ Menzies used the example of the Berlin dispute as an example of a problem solvable only by the ‘expedient that it has evoked from the people of the western powers.’ Moving to a general view of the world situation, he argued that despite the United Nations, ‘the world is in a ferment and peace at this very moment hangs on a thread.’ Menzies then made a point which he had made countless times before: that if aggressive attacks by a great power were to be restrained at all, they would be restrained, not by the Security Council of the United Nations, but by some other great powers acting together, not under the charter, but in spite of the existence of the charter. Consequently Australia’s major task had to be to build up the strength of the British Commonwealth and of the United States.47
Menzies asked the government what it was going to do about the Soviet Union in Europe. He condemned the intervention of the General Assembly and of Evatt in the
46 CPD, 2 0 1 ,9 February 1949, pp.76-87. 47 Ibid., pp.265-7.
Berlin dispute. The Berlin blockade, he said, was an act of war, which had to be met by the resolute resistance of the western allies. Finally, he asked what the government’s attitude to the North Atlantic Pact was, having perhaps, some inkling of the government’s bitter attack on the policy of Western Union in 1948. 48
Johjr Spender, the Liberal member for Warringah, reinforced his leader’s comments:
The minister for external affairs has thrown into highlight two matters, one that the government’s foreign policy is based solely on the United Nations, and the other that the opposition, which directs itself to the realities of the situation, wants some support other than the United Nations for the difficulties that lie ahead...In my view [Evatt] has been so carried away by internationalism, that either he has lost sight of or is unmindful of the strategic and vital considerations that affect Australia.
Spender argued that if one great power in the United Nations refused to resolve its differences under the settled procedures of the United Nations charter, the whole organisation would fail in its primary objective of preserving peace. Thus the western nations should fall back on defensive alliances: the Atlantic Pact and perhaps a Pacific Pact built on similar lines. The Australian government, he argued, should leave the path of internationalism and direct itself to the vital strategic interests of Australia.49
That the Labor government was determined not to depart from its internationalist principles is illustrated by the consistency of its policy towards developments in Asia. Japan’s easy conquest of Singapore in 1942, its capture of thousands of Australian prisoners of war, and the bombing of Darwin, had inflamed the minds of Australians. The Chifley government, supported by most Australians, resolved that Japan had to be subdued, punished, and rendered unable to menace Australia’s security again.
At the end of the Pacific war Evatt had two major concerns about Japan. First he feared that Europe and Japan would become so absorbed in their own concerns, that
48 Ibid., pp.272-3.