Análisis ambiental

There are two forms of deterrence: Core or passive deterrence and External or active deterrence:

Core or Passive deterrence is the threat with a nuclear strategic response in case of a nuclear attack on the home territory of the threatening nation for instance the Soviet Union.

External or active deterrence is the threat with a nuclear strategic response in case of a nuclear attack on the territory or troops of allies such as member nation of NATO. It is known as active because it involves a clear decision and the willful act on the part of the nation that owns the nuclear weapon. Also, because of its political tendencies, the

term active was used by United States European allies while policy maker in the United States deferred the term extended.

3.6 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence is a strategy and subunit of deterrence peculiar to the Cold War weapon development and how it galvanized the way superpowers approach to diplomatic relations and Cold War tension. ―Nuclear deterrence is dissuading an adversary from attacking by threatening retaliation with nuclear weapons‖, (Kegley and Wittkopf, (2001). Since the emergence of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence strategy has been a major military thrust throughout the Cold War. The strategy strived in a bipolar system dominated by the Soviet Union and United States with the increased number, type and improved methods of delivery. A nuclear deterrent is used to refer a country‘s weapons, when considered in the context of deterrence theory and sometimes composed of a nuclear triad as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States, Russia and the Peoples Republic of China.

The essence of nuclear was succinctly captured by Bernard Brodle, a United States strategic analyst, when in 1946, observed that‖ thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to war. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them‖. According to him ―nuclear weapons in d eterrence should the purpose to pervert their use‖. Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction (MAD).

Furthermore, the theory of nuclear deterrence holds that its efficacy depends on nuclear armed state X being deterred from nuclear attack on nuclear state Y and even non-nuclear armed state Z that enjoys the protective canopy of nuclear armed state Y.

The outcome will be a stand-off between nuclear armed state X an Y.

The trend of nuclear deterrence was precarious in the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States had developed their various nuclear and warned against any first attack would compel a massive retaliation, this also include protection for the nations that are under their influence. The Cold War era recorded an extensive and massive development of nuclear weapons to completely destroy the other which precipitated the development of policies of mutual assured destruction..

Beyond the two Cold War superpowers, other notions developed their nuclear arsenals. For instances, Britain and France developed their nuclear arsenals and maintained a relatively small deterrent forces to avoid depending on the United States and to preserve their status as great powers. Also, because China felt threaten by the

Soviet Union, developed her nuclear arsenals. Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa had a smaller cache of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear deterrence was a dangerous and potentially tragic one and also deeply selfish, irresponsible and lawless, risking all humanity and the planet (Krieger, 2001). During the Cold War, the deterrence forces occupied the top of the scale of preference of nuclear armed nations to prevent the calamity of first strike. Thus, nuclear armed nations were preoccupied with protecting their nuclear forces at the expense of its vulnerable ordinary citizens. However, nuclear deterrence limited a nuclear armed nation from becoming so powerful and not to assume that it can completely overwhelmed another nation with a first strike. It is on this pivot that the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union revolved. First strike, do not mean that one nuclear armed nation actually have the force and capacity to overrun its opponent‘s nuclear forces. Nuclear deterrence is a concept that reveals a high degree of unprecedented uncertainty which escalates and rises, on the one side of the coin while on the other, the possibility of irrationality in time of crisis cannot be

determined.

The philosophy, strategy, psychology and theory of nuclear deterrence has revealed that nuclear deterrence cannot be a stable system as a result of its predictable and unpredictable consequence in other countries. Thus, the security imperative of nuclear arms dictates an endless chain of development for instance, the history of

development of nuclear arsenals indicates that the Soviet Union United Kingdom arsenals were developed as a result of the United States nuclear weapons.

Subsequently, the Soviet Union and United Kingdom nuclear arsenals led to the development, of the French and Chinese forces. The development of India‘s nuclear force was as a Chinese nuclear force. The India‘s nuclear forces led to the

development of Pakistani nuclear forces. In the Middle East Israel was the first to establish a nuclear weapon to give its hostile Middle East neighbours a deterrent force.

As nuclear armed nations are on the increase there is a corrolating increase of uncertainties in the system. Nuclear deterrence is not foolproof nuclear attack , rather, it undermine security, the most feasible proof against nuclear attack is predicated on the elimination of nuclear weapons as ordained in the non-proliferation treaty.

3.6.1 PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

One problem of nuclear deterrence is to determine the efficacy. However, a counterfactual analysis can provide some measure of assessment. This is largely due to the fact that more often than not people in developed world are afraid of war because they recognize the horror of war while others contend that nuclear weapons

had a lot to do with avoiding World War III. Nevertheless, in the Cold War, certain conflict situations such as the Berlin blockade and airlift and the Cuban missile crisis would have escalated into nuclear armed conflict if not for the effects of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, according to Joseph Nye (2003) ― there are still ambiguities about the missile crisis that make it difficult to attribute the whole outcome to the nuclear component‖

Nuclear deterrent is dependent on capability to damage and credibility that weapons will be used which also involves the nature of conflict. For instance, between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the United States have the capacity to attack the Soviet Union but the outcome may not warrant the attack because the stakes involved are low. This brings to the fore the challenges and problems militating against extended deterrence. Also, the problem of credibility leads to a distinction between deterring threats against own country and extending deterrence to cover an ally.

Another problem of nuclear deterrence was self restraint, for instance, between 1945 and 1949 before the Soviet Union developed her first nuclear weapon, only the United States possess nuclear weapons though in small quantity but did not use them. Several reasons such as the small size of the arsenals, they lack understanding of these new

weapons and fear that the Soviet Union might use her large conventional forces to capture all of Europe have been identified why the United States did deploy its nuclear weapon.

Finally, nuclear deterrence raises a moral question - if nuclear war possibly fit the just war model or nuclear weapons could fit within just war theory?