As mentioned above (cf. 2.3.1. and 2.3.2.), many famous politeness theories have been criticised for their disregard of the counterpart of polite behaviour. Although there have also been studies extending the scope of these politeness theories to the area of confrontational communication (cf. Bousfield 2006, 2007, 2008; Cashman 2006; Craig et al. 1986; Culpeper 1996, 1998, 2005, 2008; Graham 2007, 2008;
Hatipoğlu 2007; Kienpointner 1997; Lakoff 1989; Limberg 2008; Penman 1990;
Spencer-Oatey 2002, 2005; Tracy 1990), the number of studies focusing on impoliteness has remained disproportionate compared to the vast amount of studies on politeness. This dearth of research on the apparent ‘dark’ side of social interaction (Austin 1990) is not only telling since any adequate account of the dynamics of interpersonal communication needs to consider both polite and
impolite behaviour (cf. Craig et al. 1986; Culpeper et al. 2003; Spencer-Oatey 2000b; Tracy 1990), but also because researchers have shown that in some contexts conflictive communication is rather common and not just “marginal to human linguistic behaviour” (Leech 1983: 105). These contexts include, for instance, settings such as army training (cf. Culpeper 1996, Bousfield 2008), police-public discourse (cf. Bousfield 2008; Limberg 2008), interactions between traffic wardens and care owners (cf. Culpeper et al. 2003), political discussions (cf. Harris 2001), courtroom trails (cf. Harris, 1984; Lakoff 1989; Penman 1990), family discourse (cf. Vuchinich 1990), doctor-patient discourse (cf. Mehan 1990), adolescent discourse (cf. Goodwin and Goodwin 1990), or fictional texts (cf. Culpeper 1998;
Liu 1986; Tannen 1990).
Contextual factors which have been shown to facilitate impolite behaviour are, for instance, an imbalance of power, since “the more powerful participant has more right to be impolite” (Culpeper 1996: 345), or interlocutors’ conflictive interests in equal relationships with high social distance, as for example in competitions, where everyone’s aim is to win. In relationships with low social distance, on the other hand, the variable affect (liking/disliking) seems to have an impact, since Slugoski and Turnbull’s study (1988) has revealed that speakers care less for their interlocutor’s face when the relationship is one of dislike. And finally, Infante and Wigley’s study (1986) points to genetic factors having an influence in that some people are predisposed towards aggressive behaviour.
Given that scholars of this field come from different theoretical camps, it is not surprising that also with regard to the term ‘impoliteness’ no common agreement on its definition has been reached. The lowest common denominator can be summarised as follows: “Impoliteness is behaviour that is face-aggravating in a particular context” (Bousfield and Locher 2008: 3, italics in original), revealing that researchers at least agree on the importance of context. Yet most scholars would also agree that this definition is insufficient, which has led to many differing elaborations on this term (cf. Bousfield 2008; Culpeper 1996; Culpeper et al. 2003;
Mills 2005; Spencer-Oatey 2005; Terkourafi 2008).
Facing the necessity of deeper and more accurate insight into impolite behaviour, Culpeper developed his well-known model of impoliteness in 1996, which he and his colleagues improved in 2003, until he came up with an incarnation in 2005.
However, since even the enhanced version retained fundamental deficiencies, most notably its previous dependence on Brown and Levinson’s (1987 [1978]) notion of face as well as its retention of the category bald, in record impoliteness, Bousfield (2008) modified Culpeper’s model even further.18 The definition of impoliteness which thereby underlies Bousfield’s (2008) approach is phrased as follows:
I take impoliteness as constituting the issuing of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive face-threatening acts (FTAs) that are purposefully performed:
1) Unmitigated, in contexts where mitigation (where mitigation equates with politeness) is required and/or,
2) With deliberate aggression, that is, with the face threat exacerbated,
‘boosted’, or maximised in some way to heighten the face damage inflicted.
Furthermore, for impoliteness to be considered successful impoliteness, the intention of the speaker (or ‘author’) to ‘offend’ (threaten/damage face) must be understood by those in a receiver role.
(Bousfield 2008: 132) Accordingly, impoliteness only exists if both the speaker and addressee (in a two party interaction) intend and perceive face-threat respectively.19
Further assuming that face is always an issue of interaction and that the ‘positive’
and ‘negative’ face strategies often systematically combine in interaction (cf.
Culpeper et al. 2003: 1560ff.; Harris 2001), Bousfield (2008) restructures Culpeper’s model (2005) along simpler lines. Specifically, he merges the original five super strategies of impoliteness and the “meta-strategy” of sarcasm (cf.
Culpeper 2005: 42) into two main ‘tactics’20 under which the existing linguistic strategies for performing impoliteness can be subsumed. These two tactics are as follows:
(1) On-record impoliteness
On-record impoliteness constitutes the use of strategies to explicitly attack the interlocutor’s face, construct it in a non-harmonious or conflictive way, or to refrain from expected face wants or rights of the recipient, or even a combination
18 For a discussion of the deficiencies of the most recent version of Culpeper’s (2005) model, see Bousfield (2008: 134ff.).
19 Definitions on impoliteness mainly differ in the role they attribute to the recognition of intentions in the understanding of impoliteness. While some researchers, like Bousfield, make the hearer’s understanding of the speaker’s intention the key for impoliteness (cf. Bousfield 2008: 132; Culpeper 2005: 38, 2008: 36), others claim that the recognition of intentions is the basis of rudeness rather than impoliteness (cf. Terkourafi 2008: 70).
20 Bousfield (2008) prefers the term ‘tactic’ to clearly differentiate his approach from the concept of
‘(super)strategies’. However, he points out that both are “unhappy terms” (Bousfield 2008: 152), since in light of their meaning in military service ‘tactics’ are in fact what Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]) misnamed in their approach as ‘strategies’, and the ‘tactics’ he identifies should rather be called ‘strategies’ (Bousfield 2008: 152).
thereof. Due to the context in which these strategies are employed, the aggravation of face is clear and unambiguous.
(2) Off-record impoliteness
Off-record impoliteness signifies the use of strategies to indirectly communicate the intended face-threat by way of an implicature (cf. Grice 1975, 1989). The speaker can hence easily deny to have intended the offence. Yet, given the context in which the strategies are used, the speaker’s real intention “clearly outweighs any others” (Culpeper 2005: 44).
Culpeper’s notions of sarcasm21 and the withholding of politeness are classified in Bousfield’s model under the heading of off-record impoliteness. They are described as follows:
(a) Sarcasm
Sarcasm designates the use of strategies or combinations of them which on the surface maintain or enhance the recipient’s face. In the context in which they occur they are, however, obviously insincere, and thus have the opposite effect, i.e.
threaten, attack, or damage the addressee’s face.22 (b) Withhold of politeness
Withhold politeness denotes the absence of politeness in contexts where it would be expected or even taken as obligatory.
A major advantage of this outlined model is clearly that it is employable alongside traditional (cf. Goffman 1967), culture-specific (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987 [1978]), and more contextually and culturally sensitive (cf. Spencer-Oatey 2002, 2005) concepts of face, making it “an adaptable adjunct to existing models of face”
(Bousfield 2008: 139). Furthermore, the different strategies of impoliteness which have been pointed out in previous models (cf. Culpeper 1996; Culpeper et al. 2003;
Cashman 2006) can all be categorised as one of the tactics described above, which shows the wide range of different means of impoliteness that are captured by this approach. And finally, Bousfield (2008) demonstrates the applicability of his model on empirical data taken from television ‘docusoaps’ or ‘fly-on-the-wall’
21 Culpeper’s (1996) notion of sarcasm is thereby close to Leech’s (1983) understanding of irony.
He nevertheless prefers the term sarcasm, since irony can refer to enjoyment or comedy, while sarcasm is always employed as a means to achieve social disharmony.
22 Similar to Culpeper (1996, 2005), also Bousfield (2008) defines sarcasm as the opposite in functional terms to banter (cf. Leech 1983). He hence calls banter the “Sarcasm’s polite ‘mirror-tactic’” (Bousfield 2008: 152, italics were added).
documentary serials. Future research will certainly have to prove its applicability on other types of data, among which the present project may serve as an example (see 7.2.).