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(ostensibly) experienced, corresponding to the division between the ways in which he is understood in theology.

We have now discussed the most important points at which theistic and monistic mysticism are alleged to differ. We have also seen that Zaehner is not justified in coming to the conclusions which he does. However, it is important to note that there is no fundamental difference in the phenomena experienced by theistic and monistic mystics in respect of those other (.less significant) features which we have not yet specifically discussed.

It is clear that theistic and monisticism are in agreement, not only about isolation, emptiness, and the experience of value, but also on the other features of the mystical experience.

For example, the state of deep dreamless sleep which we earlier claimed was typical of the monist's experience, is, correctly under­ stood, characteristic of the theist's experience also. We must

remember that although deep dreamless sleep was held to be the nearest that ordinary experience comes to the mystical state, mystical

experience was not identified with it. The aim of saying that there is a sort of analogy between the two is surely, for the monist, to point out just how different from the mystical consciousness is the state of ordinary consciousness. And how close this comes to the theists' repeated assertion that the experience which they seek to describe is ineffable 1 In deep dreamless sleep there is an absence of empirical content, including that content which is the conscious awareness of the barriers of selfhood, such as is found in the mystical experience of theists and monists. There is, as in mysticism, a total absence of desire and anxiety. But in this dissolution of the old self, the self is not totally destroyed. It is rather reduced to what Eckhart calls "one little point", and finds its essential nature as an expression

of the Divine Unity.

In both theistic and monistic mysticism the finite individual experiences himself as being absorbed into the being of God, and thereby transmuted into an expression of the Infinite. And this has the further consequence that the mystics (of both traditions) feel themselves to have passed, in their experiences, beyond space and time.

We have now arrived at the end of our comparison between

monistic and theistic mysticism. It was said earlier in this chapter that we would proceed by comparing the religious experiences of those who had made an effort to educate themselves in spiritual matters, without prejudging what counts as a genuine spiritual education. In our comparison of mystical experience as it is attributable to monists with that which is ascribable to theists, we have taken two traditions which are, in their theological perspectives sufficiently opposed to have as widely different ideas about what counts as valid spiritual endeavour as any pair of religious traditions. But despite the differences in form which spiritual education takes in the two

traditions, the awareness which, results from this education (at least when this awareness is heightened to the degree of mystical experience) is strikingly similar in the two traditions. It seems therefore that when an understanding of spiritual matters is sincerely sought, and a great deal of effort is put into the seeking, then despite the precise methods which the seeker has used in his attempt to educate himself in these things, and despite the theological assumptions of his own

tradition, it is most unlikely that he will come to an experiential understanding of God which differs in fundamental ways from the under­ standing of others who have claimed to experience God.

Having established that monistic and theistic mysticism are similar to each other in all the fundamental respects, we have now to

enquire whether there are any other forms of intensified religious experience in which the phenomena experienced are different from those experienced by monistic and theistic mystics.

According to Zaehner, there is at least one other form of mysticism (besides monistic and theistic) which is distinctive and unlike any other form. This is what he calls "nature mysticism". We shall now examine this type of mysticism.

Zaehner is at pains to sketch the phenomenology of nature mysticism, to show that it differs sharply from the other forms. It is possible to pick out, from what Zaehner says on the subject, a number of qualities which he regards as characterizing what he calls the pan-en-henic experience.

Firstly, in this type of mystical experience, the experient feels himself to be dissolved into the phenomenal world. The walls of self- identity fall away, but one is aware of oneself as a being who is not ultimately distinct from the surrounding world. A good example of this type of experience is given by Aldous Huxley in The Poors of Perception in which he reports that under the influence of mescalin he "became" the bamboo chair legs at which he had been gazing.

Secondly, in nature mysticism one feels that one "owns" the

Infinite, a feeling somewhat akin to the feeling of awe and wonder which may be felt in gazing at a scene of great natural beauty.

Thirdly, there is a feeling of time ceasing to matter, a sense of eternity.

Fourthly, this state is discontinuous with ordinary consciousness, and often comes upon people suddenly and unexpectedly.

Fifthly, there is the feeling that matter is "ennobled and sanctified by spirit".

Sixthly, there is a feeling that opposing forces are reconciled, that (seeming) opposites melt into unity.

Seventhly, the experience is accompanied by the metaphysical notion that the nobler and better is always ultimately victorious, by soaking up and absorbing its opposite into itself.

Eighthly and finally, there is in nature mysticism an

experience of elation which seems to bear a close relation to the manic phase of the manic-depressive psychosis.

From this outline of the fundamental characteristics of nature mysticism, it seems clear that this phenomenon is descriptively very different from theistic and monistic mysticism. But we should notice at once that nature mysticism does not meet our "spiritual effort" criterion, and so strictly should not have been selected for consider­ ation in the first place. The monistic and theistic experiences which we discussed previously are characteristically the outcome of a long and arduous struggle to come to an understanding of spiritual truth, but this experience of nature mysticism comes upon people who have in no way prepared themselves.

It is therefore not surprising that this experience is

descriptively different from those experiences undergone by people who have subjected themselves to lengthy preparation and training. Nor does it mean that there is disagreement about what the nature of

spiritual reality is like among the (relevant) subjects of a religious mystical experience. We had to have criteria for deciding whose

experiences should be compared with whose, and our criteria were such as to exclude the range of intense experiences into which nature mysticism falls.

Whatever nature mysticism were found to be like, it would not count against the hypothesis that those who have sincerely sought

spiritual truth in various religious traditions and cultures have tended to have experiences - ostensibly of God, which are remarkably similar to each other. But even if we did have to take nature mysticism seriously, its descriptive features are not, in any case, such as to suggest that spiritual reality as perceived by the nature mystics is utterly different from that which is suggested by monistic and theistic mystical experience. It is most plausibly interpreted as a more limited insight into the same transcendent Being that lies at the root of

monistic and theistic experience.

The nature mystics do not in their experiences identify the ordinary finite world with God, as Zaehner seems to think. It is rather that, in this form of experience, the phenomenal world is

transformed into an expression of a deep underlying unifying principle. It is experienced as a manifestation, an externalization, of God. The difference between nature mysticism and the mysticism previously

discussed seems to be best accounted for by saying that in the deeper mysticism of isolation and emptiness one makes contact with the Infinite source of the differentiated finite world, whereas in nature mysticism one makes contact with the externalized differentiated world, recognized as the work of this source. The world of nature is seen, in this

experience, as a manifestation of the unifying work of the Absolute, but not as the unifying principle itself. Thus William James speaks of his deepest experiences of the phenomenal world in the following way:

"It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity. Not only do they as contrasted species belong to one and the same genus, but one of the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the genus, and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself. This is a dark saying, I know, when expressed in terms of common logic,

but I cannot wholly escape from its