Análisis de los clientes

The return to democratic rule on 29 May 1999, and its ‘consolidation’ four years later with the national elections in April 2003, offered Nigerians a new opportu- nity, not only to elect a reform-minded government but also to exercise some pressure on those they elected to institute effective anti-corruption measures. The election of President Obasanjo seemed to reflect this logic, given that corruption was a dominant theme during his election campaigns. Although Obasanjo had promised an all-out war against corruption if elected, as had other candidates, many Nigerians reasoned that his anti-corruption credentials were far more solid than those of his rivals. Aside from his past record as a founding member of Transparency International, Obasanjo was a long-standing critic of corrupt mili- tary regimes. President Obasanjo himself even acknowledged the role of corrup- tion in his election. During his first post-election speech, he noted that heconsid- ered“this election as a mandate from the people of Nigeria and a command from God Almighty that I should spare no effort in rebuilding this nation. I understand the clear message of the Nigerian people. In giving me their mandate, they have asked me to … restore our dignity … they want me to alleviate their poverty and reduce corruption” (ThisDay, 9 May 1999). In other words, his election was largely due to the public perception that he was the candidate most capable of fighting corruption.

Once elected, Obasanjo moved to justify his reputation as a reformist by roll- ing out a number of anti-corruption initiatives, including the adoption of an anti- corruption law and institution of a specialised anti-corruption agency, retirement of military officers who had held political appointments, review of several pro- jects initiated by past regimes and believed to be tainted with corruption, and in- auguration of dozens of inquiries into the activities of public institutions (see Annex I) (Bello-Imam 2005). Initially, during his first tenure, the President was

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largely isolated in this fight, having filled his cabinet with the old political guard (a move that was widely believed to be compensation for their roles in his elec- toral victory in the February 1999 elections). But following his re-election in 2003, several individuals regarded as ‘committed reformists’ with solid interna- tional reputations were appointed to his government to head key institutions. These individuals included Dora Akuyili (National Agency For Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)), Obi Ezekwesili (Budget and Price Monitoring Intelligence Unit (BPMIU)), Nuhu Ribadu (Economic and Financial Crimes Commissions (EFCC)), Nasir El-Rufai (Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE)), Charles Soludo (Chief Economic Adviser to the President, later Gover- nor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)), and Ngozi Okonjo-Iwalla (Minister of Finance and Head of Obasanjo’s economic reform team until 2006). One common feature shared by these personalities charged with driving the reforms was that they were all technocrats with no previous political affiliation, mainly educated abroad, and/or with substantial ties to major international institutions. Although such foreign connections occasionally raised some eyebrows in Nige- ria, these concerns were brushed aside by Obasanjo, who provided these techno- crats with political shielding. In the years that followed, Obasanjo’s anti- corruption programme benefitted from the presence and initiatives of these per- sonalities.

The Western background of these technocrats or reformers led to a major ideo- logical shift in Obasanjo’s anti-corruption war. Unlike the situation that had ob- tained in the past, when corruption was viewed as a personal moral failure of po- litical leaders and public officials, corruption was now considered as a systemic and structural crisis, resulting from “excessive state intervention in economic and commercial domains” and a “failure of governance”. The new thinking now was that corruption required the adoption of a multi-dimensional strategy, including the deregulation of the national economy and privatisation of public enterprises, reform of the civil service (downsizing and review of recruitment, remuneration, and procurement policies), and legal and institutional reform (including the en- actment of new laws and creation of new regulatory agencies and the strengthen- ing of existing institutions, such as public services, the judiciary, the parliament, and civil society). At the same time, it was recognised that this multi-dimensional struggle did not exclude public reorientation via public enlightenment and puni- tive measures such as arrest, confiscation of illegally acquired assets, and crimi- nal proceedings.

This strategy draws from two of the most dominant approaches or perspectives in contemporary literature on anti-corruption: The market and neo-institutionalist approaches. The former, which is rooted in neo-liberal economic theories, views corruption as largely resulting from excessive intervention of the state in eco-

nomic and commercial domains (Toye 1987; Grindle 1991; Evans 1995). Ac- cording to this view, this state involvement breeds unlimited opportunities for corruption by public officials. The solution to this malaise must, therefore, in- clude structural economic reforms that eliminate state monopolies, discretion, and opacity and that increase transparency in the management of public resources (Klitgaard 1995, 1996; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Kaufmann & Siegelbaum 1997; Ades & Di Tella 2000; Mbaku 2002). The latter, that is the neo-institutional the- ory, underlines weakness or failure of governance and state institutions as causes of corruption. This is why it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of exiting in- stitutions and to put in place new institutions to complement existing ones.